TULLY'S
OFFICES.
IN
Three Books.

Turned out of
LATIN into *ENGLISH.*

By Ro. L'Estrange.

LONDON:
Printed for *Henry Brome* at the *Gun*
in St. *Paul's* Church-yard. 1680.

TO THE READER.

'TIS *hard, me thinks, that a Man cannot Publiſh a Book, but he muſt preſently give the World a* Reaſon *for't; when yet there's not* One *Book of* Twenty *that will* bear *a* Reaſon; *not* One Man *of a* Hundred, *perhaps, that is able to* Give *One*; *nor* One Reaſon *of a* Thouſand

(*when they are given*) *that was the* True Reason *of Doing it.* *The* True Reason (*I say*) *For there's a great Difference, many times, betwixt a* Good Reason, *for the doing of a thing, and the* True Reason *why the thing was done.* *The* Service *of* God *is a very* Good Reason *for a Man's going to* Church; *and yet the meeting of a* Mistriss *There, may, perchance, be the* True Reason *of his* Going. *And so likewise in Other Cases, where we cover our* Passions *and our* Interests *under the Semblances of* Virtue, *and* Duty. *But however, since*

Cu-

Cuſtom; (*the* Plague *of* Wiſe Men, *and the* Idol *of* Fools) *ſince* Cuſtom (*I ſay*) *will have it ſo, that a Man had as good go to* Court *without his* Cravat, *as ſhew himſelf in* Print *without a* Preface; *I ſhall e'en Content my Self to play the Fool too, in ſo* Much, *and in ſo* Good *Company.* (General Dedications *being no Other, then* Faſhionable Fopperies.) *For what can be more* Ridiculous, *than for a Man to Treat* Princes, *and* Tinkers; Coxcombs, *and* Philoſophers; *Men of* Honour, *and* Raſcals, *promiſcuouſly*, all in a Stile?

Now as it is no Eaſie Matter to give a Good Reaſon *for* Writing at all; *ſo it is yet more Difficult to give* That Reaſon *in an* Epiſtle; *which, at beſt, ſtands in need of* another very good Reaſon, *for* its own ſupport. *But* Prefaces, *at the Ordinary rate of* Prefaces, *are wholly* Inexcuſable; *Only an Idle Deal of* Fiddle-Faddle *betwixt the* Writer *and the* Reader, *made* worſe, *by* Care, *and* Peins; *and Digeſted, out of* Vulgar, *and* Pedantique Common-Places, *into one Maſs of* Putid *and* Elaborate Folly. *This Liberty of* Prefacing *againſt*

Pre-

Prefaces, *may seem a little* Unreasonable; *but* Common Scriblers *are allow'd the Priveleges of* Common Strumpets. *One of the Frankest* Prostitutes *that ever I knew since I was born, had These Words the oftenest in her Mouth:* Lord! *(says she)* to see the Impudence of some Women!

To come now to the Reasons *that induced me to the* Translating *of* This Little Book; *I shall* Begin *with the* Excellency *of the* Work it Self; *which has ever been Esteemed, both for the* Method, *and* Mat-

ter *of it*, *as one of the most Exact Pieces of the Kind that ever was written, and the most* Instructive *of* Human Life. *In so much that* Cicero himself *valu'd himself upon This Tract of* Morals, *as his* Master-Piece; *and accordingly recommended the Study of it to his Beloved Son, under* That *Illustrious Character.* Secondly, *as it was Composed in a* Loose, *and* Troublesome Age, *so was it accommodated also to the Circumstances of* Those Times; *for the assert-of the* Force, *and* Efficacy *of* Virtue *against the utmost* Rigour, *and* Iniquity *of* Fortune.

tune. *Upon which Conſideration likewiſe, I have now turn'd it into* Engliſh, *with a regard to a* Place, *and* Seaſon, *that extreamly* needs *it. I do not ſpeak This, as if at any time it would have been Superfluous; but that* Deſperate Diſeaſes *require the moſt* Powerful Remedies.

To give you the Sum of it in a few Words; It is a Manual of Precepts *for the Government of our Selves, in all the Offices, Actions, and Conditions of Human Life; and tending, not only to the Comfort of Men in* Society, *but to the Conducting of* Particulars

lars *also*, *into a State of* Felicity, *and* Virtue. *It is a Lesson that serves us from the very* Cradle, *to the* Grave. *It teaches us what we Ow to* Mankind; *to our* Country; *to our* Parents; *to our* Friends; *to our* Selves; *what we are to do as* Children; *what, as* Men; *what, as* Citizens: *It* sets, *and it* keeps *us* Right *in all the Duties of* Prudence, Moderation, Resolution, *and* Justice. *It Forms our* Manners; *Purges our* Affections; *enlightens our* Understandings; *and leads us, through the* Knowledge, *and the* Love *of* Virtue, *to the* Practice, *and* Habit *of it*.

This

This Treatiſe of Offices, *I find to be one of the Commoneſt* School-Books *that we have; and as it is the* Beſt *of* Books; *ſo it is apply'd to the* Beſt *of* Purpoſes; *that is to ſay, to the Training up of* Youth, *in the* Study *and* Exerciſe *of* Virtue. *The* Foundations *of an* Honorable, *and a* Bleſſed Life, *are laid in the very* Cradle; *and we ſuck in the Tincture of* Generous, *or* Perverſe Inclinations, *even with* our Mothers Milk: *Inſomuch that we may date the greater part of our greateſt Miſcarriages, from the* Errors, *and* Infelicities *of our* Firſt Inſtitution, *and* Education.

tion. *But tho', upon the whole matter, I do Highly approve of the* Usage *of* This Book *in* Schools, *I must confess yet, with Submission, that I am not at all satisfy'd in the* ordinary Way *of using it. For the cutting of it out into* Particles, *here and there a* Chop, *makes it a* Les-son, *to the Boys, rather of* Syntax, *then* Morality; *beside the* prejudice *that it suffers under the Trivial name of a* School-Book; *and the* disgust *which naturally continues with us, even when we are* Men, *for that which we were* whipt *for, when we were* Boyes.

Now

Now the Matter of this Book being so Excellent; and truly the Latin of it hardly Ciceronian; it should be our busines rather to inculcate the Doctrine then the Stile; and yet in such manner too, that the One may be Attended, without Neglecting the Other. And This may be effected to the Common Benefit of the Schollar, in Both Kinds; by, First, Reading, and Expounding These Offices, Whole to him, in English, before he be put to Hack, and Puzzle upon them by Snaps in the Original; the One Facilitating, and Preparing him for the Other. Let him be,

be, First, *and in his* Mother-Tongue, *instructed in the* Principles *of* Moral Duties; *and he shall then with the more* Ease, Profit, *and* Delight, *take the same Notions down in* Latin, *and Digest them. Whereas in beginning with the* Latin, *the* Pupil *has little more to do, then to bring together the* Nominative Case *and the* Verb, *without either* Understanding, *or* Heeding *the main* Scope, *and* Intent *of the* Book.

I might here entertain the Reader with Twenty Stories of the Interruptions *I have met with, in the Course of* This Translation; *how it has been only*

only the Work of Broken Hours; *and I might plead* These Distractions *in excuse of all its* Inequalities, *and* Defects. *But such as it is*, Plain, *and* Simple, *I do here present it to the* Publique, *without either* Vanity, *or* Complement: *and, I hope, without giving unto any sort of* Reader *any Just Cause of* Compleint. *For* He that does not like it, may let it alone, *and there's no Hurt done.*

TULLY's OFFICES.

The First BOOK.

ALTHOUGH, after Twelve Months spent in the School of *Cratippus*, and That at *Athens* too, you cannot (my Son *Marcus*) but be abundantly instructed in the Precepts, and Institutions of Philosophy, by reason of the Great Authority of the *Master*, as well as of the *Place*; the One, for *Erudition*, the Other for *Example*: I am yet of Opinion, that you shall do well, nevertheless, to take the same Course in *Your* Studies, that I have done in *Mine*, and to mingle your *Latin* with your *Greek*; as a Method which I have ever found very much Con-

'Tis a great Advantage, Good Institution, and Good Example.

Greek and Latin, Rhetorique and Philosophy, do well together.

Conducing to the Bus'ness, both of an *Orator*, and of a *Philosopher*: Beside that it will give you the Command, indifferently, of Both Languages. In This Particular, I am perswaded that I have done my Country-men no small Service; and that not only those who have no Skill at all in *Greek*, but even the Learned Themselves will acknowledge, that I have in some sort Contributed to the Advantage, both of their *Eloquence*, and *Judgment*. Wherefore, as you have the greatest Philosopher of this Age for your Master, you shall also Learn of him as long as you please; and so long, certainly, you ought to desire to Learn, as you find your self the Better for it. Upon the Reading of my Writings, you will see a great deal in them of the *Peripatetique*, (for I am a Follower of *Socrates*, and of *Plato* Both.) As to the Matter it self, you are at liberty to use your Own Judgment; but yet the Acquainting of your self with my Stile, will undoubtedly be of some Use toward the Improvement of your *Latin Tongue*. And let me not in This be thought Arrogant neither; For, allowing my self the meanest of many *Philosophers*, I have yet some Right, me thinks, after an Age spent upon This Study, to value my self upon all the Parts of an *Orator*; as *Propriety*, *Perspicuity*, and the *Flowers*, and *Ornaments* of *Well-speaking*. Wherefore I must Earnestly recommend unto you the Perusal, not only of my *Orations*, but likewise of my *Philosophical Discourses*, which are now swell'd almost to the Bulk of the Other: and that you will read them with Intention, and Care: for tho' there may be,

* *Cicero* Half a *Peripatetique.*

A better Orator, than Philosopher.

be, in the Other, a greater Force, and Dignity, yet This ſmooth, and temperate Mixture is not to be neglected. Among the *Greeks*, I have not found any Man that has Succeſsfully apply'd himſelf to the Language of the *Bar*, and to this gentle way of *Argumentation*, both at once; unleſs I ſhould reckon *Demetrius Phalereus* for one who was indeed a *ſubtle Diſputant*, no very Powerful *Orator*; but then ſuch a Vein of Sweetneſs with him, that a Body might imagine *Theophraſtus* had been his Tutor. For my Own part, I have labour'd in Both theſe Kinds; and with what Effect, let the World judge. *Plato*, I believe, would have made a *Ready*, and a *Weighty Pleader*, if he had bent his Mind to't: And *Demoſthenes*, a *Queint*, and a *Polite Philoſopher*, if he would but have treated of, and ſtuck to what he had from *Plato*. And This was the Caſe alſo, of *Ariſtotle*, and *Iſocrates*; they were both of them fond of their Own Way, and ſlighted one another.

None of the *Greeks* Excellent in Both Kinds.

BUT being reſolved to Write ſomewhat to you at preſent, and More, Hereafter; I have made it my Choice to begin upon That Subject, which I look upon to be moſt accommodate to your *Age*, and beſt becoming the Authority of a *Parent*. There are many Profitable, and Important Points in Philoſophy, which have been accurately, and copiouſly handled by divers Learned Men: But that which I take to be of the Greateſt Latitude, falls under the Head of *Offices*, or *Duties betwixt Man and Man*; whereof, we have many

His Reaſons for the Choice of This Subject.

Precepts, and *Traditions* transmitted to us from our Fore-fathers. For there is no Condition of Life, either *Publique*, or *Private*; from *Courts of Juſtice*, to *Particular Families*; either *Solitary*, or in *Society*; but there is ſtill a place for *Humane Duty*: And it is the *Well*, or *Ill diſcharging of This Office*, that makes our *Character* in the World, either *Glorious*, or *Shameful*. And This is the Common Theme too of all Philoſophers; for who ſhall dare to Uſurp That Sacred Name, that never preſcrib'd Rules for the Government of Life? But there are ſome Doctrines yet, that render theſe Offices wholly Vain and Uſeleſs; upon a Miſtake concerning the *Ends* of *Good*, and of *Wicked Men*: For whoſoever phanſies any Poſſibility of ſeparating the *Supreme Good*, from *Virtue*, That Man can never be either a *Friend*, or a *Juſt*, or a *Generous Perſon*, upon *That Foundation*. (That is to ſay, ſo long as he agrees with himſelf, and without attending to the Dictate of a better Nature.) Can any Man be *Brave*, that makes *Pein* the worſt of *Evils*? or *Temperate*, that makes *Pleaſure* the *Sovereign Good*? This is ſo clear, that it is not worth a Diſpute; beſide that I have expreſly diſcours'd upon it in another place. The Patrons of theſe Poſitions muſt Contradict themſelves, if they will pretend, in any ſort, to intermeddle in This Matter: For there can be no Sound, Stable, and Natural Principle of Duty erected upon any Other Foundation, than This; That *Virtue is Only, or, at leaſt, Chiefly deſirable, for its proper ſelf*. Wherefore the *Stoiques*, *Academiques*, and *Peripateticques*, were much in the Right, in This

He taxes the *Epicureans*.

Nothing deſirable for it ſelf but Virtue.

This Particular; as the Whimsies of *Aristo*, *Pyrrho*, and *Herillus*, are long since out of Doors: Not but that They had as much Right as Other People, to a Freedom of *Debate*, if they had but left us in a State, or Capacity of *Election*; without Cutting off the very Means of any Correspondence at all with *Humane Duties*. Therefore at This Time, and in This Question, I shall follow the *Stoiques*; not as an *Expositor*, but (after my Usual Custom) I shall draw as much Water at their Well as I think fit, and then make use of it according to my Own Discretion.

BEING in this Book to treat of the Offices or Duties of Mankind, it will be proper, in the First place, to define what is intended by the Word *Office*; (a thing omitted by *Panetius*, which I wonder at:) For *all Reasonable Propositions ought to be introduced by a Definition*; for the better understanding of the Point in Debate. All Disputes should Begin with a Definition.

OF *Duties*, or *Offices*, there are *Two Kinds*; the *One* respects the *Ends of Good Men*; the *Other* consists in certain *Rules*, and *Precepts* to be apply'd to the *Use*, and *Conduct of Humane Life*. Under the Former, are These Questions: *Whether All Offices be perfect, or not? Whether One Office be Greater, or Less then Another?* And *What Offices are found to be of the same Sort, and Degree?* But those Offices which are deliver'd to us by Precept, tho' they have a regard also to the Life of Good Men, yet it does not so much appear; because they seem A Division of *Offices*.

to be rather a Provision for the Ordering of Life in *Society.* These are the Offices which we shall Discourse of in this Book. There is also *Another Division* of *Offices*; some are call'd *Middle*, and *Imperfect*; others *Perfect*; We may call the *Latter*, a *Right*, (according to the *Greek* word Κατόρθωμα) and the *Other*, a *Common Office*, (Καθῆκον) defining *That* to be *Perfect* which they call *Right*, and *That* to be a *Middle Office*, *when a Man may give a Reasonable Accompt for the doing of it.*

Deliberation, according to *Panætius*, under Three Heads.

IT is Natural to *Deliberate*, before we *Resolve*; and *Panætius* reduces the subject matter of *Deliberation* into *Three General Heads.* The *First* Question is, Whether the thing *deliberated* upon, be *Good*, or *Evil?* wherein several Men are many times of several Opinions. The *Second* Enquiry or Consult refers to the *Ease*, *Pleasure*, or *Convenience* of *Life*; as *Estate*, for the Purpose; *Wealth*, or *Power*; by which we are enabled to be helpful, both to our selves, and our Friends: Whether the Matter in debate be *convenient*, or *not?* And This Question is carry'd by the Appearance of *Profit.* The *Third* Point of *Deliberation*, lies in a Case, where the *Honest* and the *Profitable* come in *Competition.* For when *Utility* drives *One Way*, and *Virtue* invites us *Another*, there follows a *Distraction of Mind*, and a dubious *Anxiety* of *Thought.* It is a great failing to leave out any thing in a *Division*; and yet there are Two things omitted in This. For the Question is not only Whether a thing be *Honest*, or *Not*, but where there are *Two things Honest*,

Cicero makes Five.

Honest, before us, which is the *Honester?* and of *Two Profitables*, whether is the more *Profitable?* So that his *Three Branches* must be *extended* to *Five: First*, the *Concurrence* of *Two Good Things*; *Secondly*, That of *Two Profitables*; and *Lastly*, *Both* of them in *Comparison*. Of which in Order.

Self-love is Natural.

ALL Living Creatures are Originally mov'd by a Natural Instinct, toward the means of *Self-Preservation*: As the *Defence* of their *Lives*, and *Bodies*; the *Avoidance* of things *hurtful* to 'em; the *search*, and *provision* of all *Necessaries* for Life; as *Food*, *Shelter*, and the like. It is likewise Common to them All, the appetite of Propagating, and Continuing their *Kind*; with a Certain Care, and Tenderness for their *Issue*. Now betwixt a *Man*, and a *Brute*, there is eminently This Difference. The *One* is carry'd on by *sense*, and to That only which is *present*; with little or no regard to what is either *past*, or *to come*: whereas the *Other*, by the Benefit of *Reason*, sees the *Consequences* of Things; Their *Rise*, and their *Progress*; and couples together, *Causes*, and *Effects*; compares *Resemblances* of *Times*, *Actions*, and *Events*; tacks the *Present*, to the *Future*; and so taking in his whole Life at a View, he prepares all things for the Use, and Comfort of it.

The Difference betwixt *Instinct*, and *Reason*.

The Seeds of Justice.

It is by Force of the same *Reason*, that *Nature* makes one Man a *Friend* to Another; that she moves us to the Love of *Communication*, and *Society*; that she implants in us a particular *Affection* to our *Children*, and dictates to us

Liberality.

the *Neceſſity* of *Communities*, and *Councils*. This is it that puts us upon providing for Food, and Clothing; and not for our ſelves alone, but for our Wives, our Children, our Friends, and for all thoſe that are under our Protection. This Impreſſion raiſes great Thoughts in us; and fits us for Action: but there is nothing ſo *Appropriate*, and *Peculiar* to *Mankind*, as the *Love*, and *Faculty* of Tracing out the Truth. Inſomuch, that we are no ſooner at Liberty from Common *Cares*, and *Buſineſs*, but our Heads are preſently at work upon ſomething to be either *ſeen*, or *heard*, or *underſtood*; accompting upon the knowledge of things *wonderful*, and *hidden*, as a *neceſſary Ingredient* into a *Happy*, and a *Virtuous Life*. From whence may be drawn this Concluſion, That *whatſoever is* True, Simple, *and* Sincere, *is moſt congruous to the Nature of Man*. This love of *Truth* is accompany'd with a deſire of *Rule*; ſo that a *Generous and Well-qualified Mind*, will never be brought into *Subjection*, unleſs either for *Learning*, or *Inſtruction* ſake; or in Submiſſion to a *Juſt*, and *Lawful Governour*, for the *Common Good*. This Elevation begets a Contempt of Fortune, and a Dignity of Spirit. And it is no ſmall matter neither, the power of Reaſonable Nature even in This reſpect; that *Man alone* underſtands *Order*; the Bounds of *Decency*, in *Words*, and *Actions*, and the Terms of *Moderation*: That *only Man* is affected with the *Beauty*, the *Gracefulneſs*, and the *Symmetry* of *Viſible Objects*. Now if *Nature*, and *Reaſon*, take ſuch Care to convey the *Images*, even of *Senſible Things*, from the

Prudence.

Magnanimity.

Modeſty and Temperance.

Synonima

the *Eye*, to the *Mind*; how much a greater Value must she set upon the *Grace*, and *Constancy* of our *Manners*; and the keeping such a guard upon all our *Words*, and *Deeds*, that no *Unmanly* thing, not a *loose Syllable*, or *Thought* escape us? This is the Composition of that *Honesty* we look for, which is never the less Venerable, for being little Esteem'd: For without any approbation from *abroad*, the whole earth cannot yet hinder it from being praise-worthy in its own Nature. Oh! my Son, *Marcus*, we may fashion to our selves some feint *Idea* of *Virtue* or *Wisdom*; but if it could be presented to our *Eyes* in its *Genuine Lustre*, how should we be *transported* (says *Plato*) with the Love of it?

The Four Cardinal Virtues, and the subject-matter of each.

THERE is not any Virtue whatsoever, but arises from *One*, or *Other*, of *these four Heads*; and consists either, First, in the *search*, and *perception* of the *Truth*; or, Secondly, in the Conservation of *Humane Society*; giving every man his *due*; and *keeping faith* in all *Promises*, and *Contracts*; or, Thirdly, in the *Greatness*, and *Force*, of a *Brave*, and *Invincible Courage*; or, Fourthly, in the *Order*, and *Measure* of all our *Words*, and *Actions*; according to the Rules of *Modesty*, and *Temperance*.

Distinct Duties in a Complication of Virtue.

NOW though these *four Virtues* may be *Complicate*, and *Link* together, there are yet certain *distinct Duties*, that issue severally from each of them: As the Scrutiny and Bolting out of a *Truth*; from *Prudence*, which is a *Faculty* particularly appertaining to *that Virtue*: For he that makes the best judgment of the *Truth* of

Prudence searches the Truth of Things.

of Things; he that moſt readily finds the *way* to't; and gives the beſt account of the *Reaſon* of it, we conclude him, without all diſpute, to be the wiſeſt Man. So that effectually, the proper *Subject* of This Virtue, is *Truth*: But the Buſineſs of the *Other three Virtues*, is, To procure and maintain *Neceſſaries* for the Commodity of *Life*; the upholding of *Communities*, and *Society*; and to ſhew the Dignity of the *Mind*, as well in the *Communicating* of our *Fortunes*, as in the *Acquiring* of them; and more yet (if there ſhall be occaſion) in the *deſpiſing* of them. But *Order*, *Conſtancy*, *Moderation*, and the like, require ſomthing of *Action*, in concurrence with the Operations of the *Mind*: And he that would acquit himſelf in the Courſe of his Life, with *Reputation* and a good *Grace*, muſt obſerve *Order*, and *Meaſure*.

Juſtice ſhews it ſelf in Society.

Fortitude in the Contempt of Difficulties.

Temperance in Order and Meaſure.

A Decorum in the Congruity of all.

Prudence is a Natural Virtue.

OF theſe *Four Parts*, into which we have divided the *Nature*, and the *Power* of *Virtue*; that which concerns the diſquiſition of *Truth*, holds moſt affinity with the *Soul* of *Man*. We are all of us, both *drawn*, and *led* to a deſire of *Knowledge*; and every man values himſelf upon being *wiſer* then his *Neighbor*; but on the other ſide, to *Fail*, to *Wander*, to be *Ignorant*, and to be *deceived*, we look upon as a wretched, and a reproachful thing.

Have a care of Two Miſtakes.

Credulity, and

IN the purſuit of this moſt Natural Virtue, we muſt take heed of *Two Miſtakes*: *Firſt*, the taking up of Things upon *Truſt*; and flattering our ſelves, that we *know more*, then effectually we *do*. He that would keep

keep clear of this Rock, (as every man ſhould endeavor it) muſt diligently attend his Buſineſs, and allow himſelf time to conſider of it. The *Other* is the beſtowing of more *Pains* and *Study* upon things that are *obſcure*, *hard*, and *ſuperfluous*, then the Matter is *worth*: whereas by avoiding theſe Errors, and employing the ſame application upon profitable Knowledge, and the ſtudy of Virtue, a Man gains to himſelf deſerved Commendation. We have heard of *Cajus Sulpitius*, for his *Aſtrology*; of *Sextus Pompeius*, for his *Geometry*; and of other perſons eminent for *Logique*; and *Civil Law*; which Sciences are all of them exerciſed in the Inveſtigation of *Truth*; and yet for a man to divert himſelf, by theſe Studies, from *Common Offices*, and *Buſineſs*, is againſt the *Nature* of *Humane Duty*. For the Excellency of Virtue lies in *Action*; but yet not without Intervals; for we muſt Work, and Reſt, by Turns. Not that the *Mind* is ever *Idle*; but ſtill in a Conſtant Agitation of *Thoughts*, even when the *Body* is moſt at *Repoſe*: and all the *Motions* of it are apply'd either to the *deliberating*, and adviſing upon things *Honeſt*, and tending to a *good* and *happy life*; or upon the Acquiring of *Wiſdom*, and *Knowledge*. And ſo much for *Prudence*, which is the *firſt Fountain* of *Virtue*. Curioſity.

OF the *Other Three Virtues*, we find That to be of the largeſt extent, which directs the Ordering of Men in *Society*: and in a kind of *Community* of Life. Of This, there are *Two parts*; *Juſtice*, which is the more *Glorious* Juſtice and Liberality.

Virtue,

Virtue, and entitles us to the very Name, and Character, of *Good men*; and *Beneficence*, which we may otherwise call *Liberality*, or *Bounty*.

The Duties of Justice.

The first Duty of *Justice* is *This*; *That we hurt no man*, unless provoked to it by an *Injury*, and in our Own *Defence*. We are then to *distinguish*, betwixt things *Common*, and *Particular*;

The Bounds of it by the Civil Law.

and to use them accordingly: Not that any thing is *Private* in its *Own Nature*; but as it becomes so, either by *Antient possession*, as *appropriated* by the *first Occupant*, or by *Conquest*, upon the right of *Arms*; or else by *Law*, *Agreement*, *Condition*, or *Lott*. From hence comes the Field *Arpinas*, to be called *Arpinatium*, and *Tusculanum*, to be called the Field of the *Tusculanes*; and in like manner is it of *Private Possessions*. Now since *Custom*, and *Usage*, have rendred many things *Private*, which *Nature* made *Common*; let every man quietly enjoy his *Lot*; and be reputed an Enemy to the *Publique*, if he attempt any thing *beyond* it. But because (as *Plato* says singularly well) *we are not born for our selves alone, but for our Country, our Parents, and our Friends*: and with the *Stoiques*, that the *Earth*, and all the *Productions* of it, were Created for the Use of *Man*; and *Man* only for *Mans* sake begotten; that one might be helpful to another: What can we do better then to *follow*, where *Nature* is our *Guide*. To lay *Common Benefits* in *Common*; and by an *Intercourse* of *Good Offices*, as *Giving*, and *Receiving*; by *Arts*, *Industry*, and all our *Faculties*, to Incorporate *Mankind* into One *Society*.

the Field of the Arpinates

THE

THE Foundation of *Justice*, is *Faith*; That is to say; a *Firmness*, and *Truth* in our *Words*, *Promises*, and *Contracts*. The *Stoiques*, that are great *Etymologists*, will have *Fides* to be as much as *Fias*, And that it is therefore called *Faith*, *quia fit quod dictum est*; because that which is said, is done. This may seem to be far fetch'd; but however, we have taken the Freedom to apply it. A forced *Etymology* of *Fides*.

THERE are Two sorts of *Injustice*: *One* is the *Immediate* doing of an *Injury*; and the *Other is*, the *not protecting*, or *defending* the *Injur'd person*; for so much as in us lies. For he that *Injuriously* offers Violence to any Man, either in his *Rage*, or any other Passion whatsoever, may be taken to be in some degree, constructively, a *Murtherer*; and he that does not his best, to *save* his Neighbor from *harm*, and to keep off the *Blow*, is as well to blame (tho' not so much) as the Deserter of his *Parents*, his *Friends*, his *Country*, or his *Companions*. Now there are many *Injuries* done us upon *Set purpose* to *hurt* us; which arise yet from Fear; as when he that watches to do Another man mischief, does it upon prevention, for fear the Other should hurt him. But the greater Part of Injuries are done with a design to compass something we have a mind to: wherein *Avarice* has a very great share. As to the Matter of *Riches*, they are desir'd, partly for our *Necessities*, and partly for our *Pleasures*. The desire of *Money* in *great Minds*, is to make an *Interest* by it; and to get into our Power, the means of obliging. It was the Two sorts of Injustice. The Injurious Aggressor. And the Deserter. An Injury out of Fear. Avarice. Magnificence.

Ambition. the saying of *Crassus*, that *He that would be Uppermost in a Commonwealth, could never have money enough, till he was able to maintain an Army at his own Charge.* There is a *pleasure* also, in a *Splendid*, and *Magnificent Appearance*; *rich Furniture*; and Men take delight to live in *Reputation*, *Glory*, and *Plenty*; which begets an Insatiable Thirst of *Mony* to *maintain* it. And yet we are not forbidden to *advance*, or *encrease* our *Fortunes*; provided it be done without *wrong* to *Another*; and by *Fair means*. But Men are apt to forget the *Rules*, and *Measures* of *Justice*, when they come once to be transported with the desire of *Empire*, *High Places*, and *Titles*. It goes a great way, that saying of *Ennius*. *There is no Faith, or Fellowship in Empire.* 'Tis a hard matter to preserve *Friendship*, and *Agreement*, in a Case where there are *many Competitors*, and but *one* can *succeed*: which manifestly appeared in that Tempest which *C. Cæsar* lately brought upon the Government; who confounded Heaven and Earth, and overturn'd all Laws Divine, and Humane, for the compassing of that Power which he vainly propounded to get wholly to himself. And great pity it is, that this Inordinate desire of *Honor*, *Dominion*, *Power*, and *Glory*, does for the most part infest the most Famous Wits, and the largest Minds: so that an Error in this Case, is the more to be avoided.

Luxury.

Difference of Injuries. NOW in all *Injuries*, there is a great difference betwixt that which is done upon the *Sudden*, and in *Hot Blood* (which is Commonly

ly but Short, and Tranſient) and that which is done upon *fore-thought*, and *Council*, for thoſe in a *heat*, are much lighter then thoſe upon *preparation*; and this ſhall ſuffice of *Injuries, offer'd*, or *done*.

Injuries of Omiſſion; and the Cauſes of them.

NOW why we do not *Protect*, and *Defend* the *Oppreſſed*, but abandon our *Duties*; there may be ſeveral Reaſons. We are not willing to be at the *Charge*, or *Trouble*; we are loth to make *Enemies*; or it may be, we are *negligent*, *lazy*, *ſluggiſh*, taken up with *particular Studies*; or hinder'd by *Buſineſs*, and This makes us leave thoſe expos'd to Ruine, whom it is our Duty to preſerve. Wherefore we muſt take heed, not to reſt upon that which *Plato* obſerves of the *Philoſophers*; as if the *ſtudying* and *endeavouring* to find out the *Truth*, the *vilifying* and *deſpiſing* of the things that moſt Men vehemently *deſire*, and *quarrel about*, entitled them preſently to the Character of *Honeſt Men*: Not conſidering, that while they are ſo *juſt* on the *One ſide*, as to *wrong no Body, themſelves*; they are yet ſo *unjuſt*, on the *Other*, as to leave *Other People* to *do* it: And ſo rather than quit their *Studies*, they forſake their *Duties*, and their *Friends*, whom they ought to defend. And therefore (ſays he) they would have nothing to do with the *Community* it ſelf, if they were not compell'd by Force: A Thing which ought rather to be done, by *Good Will*, and by *Choice*. For it is not the *Quality* of the *Act*, let it be never ſo *right*, but the *Intention* of it, that makes the *Virtue*. There are ſome, that either for *ſaving* of their *Own Stake*, or

Expence.
Fear.
Sloth.
Buſineſs.

out

out of an *Averseness* even to dealing with *Mankind*, cry, *Let every Man look to his Own Business; I meddle with no Body*; And all this, to get the Reputation of *Harmless People*. These Men, while they *shun One Injustice*, ~~they~~ *fall* into *Another*. For he that contributes neither *Study*, *Labor*, nor *Fortune*, to the *Publique*, is a *Deserter* of the *Community*. Now these *Two sorts* of *Injuries* being laid down, together with the *Causes* of them; and having stated, beforehand the *Bounds* of *Justice*, it will be no hard matter to assign unto every *Person*, and *Occasion*, its *proper Duty*, if we be not over partial to our selves: but in another bodies Case, it is quite Another matter: Although *Terence*'s *Chremes* will have every *Individual* to be concern'd in the *Common Interest* of *Mankind*: But yet being more sensible, and quicker-sighted in our Own Concerns, then for the Good, or Evil that befals others; (which we look upon as more Remote) we pass upon the One, and the Other, (tho' in the very same Case) a quite Different Judgment. It is good Advice therefore, to forbear coming to a *Resolution*; where we *doubt* whether the thing be *good*, or *bad*. For the *Right* is as Clear as the *Sun*; but a *wavering* implies the *deliberation* of an *Injustice*.

Do nothing with Doubting.

Faith is not always to be kept.

BUT it often falls out, that the same thing which at *one time* would become a Man of *Honor*, and *Justice*, would at *another time* not only Vary, but prove the Clear *Contrary*. As the delivering up of a *Trust* to a *Mad man*; or keeping *promise* with him: nay in matters of *Faith*, and *Truth*, it is *just*, in some Cases

to

to *deny*; and in others, not to keep *Touch*; for all must refer to those Fundamentals of *Justice* already propounded. As *First*, to *wrong* no Man; and *secondly*, in all Cases to consult the *Common Good*. So that the *Duty* is not always the *same*; but changes with the Occasion. Suppose such a Promise or Contract past, as if it were performed, would manifestly tend to the damage, either of the Party promising, or of the person to whom the Promise was passed to have it perform'd. If *Neptune* (as it is in the *Fable*) had not made good his Promise to *Theseus*, his Son *Hippolitus* had been sav'd. The Story goes, that of *Three Wishes*, the *Last* was in his *Passion* the *destruction* of *Hippolitus*: And the *Grant* of That request, cast him into Inconsolable Sorrows. So that neither are we to *keep* those *Promises* that are *unprofitable* to the *Promised*; or *more hurtfull* to the *Promiser*, then *advantageous* to the *Other*. Of *Two Evils*, we are to chuse the *Less*: As if I promise to plead any mans Cause, and in the *Interim*, my Son falls dangerously Ill; it is no Breach of Faith, or Duty in me, not to appear; but rather the Contrary; and it were yet worse, in him to whom the Promise was made, to complain of such a disappointment. And now in matters where a man is under *Violence*, or over-aw'd by *Fear*, or *out-witted*, and *over-reach'd* by *Fraud*, every body knows that *Those promises* are not *Binding*; many of them being discharg'd in Form, by the *Prætors* Court; and some by the very *Law it self*.

The Duty changes with the Occasion.

Of Two Evils the Less.

Injuries of Fraud and Cavil.

THERE are several *Injuries*, that are meerly matter of *Cavil*, and only advantages taken, by a *Crafty* and *malitious Interpretation* of the *Law*. From whence comes that saying, *Extreme Right, is Extreme Wrong*. The Proverb is now worn Threed-bare. Of This Sort, there have been many Practices, even upon a Publique Score: One agreed upon a *Truce* with the Enemy for 30 *days*, and afterward made Incursions upon him, and destroyed his Country by *night*; because the Cessation was for *days*, not *nights*. Neither can I justifie our Countryman, if it be true: *Q. Fabius Labeo* (or some body else (for I have it only upon *Hearsay*) was by the Senate Constituted *Arbitrator* of the *Boundaries* of *Nola* and *Naples*. When he came to the place, he took the Commissioners apart, and advised them in private, not to do any thing greedily, or to press too much; but rather to abate of their Pretensions, then to demand more; and prevailed so far upon them, that there was a good space of ground left betwixt them; so that when they had marked out their Bounds, according to Agreement, that which was left in the middle, was adjudg'd to the *Romans*. This was rather a *Cheat* then a *Judgment*; and this Indirect, and Crafty way of Imposing, should be avoided in all Cases. There are certain *Duties* to be observ'd also, even to those that do us the greatest *wrong*; for there must be a *Meane* in the very *Punishment*, and *Revenge*: and I do not know, whether it may be sufficient, for the *Aggressor* barely to *Repent* of his Injury, without some *Penalty*

over

over and above; both for his *Own Amendment*, and the *Terror*, and *Example* of *Others*.

The Laws of *War*, among all Nations, should be strictly and Punctually observ'd. For since there are but *Two ways* of *Contending*, the *One*, by *Dispute*, the *Other*, by *Force*; the *One*, *Humane*, and the *Other Brutal*; we must of necessity have recourse to the *Latter*, where the *former* will not take place. Wherefore the end of *War* is to secure our selves from *Violence*, in a state of *Peace*: and in case of *Victory*, we should preserve those that behaved themselves with *Honor*, and *Generosity* in the *Action* of the *War*: As our Ancestors receiv'd into the very *Privileges* of the *City*, the *Tusculans*, the *Æqui*, the *Volsci*, the *Sabines*, the *Hernici*; but *Carthage*, and *Numantia*, they wholly *ras'd*. I could wish they had spar'd *Corinth*; but they had a respect, I suppose, to the strength, and scituation of the Place, and so destroy'd it; that for the future, it might not, some time or other, prove an Encouragement to a Revolt. In my Opinion, *Peace* should be always consulted, where it may be had without *Treachery*: and if my advice had been hearkned to in This matter, we might yet at this day, have had *some* sort of a *Republique*, though not the Best; whereas now we have just none at all. We should provide likewise, not only for those that are *Overcome* in the *Field*, but for those also that threw down their Arms, and cast themselves upon the Faith of the General. Nay I would have an Enemy receiv'd, even after the *Bat-*

The Rules of War.

The End of War.

The *Roman* Generosity to their Enemies.

And to those that yielded.

tery is begun, and the *Breach* made. In which Point, we have been ſo ſcrupulouſly Juſt, that according to the Cuſtom of our Predeceſſors, thoſe that took Cities, or Nations, conquer'd in War, into the *Roman Allegeance*, were made *Patrons*, and *Protectors* of what they took. And the Rights of *War* are ſet forth with exact ſolemnity in the Proviſions of the *Fecial Law*; wherein we are given to underſtand, that no *War* can be *Juſt*, and *Warrantable*, unleſs it be grounded upon ſome matter of *Claim*, or *denounced* beforehand, by *Proclamation*. *Pompilius* (the General) held a Province; and a Son of *Cato*'s liſted himſelf a Soldier under his Command. *Pompilius*, finding it convenient to diſcharge *one Legion*, *Cato*'s Son ſerving in *That Legion*, was alſo diſmiſt; but he continuing ſtill in the Army, out of a love of action, his Father wrote a Letter to *Pompilius*, *Requeſting him, that if his Son contin'd with him in Arms, he would give him the* Military Oath, over again, *becauſe his former Sacrament being diſſolv'd, he could not otherwiſe juſtifie his putting himſelf into the Quarrel.* Such was the Reverence they bare, even to the *Conſcience* of *making War!* There is extant, an *Epiſtle* of *Marcus Cato* the *Elder*, to his Son *Marcus*, when he was a Soldier in *Macedonia*, in the *Perſian War*. Wherein he tells his Son, that *he heard the Conſul had diſmiſt him*; *and charges him not to engage in any Combat, as a thing unlawful for him, that was no longer a Soldier, to fight an Enemy.* It is remarkable, the changing of the word *Perduellis* (a *publique Enemy*) into *Hoſtis*; to ſweeten the

Upon what Terms to undertake a War.

A Conſcientious inſtance.

the Foulneſs of the Thing, by the ſoftneſs of the Term. For *Hoſtis* (with our Forefathers) was as much as *Peregrinus*, (a Stranger) as appears by the *Twelve Tables*. *Aut ſtatus dies cum Hoſte*. And then, *Adverſus Hoſtem Æterna Auctoritas*. What can be Gentler, then to Treat an Enemy in this eaſie Language? Although *Cuſtom*, I muſt confeſs, has made it *harſher*, by transferring the ſignification of it, from That of a *Stranger*, to the proper Denomination of one that *bears Arms againſt us*. Nay in the Caſe of a War for *Honor*, or *Dominion*, there muſt yet be the ſame *Cauſes*, and *Grounds* beforementioned, to make it Juſt: but ſtill all Conteſts of This kind muſt give fairer Quarter: for (as in *ordinary Differences*) we diſtinguiſh betwixt an *Enemy* and a *Rival*, our *Title*, and *Dignity* lies at Stake in the *One Caſe*; but our *Life* and *Reputation*, in the *Other*. The War we had with the *Celtiberi*, and the *Cimbri* (the *Spaniards*, and *Danes*) was a War of *Enmity*; and the queſtion was not, who ſhould *Govern*, but who ſhould *Live*. With the *Latines*, the *Sabines*, the *Samnites*, the *Carthaginians*; and with *Pyrrhus*, the quarrel was *Empire*. The *Carthaginians* were *perfidious*; *Hannibal* was *cruel*; but the Reſt more Honourable. It was a Glorious Declaration, that of *Pyrrhus*, about the diſcharge of ſome Priſoners, as we find it in *Ennius*.

A Brave Resolution of *Pyrrhus*.

Let Mercenaries Truck, *and Treat for Gold*;
Honour's a thing not to be Bought or Sold.
Courage *and* Steel *must end this Glorious Strife*;
And in the Case of Victory, or Life,
Fortune's the Judge. We'll take the Chance of War;
And what Brave man soever She shall spare
With Life; *depend upon't*; *I'll set him* Free;
Let him but Own the Gift, to the Great Gods, and Mee.

This was a Royal Speech, and Resolution, and well becoming the Bloud of *Æacus*.

Faith must be kept with an Enemy.

A noble Example of *Regulus*.

BUT even in the Case of a Private promise; and upon what pinch, or necessity soever; Faith is yet to be kept, even with an Enemy. When *Regulus* was taken Prisoner in the first *Punique War*, and sent to *Rome* to sollicite the exchange of some Prisoners, upon his Oath to return: so soon as ever he came There, he advised the Senate against himself; and that they should not agree to the *Exchange*. His Friends, and Relations prest him extremely against going back again; but he chose rather to return to the Torture, then to stay and break his Faith to an Enemy. In the *second Punique War*, after the Battel of *Cannæ*, *Hannibal* sent ten Prisoners to *Rome*, under an Oath of returning; unless they could obtain the Liberty of such and such Prisoners in Exchange. They were no sooner out of the Camp, by *Han-*

Hannibal's permission, but one of them found out a shift to evade the Oath; and presently went back under colour of something left behind him, and then returning, went his way, as if the Obligation of the Oath had been discharg'd. And so it was, in *Words*, but not in *Effect*; for in all *promises*, the *Intention* is to be consider'd, not the *Letter*. The *Censor* set a Fine during Life, upon all their heads that were forsworn; and upon His, among the rest, that invented this *Shift*. But the more Generous Instance of *Justice* to an *Enemy*, was that of our Ancestors. in the Case of *Pyrrhus*: There was a Fugitive that made a Proposal to the Senate, for the Poysoning and dispatching of *Pyrrhus*: but the *Senate*, and *Fabritius* deliver'd up the Traitor to his Master: Such was the detestation they had for Treachery, that they would not make use of it, tho' to the destruction of a Powerful and an Invading Enemy. And so much for *Military Duties*.

A glorious piece of Justice.

The *Romans* a generous Enemy.

WE must not forget neither, that toward the meanest of men also, there is a Justice to be observ'd; even in the Condition, and Fortune of Slaves: and it is good Council, to advise the using of them as *Hirelings*; and for their *Work*, to allow them their *Reward*. Now there are *Two ways* of doing a man an *Injury*; the *one* is by *Force*, the *Other* by *Fraud*. The *One* is the quality of the *Fox*, the *Other* of the *Lion*. They are neither of them proper for a *Man*; but yet *Fraud* is the more *Odious* of the Two; and *of all Injustices, That is the most Abominable, and Capital, which imposes upon us, under the colour of* Kindness *and* Good meaning: and this shall suffice for *Justice*.

Of Justice to Inferiors.

TO

Of Liberality.

TO perſue my purpoſe, I ſhall now handle the Point of *Liberality*, or *Bounty*; then which there is nothing more accommodate to the Nature of man: But it falls under many Limitations. It ſhould be our *firſt* Care to ſee, that what we *Give*, may not be to the diſadvantage of the perſon we would *oblige*, or of any other body; and that it be not above our *Proportion*. *Secondly*, that it be ſuited to the *Dignity* of the *Receiver*; for This is the Foundation of Juſtice, to which all the Circumſtances of it are to be referr'd. He that pretends to gratifie any man with that which is rather to his *damage*, then to his *Benefit*, is ſo far from deſerving the Reputation of being *Liberal*, or *Bountiful*, that he is to be accounted as the moſt pernicious of Flatterers. And Thoſe alſo that Rob one man, to give to another, are guilty of the ſame Injuſtice, with them, that take Mony out of their Neighbors Pockets, to put into their Own. There are many people that look big, and ſet up for men of Honor, that yet have this humour of *taking* from *one*, and *giving* to *another*; and reckon upon it, as a high piece of *Bounty*, if they can but advance the Fortunes of a Friend, upon what Terms ſoever. But This is ſo far from a *Good Office*, that it is the clear *Contrary*. Let us therefore ſo govern our Favours, that we may oblige thoſe we love, and yet hurt no body. Shall we call it *Liberality*, in *L. Sylla*, and *C. Cæſar*, the Tranſlation of ſo many Eſtates from the Right Owners, into the poſſeſſion of Strangers? There can be no *Liberality* in a Caſe of *Injuſtice*. The *Second Caution* is the keeping of our

How to Give, How much, and to Whom.

Whom to Oblige.

our Bounty within *Compass*; and not to give beyond our *Ability*; for they that extend their Kindnesses beyond this Measure, wrong their Relations, by transferring those Bounties to *Strangers*, which they should rather have communicated, or left to their *Friends*. This humour of *Liberality*, is commonly accompanied with a certain *Greediness*, that makes no Scruple of getting any thing, though by *Rapine*, or Injury, so they may but have wherewithal to supply a mistaken Bounty. Nay, there are many that give largely, merely to be *Thought Bountiful*; and This, only upon a Score of Vanity, without any Frankness of Heart; which is rather a flash of *Ostentation*, then an act of *Generosity*, and *Virtue*. The *Third Caution* is, the making Choice of a worthy Person; wherein we should consider the *Morals* of the Man that we would oblige; his particular disposition towards us; our entercourse with him in a Community, and Society of Life, and the good Offices he hath already done us. It would be well, if we could find a Concurrence of all these; but if not, the more Inducements we have, and the greater they are, the more is their weight.

Give in Proportion.

Consider the Income of the Giver.

The Choice of the Person.

HOWBEIT, since we do not live with Men absolutely *Perfect*, either for *Virtue*, or *Wisdom*, but with those that acquit themselves very well, if they can but arrive at some feint resemblances of Virtue; let This be also taken into Consideration, that no Man whatsoever is to be neglected, in whom there appears the least sign, or Glimmering of Goodness. But still we are to set the greatest Value upon him, that

There is no *Stoical* Perfection. 15

Whom to value most.

that we find best endow'd with the soft, and gentle Virtues of *Modesty*, *Temperance*, and that *Justice*, of which we have already spoken at large. For a *Bold*, and *Manly Courage*, in a Man that is neither *Good*, nor *Wise*; is commonly more *forward*, and *eager*, perhaps, then is *Convenient*. The *Other* are more properly the Virtues of a *Good Man*. And so much for our *Manners*.

How to return Benefits.

TOUCHING the *Good Will* that any Man bears us; it is, *First*, our Duty to do *much Good*, where we are *much Belov'd*: but then we are not to express that Affection, in a Childish Ardour, and Fondness of Passion; but in a Constancy, and Firmness of Mind.

Benefits to be repaid with Interest.

IN the Case of an *Antecedent Merit*, where we are not now to *Enter* into an *Obligation*, but to *Acknowledge*, and *Requite* it; there must be a more than Ordinary Care taken. For *Gratitude is the most Indispensable of all Duties*. If *Hesiod* bids us, *Restore what we borrow; if we can, in a Larger Measure*; what ought we to do in the Case of a *Prior Obligation?* Are we not to imitate Fruitful Lands, that still Return more than they Receiv'd? We are ready enough to oblige those that we hope to be the better for hereafter. How should we behave our selves then, toward such as we are the Better for already? Since so it is, that there are *two sorts* of *Liberality*, the *One*, of *Bestowing* a Benefit, and the *Other* of *Returning* it; it is at our Choice, whether we will *Give*, or no: But an Honest Man is not at Liberty in the point of *Returning* it; provided

provided that it may be done without Injury. And yet we are to distinguish also betwixt *Benefits Receiv'd*; and the *Greater* the *Benefit*, the *Greater* is the *Obligation*. Now the *Obligation* is to be valu'd according to the *Mind*, the *Intention*, and *Good Will* of the *Giver*: For many People do many things *rashly*, without either *Judgment*, or *Measure*. They Squander away their Donatives, indifferently upon all; carry'd on by sodain, and impetuous Passions, as if they were driven by the Wind. Now these Benefits are not so much to be esteem'd, as those that are conferr'd with Steadiness, and Consideration. As to the Placing of our Bounties, and Returning of Acknowledgments, (supposing other things to be Equal) it is our Duty to help him *First*, that is most in *Want*; tho' most People do the Contrary. For they are there most Officious, to offer their Service, where they hope for most again; tho' in cases, where their help was not at all needful.

Rash Bounties.

Whom to Requite first.

FOR the Preservation of *Society*, and good Correspondence among Men, we should do well to proportion our *Bounties* to our *Relations*; and to give *most* to those that are *our nearest Friends*. But for those Principles of Nature, which regard *Communities*, and *Humane Society*, they must be fetch'd higher; as the First thing that we take notice of in the Fellowship of Mankind. *Reason*, and *Speech* are the Bond of it; which, by *Teaching*, *Learning*, *Communicating*, *Disputing*, and *Judging*, accommodate one Man to another, and ciment

Reason and Speech are the Bond of Humane Society.

ment the whole *Body* into a kind of *Natural Community*. Nor is there any thing wherein we are further remov'd from Beasts, than in this Advantage of Society. It is usual for us to speak of *Courage*, and *Boldness*, in *Lions* and *Horses*; but we hear nothing of either *Justice*, *Equity*, or *Goodness* in them; and the business is, that they have neither *Speech*, nor *Reason*. This Society of *One* Man with *Another*, and of *All*, with *All*; This *Society*, (I say) *General* and *Particular*, is of a large extent; And herein there must be a Community preserved, of all those things which Nature hath brought forth, for the Common Use of Men: provided always, that such things as are limited by Laws, and Civil Ordinances, may be observed according to the Constitution. As to the rest; they may be reduc'd to the *Greek Proverb*, *Friends have all things in Common*. Now all those things that Men hold in *Community*, are such, as *Ennius* having laid down in One Instance, may be apply'd to Many.

To put a Wandring Traveller in's Way,
Is but to light One Candle with Another:
I've ne'er the less, for what I Give -

Benefits in Common.

FROM this One Case we may learn, that whatsoever we may part with to Another, without any Damage to our selves, it is our Duty to Give, or to Lend Freely, tho' to a Stranger. Of This sort, we reckon many things to be in *Common*; as *Water from a River*; *Fire from Fire*; *Good Counsel to a Man that*

that is in doubt, or distress. All these things are profitable to the *Receiver*, without any loss, or burthen to the *Giver*. So that we may both use these things our selves, and yet be still contributing of somewhat to the Common Good. But in regard that particular Persons have not much to Give, and the Number of those that want, is almost Infinite; Common Liberality must have a respect to that End of *Ennius*. We must keep wherewithal to give Light to our selves, that we may have the Means of being bountiful to our Own.

Degrees of Communities.

TO descend now from *Humane Society* in the *Latitude*, of which there are many degrees; there is a nearer Bond yet, betwixt People of the same *Province*, the same *Nation*, and the same *Language*: And it is yet stricter, betwixt Men of the same *City*: For among Citizens, there are many things in Common: As Courts of Justice, Temples, Walks, Ways, Lanes, Customs, Judgments, Suffrages; beside frequent Meetings, and Familiarities, Common Bus'ness, Commerce, and Contract. And there is yet a nearer Tye; and That is, the Society of Kindred, which is Contracted into a narrow place, apart from the Vast Society of Mankind. It is by Nature, Common to all living Creatures, the appetite of producing the Kind: And the First Society is in Wedlock, the next, in Children; it comes then to a Family, and a Community of all things. And this is the Original of a City, and as it were the Seminary of a Commonwealth. The Relation of Brothers comes next; and after

Common Privileges.

Marriage, Children, Families.

That,

That, of Brothers, and Sisters Children; who, when they are too many for One House, are transplanted into Others, as into Colonies. And then follow Matches, and Alliances, with increase of Kindred; and their Off-spring is the Beginning of a Commonwealth. There is no doubt but Relation of Blood, and the Kindness that arises from it, must necessarily endear Men to One another. For it is a great matter to have the same Pedigree; to exercise the same Religion, and to deposite their Ashes in Common Sepulchres: But of all Associations, there is none so Firm, none so Noble, as when Virtuous Men are link'd together by a Correspondency of Manners; and a Freedom of Conversation. For such is the Charm of That Honesty which we have often spoken of, that the very Encounter of it moves us, tho' in a Stranger, and makes us Friends to the Possessor of it, where-ever we find it. Now tho' all Virtue whatsoever, is, of it self, Amiable, and Attractive; insomuch that we cannot but have an Esteem for those that we find possess'd of it; yet *Justice*, and *Liberality* gain upon us in a higher degree. But there is nothing more Lovely, or more Engaging, than a *Conformity*, and *Agreement* of *Good Manners*. For where there are the same Inclinations, the same Desires, and the same Will, the One cannot chuse but be delighted with the Other, as with its proper self; and it effects that which *Pythagoras* requires in Friendship; the making *One*, of *many*: And it is a great Obligation that is created by the reciprocation of Benefits, that pass Forward and Backward, in Exchange: which being

Kindred.

Friendship.

Similitude of Manners.

Exchange of Benefits.

ing mutual, and grateful; must needs, upon the *Entercourse*, produce firm and extraordinary Friendship. But when ye shall have lookt over all the Ties in Nature, as far as your Mind, and your Reason can carry you; you will find nothing dearer, no Obligation of greater importance, then That by which we are every one of us Ty'd to the *Commonwealth*. Our *Parents, Children, Kindred, Acquaintance*, are all dear to us; but *our single Country* is more then *all the Rest*: and every honest man is ready to lay down his life for the advantage of that sacred Interest. How execrable then is the barbarous Impiety of those people, that have torn their Country to pieces, by all sorts of Villany; and who not only have been, but are at this instant, conspiring the destruction of it, by a final desolation? But if there should be any dispute, or Comparison, where to pay our duty, in the first place, our *Country* and our *Parents* are the *Principals*; to whose Benefits we are the most *Oblig'd*. Our *Children* and our *Families* are next; as depending upon us alone, without any other Retreat: After *These*, our *Friends* and *Relations*; which are commonly of our Own Rank, and Condition. Wherefore we owe the necessary helps of Life to these beforementioned; But for Conversation, Table-Society, Counsels, Exhortations, Consolations, and (upon Occasion) Reproofs: These things are found most amongst Friends; and let me tell you over again; *The pleasantest Friendship is That, which is contracted by a Similitude of Manners.*

Our Duty to our Country.

Our Kindred and Friends.

NOW

NOW in the Exercise of all these Duties, we should observe what every man has most need of; and what with our help, he may, and what without our help, he cannot attain; and in some cases there is a respect to be had to *Times*, and *Occasions*, even before *Relations*: There are some Offices that we should rather pay to *One*, then to *another*; as I would sooner help a *Neighbour* in with his *Harvest*, then either a *Brother*, or *Familiar Acquaintance*; but in a *Suit of Law*, I'll defend my *Kinsman*, or my *Friend*, before my *Neighbour*. Wherefore these Circumstances, and the like, should be duly consider'd in all Offices. By Custom, and Exercise, we shall become good Accomptants: For it is by *Adding*, and *Substracting*, that we come to know *what Remains*; and Consequently, in all Cases, the Bounds, and Limits of our Duty: But as neither Physitians, nor Commanders; nor Orators, tho' never so well instructed in the Rules of their Profession, shall ever be able, without Use, and Practice, to make themselves Eminently famous; to the same end, are the Precepts of Humane Duties deliver'd us; that we should put them in exercise; but yet the difficulty, and Condition of the thing does over and above require it. Now in what manner that Virtue is deriv'd, and whence That Duty arises, which falls under the Consideration of *Sociable Rights*, and *Common Justice*; we have almost said enough already.

Duties vary with Circumstances.

IN

In the propounding of *Four general Heads*, from whence all Virtues, and Duties flow; That which is done with a Noble, and Exalted Mind; a Mind advanced to the Contempt of Fortune, and Worldly things; that Virtue, I say, ought to be reputed the most Glorious: and therefore that Reproach of *Ennius*'s is always at hand upon Occasion: Magnanimity.

Young Men, *in* shew, *but* Wenches, *in your* Hearts;
While Clœlia *plays the* Brave, *and acts your Parts.*
You're for Exploits that cost no Sweat, nor Blood, &c.

And on the other side, with what Transport and Rapture do we extol the humour of Brave and Generous Actions? From hence, comes that Field of the Rhetoricians, upon *Marathon, Salamis, Platea, Thermopilæ, Leuctræ, Stratocles*; and from hence it is, that our *Cocles*, the *Decij*, the two *Scipio*'s, *Marcellus*, and a World of others, especially the *Romans* Themselves, are grown so famous, for the Greatness of their Minds. And their ambition of Military honour, may appear in This, that almost all the Statues they have left us, are dress'd up in Armour.

AND yet That Elevation of Courage, which is seen in Hazzards, and Adventures, unless accompany'd with Justice, and contending rather for the Publique, then for it self; That Courage (I say) is so far from

being a Virtue, that it is a Fault, and a brutal Fierity, inconsistent with the Tenderness of humane Nature. Wherefore the *Stoiques* have well defin'd it, in calling *Courage*, *a Virtue contending for Equity*. Nor did any man ever gain the Reputation of *True Valour*, by *Treachery*, or *Malice*. Nothing can be *Honest*, but what is Just; and therefore it was notably said of *Plato*. *As That Knowledge* (says he) *which is divided from* Justice, *is rather* Craft, *then* Wisdom; *so That* Courage, *which is* Bold, *and* Adventerous, *is rather* Temerity, *and* Foolhardiness, *then* Valour; *if it be carryed on by* Passion, *or* Interest, *rather then for a* Common Good. Wherefore all Men of Valour, and great Undertakings, should be likewise Men of Goodness, Simplicity, Candor, and Friends of *Truth*: which are all Inseparable from Justice. But the Mischief is, that this Tumour, and Elation of Mind, breaks out many times into a *Pertinacy*, and an Ambitious desire of *Rule*. For as *Plato* has it, the *Lacedemonians* were Naturally inflam'd with an Ardent desire of Overcoming. So that whosoever has the greatest Soul, is the most addicted to aspiring Thoughts: And to set himself above All; or in Truth rather to stand Alone. It is a very hard matter, for a Man to observe the Tenor of *True Equity* (which peculiarly belongs to Justice) in the Inordinate Appetite of *Superiority*, and *Dominion*. From whence it comes to pass, that such men will not be govern'd, either by *Reason*, or any *Publique*, and *Lawfull Constitution*. This humour stirs Factions in a Commonwealth, that work by Bribery

Courage defined.

Pertinacy and Ambition.

Bribery, and Corruption, to advance their Power, and their Fortunes; whose business it is, rather to make themselves Greater, by *Violence*, then to keep themselves in a Station of *Equality* by *Justice*. But the harder any thing is, the fairer it is: nor is there any Time, or Season, that can dispence a man from Justice. Wherefore Those are Truly *Brave*, and *Magnanimous*, that *keep off* an *Injury*, not Those that *offer* it. He that is truly *Wise*, and *Stout*, places That Virtue which is most consonant to Nature, in *Action*, and not in *Glory*; and in *making* himself more Considerable then other men, rather then *appearing* so. No man can be said to be truly *Heroique*, that depends, for his Reputation, upon the Opinion of the Multitude. But every man, the higher his Stomach is, and the greater his Thirst of Honor, the more easily is he transported to do Unjust things. He stands upon a Slippery place: For where is the man, who after all his hazzards, and Travels, does not desire, and expect *Glory*, as a reward of his Adventures?

True Magnanimity.

YOU shall know a man of *Generosity*, and *Courage*, chiefly by these *two Marques*. First, he despises *outward things*, upon an Opinion that a man should not admire, wish for, or desire any thing but what is Becoming and Honest; nor subject himself to any Person, Passion, or Fortune. The *Other* is a disposition of Mind (as is said before) that spurs a man to attempt things *Great* and *Profitable*; but *difficult*, *laborious*, and *dangerous*, as well in the matter of Life it self, as in other Con-

veniences that belong to't. All the *Splendor*, and *Reputation* (and let me ſay, the *Profit* alſo) of Theſe two Things reſts in the *Latter*: but the *Cauſe*, and the *Motive* is in the *Former*: For There is the Riſe, and Spring of great Reſolves, that carry men even above the Conſideration of any thing that is below. The thing it ſelf is ſeen in *Two particulars*: *Firſt* in Judging That only to be *Good* which is *Honeſt*; and, *Secondly*, in a *Freedom* of the Mind from all *Perturbations*. For it muſt be confeſt to be the part of a Brave and Generous Mind, to look upon Thoſe, as Little Things, which many Account to be Great, and Glorious; and to Contemn them, upon the Foundation of a Firm, and ſetled Judgment. It is likewiſe the part of a Conſtant, and Invincible Mind, ſo to bear all ſorts of Calamity, and Affliction, as neither to depart from the Order of Nature, nor to deſcend below the Dignities of a Wiſe man. How Incongruous is it for a man that ſtands the ſhock of *Danger*, to be broken with *Luſt*? or to endure the Fatigue of *Labour*; and then to be overcome with *Pleaſure*? This muſt therefore be avoided; and ſo muſt the greedy deſire of *Mony*. There is not a greater Argument of a Narrow, and Wretched Mind, then to dote upon *Pelf*: Nothing more humane, and honourable, then to deſpiſe it, if we have it not; and to employ it generouſly, and do good with it, if we have it. And ſo for the Affectation of *Glory*: We muſt beware of it (as is ſaid already) for it bars a man of his *Liberty*; which a Brave Man will rather

Contempt of Mony.

Affectation of Glory.

rather die, then part with. We ſhould not be ſollicitous neither for *Power*; which, in ſome Caſes, we ſhould not receive, and in others, we ſhould lay down We muſt deliver our ſelves from all diſorders of mind; either by *Fear* or *Appetite*: and likewiſe from all *Sowerneſs*, and *Tranſport*, either of *delight*, or of *Wrath*; that we may be Calm, and Secure: In which State, we ſhall Find both Steadineſs, and Credit. There are at this day, and there have been many, that to gain this Repoſe, have wholly withdrawn themſelves from Publique Buſineſs: Among Theſe, the nobleſt, and moſt eminent of Philoſophers; and men truly, of great Severity, and Weight; who could neither endure the People, nor Government: and ſo retired into Deſerts, and Retreats, to live privately with Themſelves. And theſe men, in this Receſs, had the ſame Deſign with Princes (whoſe Privilege is to live as they liſt) that they might want nothing, but enjoy their Freedom, without Controll. Wherefore, ſince both Thoſe that affect Power, and the other Idle people that I ſpeak of, aim at the ſame thing; and have This in common betwixt them; the One thinks they may Gain their End, if they had but ample Fortunes: and the Other, Theirs, if they can but be content with their Own, and with a Little: They may be Both, (for ought I know) in ſome meaſure, in the Right. But it muſt yet be allow'd, that a Private, and Retir'd Life, is both Eaſier and Safer: And leſs Importune, and Troubleſome to Others. But the life of Thoſe that apply themſelves to

A Retired Life.

Publique buſineſs, is more profitable to Mankind; and more conducing to the Acquiſition of Honour, and Reputation in the World. Wherefore there is ſomething to be ſaid for thoſe Excellent Wits that dedicate them Selves to Letters; without medling in Publique Affairs: And alſo for ſuch Others, as either for want of Health, or perhaps ſome more powerful Impediment, have quitted their publique Stations; being well ſatisfi'd, that others ſhould enjoy the Power and the Credit of the Employment. But for thoſe that have none of this Pretence, to talk of deſpiſing Government, and Offices, which moſt people have in great eſtimation; I do not only, not approve of them, but take them to be much to blame. Not that I diſallow of their Judgment, in the little Conſideration they ſeem to have for Glory; but becauſe they are manifeſtly afraid of the Labours, Troubles, Repulſes, and Diſpleaſures that they are to encounter. For there are many that behave themſelves *Unequally* in *Contrary Caſes*: Severe Contemners of *Pleaſure*, but they ſink under *Pain*; Regardleſs of *Fame*, but dejected with *Scandal*. Nor are they Steady, even in theſe very Caſes: But for thoſe that are by nature, fitted and qualifi'd for Civil Buſineſs; I ſhould adviſe Theſe people to apply themſelves to it without delay; and to take ſome Commiſſion in the Government. For This is Neceſſary, both as to Publique Adminiſtration; and to ſhew the Greatneſs of the Mind. And publique Officers, as much perhaps, as Philoſophers themſelves, (if not more) ſhould be affected with

with a general disdain of External things, (as I have often said) and fixed in an Immoveable Tranquility, and security of Mind; which will deliver them from all Anxiety for things to come; and establish them in a life of Constancy, and Honour. Now this Point is by so much easier, for a Philosopher to gain, by how much his Life is less expos'd to the Stroke of Fortune: For there are not many things that he stands in need of: beside, that in case of any disaster, his Fall is not so dangerous. It is but reasonable therefore to Conclude, that Men in Great, and Publique Places, are exposed to greater Perturbations of Thought, then those that live in Privacy and Repose. So that a greater Stock of Courage is there Necessary, and a Mind at Liberty from Trouble, and Care. But for him that puts himself into *Business*; let him first consider the *Honesty* of the Employment; and Then, his Own *Abilities*, to go thorough with it. Wherein let him neither rashly despair, out of heartlesness, and sloth; nor be over Confident neither, in the Opinion of himself. But in all matters of Business, a man should diligently prepare himself before he goes about it.

A Comparison of Military Virtues with Civil.

BUT since most Men take *Military Charges* to be of a greater Consideration then *Civil*, This Opinion should be a little qualifi'd; For 'tis a very Common thing for men to apply themselves to that course of Life, out of an Itch of *Glory*; and this happens most frequently in Men of *large Souls*, and *Abilities*: Especially

cially where the *Genius* lies that way, and the *Diſpoſition* carries them to the Profeſſion of *Armes*. But if we would deal impartially, there have been Greater and more Glorious things done in the *Senate*, then in the *Field*: for although *Themiſtocles* be worthy of all honour, and his Name, and Memory, more Illuſtrious then That of *Solon*; *Salamis* being ſtill mentioned as a Memorial of his noble Victory over *Xerxes*, which is ſtill preferr'd before the Counſel of *Solon*, for the Inſtitution of the *Areopagites*. This muſt not at all give way to That: For the *One* did *once*, deliver, preſerve, and help the City; but the *Other* will *ever* do it. This Council preſerves the Laws of *Athens*, and Conſtitutions of their Anceſtors. *Themiſtocles* cannot ſay that ever he help'd *Areopagus*, but the *Other* may truely boaſt of ſerving *Themiſtocles*. For *Solon* was the Founder of That Senate which manag'd the War: And ſo for *Pauſanias*, and *Lyſander*. It is true, that their Actions, and Conduct, enlarg'd the Territories of the *Lacedemonians*; and yet the Laws of *Licurgus*, are Incomparably to be preferr'd. Nay, and upon That very Conſideration, their Armies were both *Readier* and *Bolder*. It was my Opinion, even when I was a Boy, that *Marcus Scaurus* was not Inferiour to *Caius Marius*; and when I came afterwards into Publique Buſineſs; I lookt upon *Q. Catulus* not one jot below *Cneius Pompeius*. For what ſignifie *Armies*, *Abroad*, without *Counſel at Home?* Neither did *Affricanus* (tho' an Excellent *Man*, as well as a great *Captain*) do the Commonwealth a Nobler Service in the Raſing of *Numantia*,

mantia, then *Pub. Naſica* (a private Man) did at the ſame time, in cutting off *Tiberius Gracchus*. Now This Inſtance is not purely *Civil*; but in ſome reſpect, *Military*, becauſe it was done by a *Violent hand*: But ſtill it was done by a *Civil Council*, and without an *Army*. It was a memorable ſaying of mine, that is ſo often caſt in my Teeth, by a ſort of Malicious, and Envious people.

Let Swordmen *to the* Gown *give place.*
And Crown the Oratour *with Bayes.*

To paſs over other Inſtances. Did not the *Sword* give place to the *Gown*, when the Commonwealth was under *My Adminiſtration?* Never was there a more malicious Conſpiracy; and yet by the Influence of our Diligence, and Counſel, how quickly was it cruſh'd? Inſomuch, that the very Arms themſelves fell out of the hands of the moſt Audacious of the Mutineers. When was there ever any Action done in the *Field*, or any Tryumph Comparable to it? This Boaſt, to You, my Son, that are to inherit the honour of my Actions, and to whom I would recommend the Imitation of them; This Boaſt, to You, (I ſay) may be allow'd me. Nor is it any more then *Cn. Pompey* (a Man laden with Military honours) aſcribed to me in a full Audience. *My Third Triumph* (ſays he) *would have been to little purpoſe, if* Cicero, *by preſerving the* Commonwealth, *had not left me a place wherein to* Triumph. So that *Domeſtique*, and *Civil Reſolution*, is not Inferiour to *Military*. And it

it requires more Pains, and Study, to be employed upon it. That Virtue without diſpute, which we look for from a High, and Illuſtrious Mind, is acquired by the Force of the Soul, not of the Body. And yet the Body is ſtill to be kept in Exerciſe; and ſo affected, as to obey the Dictates of Counſel and Reaſon, in the diſpatch of Buſineſs, and in the bearing of Toil. But the *honeſty* here in queſtion is wholly plac'd in the Care and Conſideration of the Mind: wherein the Men of the *Robe*, in *Civil Adminiſtration*, bring no leſs advantage to the *Publique*, then Thoſe that bear *Arms*: For War is many times, either not begun, or otherwiſe finiſh'd, by their Advice: Nay, and ſome brought on too: as the *Third Punique War* of *M. Cato* was; where his Authority prevail'd, even when he was dead. Wherefore the Faculty of *Determining*, is more deſirable then that of *Contending*. Always provided that we ſteer not our Courſe rather by an *Averſion* to *War*, then a *Conſideration* to *Benefit*. In the Undertaking of a War there ſhould be ſuch a proſpect, as if the Only end of it were *Peace*. It is the part of a Valiant and a Reſolute Man, not to be diſcompoſed in diſaſters, or to make a Buſtle, and be put beſide himſelf; but to maintain a preſence of Mind, and Judgment, without departing from Reaſon. As this is the Marque and Effect of a great Courage; ſo is the Other, of an Excellent underſtanding, to forecaſt in our Thoughts the Events of things to come: and to weigh beforehand the Good and the Bad; and what's to be done when it happens, without

without being put to the foolish Exclamation of *who would have Thought it?* These are the Works of an Elevated Soul, that supports it self upon Prudence, and Judgment: but he that rashly thrusts himself into Dangers, without fear, or wit; and engages an Enemy hand over head; this is only Brutality, and Outrage: But yet when the time comes, and necessity requires it, let a man fight with his Sword in his hand; and rather lose his Life, then his Honor and Freedom.

Clemency to the Conquer'd.

IN the Case of *Razing* or *Demolishing* of *Cities* there should be great Care taken, that nothing be done either *Headily*, or *Cruelly*. It is the part of a Great man, in Publique Broyles, to punish the *Guilty*; but still to spare the *Multitude*; and in all Conditions, to adhere to that which is Right, and Honest.

Spare the Multitude.

Courage with Discretion.

THERE are some that esteem *Feats of Arms* above *Civil Administrations*; (as is aforesaid) and there are Others that think it more estimable, to deal in *Dangerous*, and *Crafty*, then in *Quiet*, and *Considerate Counsels*. We must never in such manner avoid *Dangers*, as to appear *Weak* and *faint-hearted*; And we must likewise have a Care, on the other side, not thrust our selves into *Unnecessary hazzards*; which is one of the greatest Follies in the World. Wherefore in difficult Cases, we should do like Physitians, that apply *Gentle Remedies* to *Gentle Diseases*: but in Cases of *Extremity*, *a desperate disease must have*

desperate Cure. None but a Mad man will wish for a Storm in fair Weather. But it is yet the part of a Wise man, to weather it the best he can, if he falls into a Tempest. And the honour is so much the more, if the advantage of the success be greater then the Miscarriage.

Danger Publique and Private.

ACTIONS are dangerous, partly to the *Undertakers*, and in part to the *Commonwealth*: Some run the hazzard of their Lives; Some of their Good names; and Others, of the Love of the people: Now we should more frankly venture our selves, then the Publique: and more chearfully expose our selves for Honour, and Reputation, then for other Commodities. Some there are that make no scruple of hazzarding their Lives, and Fortunes, in the defence of their *Country*; and yet are so nice and scrupulous in the matter of *Reputation*; that rather then run any risque of their *Honour*, they will leave their very *Country* in danger. As *Callicratidas* the *Lacedemonian General*, in the *Peloponnesian War*; after many glorious Exploits, ruin'd all at last, by not removing the Navy from the *Arginusæ*, and making his Retreat without giving the *Athenians* Battel, as he was advis'd to do; To which he made This answer, that *if the Lacedemonians lost one Fleet, they might set out another; but that if he quitted his Ground, his Honor was lost for ever*. But the *Lacedemonians* however might have born this Loss, whereas the Other Blow was mortal; when *Cleombrotus*, for fear of an Ill Report, unadvisadly engaged with

A Mistake in point of Honour.

with *Epaminondas*, where the whole power of the *Lacedemonians* was cut off at a Blow. How much better now was the Conduct of *Q. Fabius Maximus*, of whom *Ennius*.

Fabius *was* ſlow; *but* ſure; *and his Delay*
Reſtored the tottering State. Now it was his way
To mind his Bus'neſs, *not what people* ſaid:
He liv'd a Great *man, but he's Greater* dead.

This is an Error, of a Quality to be avoided alſo in Civil Matters. For there are many that dare not ſpeak their Opinions, tho' for the beſt; for fear of falling under Evil Tongues.

Plato's advice to Magiſtrates.

THERE are two Precepts of *Plato* to be obſerv'd by all Men of Authority in the Government. The One is, in ſome ſort to aſſert and defend the Publique Intereſt, that all their Actions ſhould refer to That, without any regard to their Own advantage. The Other is, to attend the ſervice of the whole, in ſuch ſort, that while they are ſerving one part, they do not abandon another. It is in the Adminiſtration of a *Government*, as in the Caſe of a *Ward*: The *Commiſſion* has a regard to the benefit of thoſe that are deliver'd up in *Charge*; and not thoſe to whom ſuch a Charge, or Care is *Committed*. But they that Provide for One part of the People, and Neglect Another, bring into a City the moſt pernicious thing in the World; That is to ſay, *Diſcord*, and *Sedition*: and when they are ſplit in-

The danger of Factions.

to

to Parties, some side with the People; others with the Nobility: but none mind the Whole. This wrought great Mischiefs among the *Athenians*; and in *our Republique* not only *Sedition*, but the most Pestilent *Civil Wars*. A Course not to be endur'd by a Sober, and Valiant Patriot; or any man that deserves a place in the Government: For such a man will apply himself wholly to the Care of the *Publique*, without designing either upon *Wealth*, or *Power* to himself; and in such manner defend the whole, that he also provide for every part of it: Neither will he bring any man into *Envy*, or *Hatred*, by *Calumny*, or *Subornation*; but resolutely adhere to *Justice* and *Honesty*; maintaining his Post, in spite of all Opposition; and rather die then desert the aforesaid Duties.

Of Ambition.

AMBITION or the Thirst of Honour is a wretched thing: Of which *Plato* says very well; they that strive who shall be Uppermost in the *Republique*, do as if *Mariners* should contend which should be at the *Helm*. And he tells us further, that we are to account those for Enemies, that take up *Armes* against the *Commonwealth*; and not such as with *Honesty*, and *Judgment* labour to *defend* it. This was the Controversie betwixt *P. Affricanus*, and *Q. Metellus*, without any sort of bitterness.

Against Anger.

GIVE no ear to those that take it to be the part of a Brave, and Resolute man, to be Violently *Angry* with an *Enemy*: For there is

is nothing more commendable or better becoming a generous Person, then *Clemency*, and *Good Nature*. Nay towards a *Free People*, where all are liable to the *Law*, we should join a *Facility* with That which we call *height of Courage*, least if we should accustom our selves to Transports upon Unseasonable Addresses, or shameful Importunities, we should fall into a humour of Morose and unprofitable sourness: Provided that with these soft, and gentle ways, we use severity also, where the Publique requires it; for without That, a City can never be kept in order.

Of Reproof and Correction.

ALL *Reproof*, and *Correction*, let it be without *Contumely*, as being directed only to the profit of the *Commonwealth*; without regard to the gratifying of his *Passion*, or *Interest* that gives either the *Words*, or the *Blows*. And the *punishment* likewise should be proportion'd to the *Fault*: For it is unjust, that one man should have *Blows*, and another, not so much as a *Check*, for the same transgression. But above All things, *Correction* is not to be given in *Anger*; For a man in Passion will never observe the due mean betwixt the two Extremes of too *much*, and too *little*: wherein the *Peripatetiques* are much in the Right; if they would not also approve of *Anger* given us by Nature for our Advantage. But I am for the avoiding of it in all Cases; and I could wish that *Magistrates*, like the *Laws Themselves*, would never proceed to *punish*, in *Wrath*, but only in *Equity*.

LET

Moderation in both Fortunes.

LET us alſo in *Proſperity*, and when we have the World at will, as much as poſſible, avoid *Pride*; *diſguſting* of every thing; and *Arrogance*; for it is the *ſame Levity* to be Tranſported either with *Good Fortune*, or with *Bad*: And it is an Excellent Thing to obſerve an Equal Tenor of Life, and to have ſtill the ſame humour, and the ſame Countenance; as we find it recorded of *Socrates*, and *C. Lælius*. *Philip* of *Macedon*, was outſtript by his Son, in *Glorious Atchievements*, and *Military Execution*, but in *Gentleneſs*, and *Humanity* of Manners, *Alexander* came ſhort of him: So that the *One* of them was *always*, *Great*, and the *Other* was *many* Times *Intemperate*, and *Brutal*. 'Tis good Advice, that bids us, the *Higher* we are, to be the more *Humble*. *Panætius* tells us of *Affricanus* (his Diſciple, and Familiar Friend) how he was wont to ſay, that as we put out Horſes of Service to Riders, for the Training them, and making them fitter for uſe, when they are grown Fierce, and Unmenageable, by being chaf'd, and heat by the Action of the Battel; ſo ſhould we commit Men, that are Tranſported with Proſperity, and over-confident in Themſelves, to ſome Guide that ſhould keep them, as it were in the Ring; or within the bounds of Reaſon, and good Government, to make them underſtand the Uncertainty of Humane Affairs, and the changes of Fortune. It is in the height of our Proſperity, that we ſhould chiefly conſult our Friends; and allow them more Authority over us then at other times: but we muſt have a Care of

Entertaining

Entertaining Flatteries, and of being impos'd upon by Fair words, wherein we are too easie to be Mistaken. For such is the Conceipt we commonly have of our selves, that we think no Commendation more then we deserve. From This weakness there arise Innumerable Errors. For when we come once to be blown up with Praises, and high Opinions of our selves, we do but serve to make sport for Others, and labour under grievous Mistakes. And so much for this Point.

THEIR Busines that Govern Commonwealths, must of necessity be of the greatest moment, and require the largest Souls; because it has the largest prospect, and concerns most people. This is to be given for granted; and yet it must not be deny'd neither, on the Other side, that great Generosity of Mind has been many times shew'd in a private Life; either in the search, or attempt of Great Matters; and the people yet keeping themselves within their own Bounds, or else mingling with Philosophers, and Men in Publique Bus'ness; contenting themselves in their Private Condition: Neither scraping together Estates, by all manner of Ways, nor debarring their Friends from the use of what they had; but rather dividing with Them, and with the Republique, where there was Occasion. Now for *This Estate*, let it be, First, *well gotten*; and neither by *Shamefull*, nor by *Odious wayes*. Let a man next do *good* with it to as many as he can; (so they be worthy) let him encrease it, with *Prudence*, *Diligence*, and *Good Hus-*

Greatness of mind in a private Life.

Husbandry: and let him rather indulge *Liberality*, and *Bounty*, then *Luxury*, and *Lust*. He that obſerves Theſe Rules may live Soberly, Splendidly, and Generouſly; and no leſs Candidly, Faithfully, and amicably with all Men.

WE are now to ſpeak of the remaining part of Duty; wherein *Baſhfulneſs*, and a certain *Gracefulneſs* of Life; *Temperance*, *Modeſty*, the Compoſure of all *Perturbations* of the Mind, and *Moderation*, are to be conſider'd. Here it is that we find that ſame *Decorum*, or as the *Greeks*, πρέπον; which is of ſo Excellent a Nature, that it is Inſeparable from Virtue. For whatſoever is *Decent*, is likewiſe *Honeſt*; and whatſoever is *Honeſt*, is *becoming*. But ſtill there is a difference betwixt this ſame *Honeſty*, and *Decorum*; which may be better underſtood, then explained: For That which *becomes* us, does only *Then* appear, when *Honeſty is gone before*.

Honeſty and *Decorum*.

NOW this *Decorum* does not only appear in the Virtue now in queſtion, but alſo in the Three former. For the Right and Prudent uſe of Reaſon, and Speech; the doing of every thing Conſiderately; the finding out of Truth, and the Defending of it, looks well in Any man; as on the Other ſide to be deceived, to Miſtake, to Slip, to be Impos'd upon, is as misbecoming, as if a man were in a fit of Dotage, or out of his Wits. And ſo whatſoever is *Juſt*, is alſo *Gracefull*; and whatſoever is *Unjuſt*, or *Diſhoneſt*, is likewiſe *misbeſeeming*,

A Decorum in Prudence.

beſeeming? And the ſame Rule holds in *Fortitude*: For whatſoever is done *Generouſly*, and like a Man of *Courage*, cannot but be *Graceful* too, and well-becoming a man; and the *Contrary* as *Reproachful*, and *Misbecoming*. Wherefore the *Decorum* I here ſpeak of, appears likewiſe in all other Virtues; and does in ſuch manner appertain to them, that it lies open; and there needs no Myſtery to the finding of it out. There is in all Virtue, ſomewhat that is *Graceful*, and only *ſeparable* from Virtue, by *Imagination*: As the Gracefulneſs, and Beauty of the *Body*, cannot well be ſeparated from *Health*: And ſo it is with the *Gracefulneſs* here in *queſtion*. It is a *Decorum* that is in a manner ſo confuſed with Virtue, that it is Incorporated with it; but in the Mind and Conception, it may be diſtinguiſh'd. And there are of it, *Two Sorts*. The *One* is a Certain *General Decorum*, that ſhines in all Virtues; and there is *Another* that is ſubject to This, or dependent upon it, which reſpects *every Virtue* in *particular*. The *Former* is Commonly defined to be *a Decorum congruous to the Excellency of Man, in that which differences Man, from Other Living Creatures*. But the *Special Decorum*, as dependent upon the General, they define to be *a quality ſo Congruous to Nature, that Moderation and Temperance appear in it, with the very Image of a Generous Soul*. This we may judge to be the *Decorum*, which the Poets obſerve; whereof we have ſpoken more in Another place. But we are then ſaid to obſerve the *Strict Decorum* of the *Poets*, when every *Word*, and *Action* is fitted to the *Dignity*, and

And in all Virtues.

A Decorum General and Special.

The Decorum of the Poets.

Condition of the *Person*. As what could be more Improper, and Unseemly then to bring in These just Judges, *Æacus*, and *Minos* with these words in their Mouths, *Let them hate, so they Fear*: Or, *the Father is the Grave of his Own Children*. And yet when *Atreus* says it, what Acclamations are there, because the expression Suites with the Person! But Nature her self, as to us, has given every man his Part, with great Excellency, and advantage over other Living Creatures. So that the Poets will see to the accommodating of all parts to the variety of Persons, even the Observing of a *Decorum*, toward the worst of men, as well as the best. But since Nature has assign'd us our parts of Constancy, Moderation, Temperance, Modesty; and the same Nature teaches us not to be wholly careless, how we demean our selves toward one Another; it is clear to us, how far that *Decorum* extends, that belongs to every Virtue, and every kind of Honesty. For as the Beauty of the Body, with an apt disposition of the Parts, proves the Eye; and delights us in the very Correspondence, Symetry and apt disposition of the Parts; so this *Decorum*, that Illustrates Life, gains upon all those we converse with, by the Order, Steadiness, and Moderation of all our Words, and Deeds. Wherefore there should a Certain reverence be used toward all men, both high, and low; for 'tis the humour of an Arrogant and dissolute Man, not to care what the World says of him. But there's a great difference betwixt *Justice*, and *Modesty*, upon all Accounts. It belongs to *Justice* not to *wrong* men;

The Decorum of Order, Steadiness and Moderation.

men; and to *Modesty*, not to *offend* them: Wherein the Power, and Virtue of a *Decorum*, does most eminently appear. This is enough said, I suppose, to make it understood, what is intended by that which we call a *Decorum*.

THE Duty that proceeds from it, is chiefly to preserve our selves in a Conformity to Nature; A Guide That will never mislead us; but conduct those that follow her, to all acuteness, and perspicacity of Understanding; to the best means of Uniting men in Society; to That which is Strong, and Manly. But the mighty power of *Gracefulness* is in That part which we are now upon: For not only the Motions of the Body, according to Nature, are to be allow'd, but the Motions of the Mind likewise much more.

A Decorum in a Conformity to Nature.

THE *Force*, and *Nature*, of the *Mind*, is *Two-fold*: *One part* is plac'd in the *Appetite*; the *Greeks* call it ὁρμὴ; that carries a man hither and thither: The *Other*, in *Reason*, that teaches us, and explains to us what to *do*, and what to *avoid*; by which means, our Appetite shall be kept obedient to our Reason. In all Cases, we should have a care of Rashness and *Negligence*; and do nothing but what we can give a fair Account of. This is, in some degree, the Image and Description of Duty; But then we must so order it, that the *Appetite* follow the Dictate of *Reason*, so as neither *rashly* to *out-run* it, nor out of *Heaviness*, and *Sloth* to *desert* it; but keep it *quiet*, and *calm*, and free from all *Perturbation*. This

From the Appetite arise Perturbations.

make us Eminent for *Conſtancy* and *Moderation*: For *Thoſe Appetites* that wander from the *Rule*; and Skip from one thing to another, either by *Coveting*, or *Avoiding*: *Thoſe Appetites*, I ſay, for want of being govern'd by *Reaſon*, will without all queſtion paſs *Bounds*, and *Meaſure*; for they relinquiſh and caſt off their *Allegeance* to *Reaſon*, which they ought to obey by the Law of *Nature*: and their Ill Effects are Imprinted, not only upon our *Minds*, but alſo viſibly upon our *Bodies*: As in the Tranſports of *Wrath*, *Luſt*, *Fear*, *Pleaſure*; What an Alteration is there of *Countenance*, *Voice*, *Motion*, *Geſture*? from whence we may Collect, how neceſſary it is to moderate, and govern our Paſſions; and ſo to keep our ſelves upon a Guard, that we do nothing heedleſly, Or as it were by Chance, without Care, or Conſideration. For man was never made for Levity and Pleaſure, but rather for the ſeverity of Grave, and weighty Studies. Not that we are to be debarr'd the Freedom of Froliques, and Divertiſements; provided that we uſe them only as Sleep, and ſuch other ways of Repoſe; after the diſcharge of our Serious and more Important Duties. And our very Liberties in Diſcourſe, muſt not be Profuſe neither, nor Immodeſt; but only Candid, and Facetious: For as we do not allow our Children all ſorts of Games; but only ſuch ſports as hold ſome proportion with honeſt Actions; So in *Raillery* it ſelf, there muſt be a mixture of *Candour*, as well as *Underſtanding*.

Paſſion diſorders both Mind, and Body.

The Bounds of Mirth.

THERE

THERE are two ſorts of *Raillery*, or *Mirth*; the One is *Courſe*, *Petulant*, *Criminal*, and *Foul*; the *Other*, *Cleanly*, *Gracious*, *Ingenious*, and *Facetious*: In which kind, not only *Plautus*, and the *Greek Comedians*, but the Followers of *Socrates*, have written much; and ſtuffed their Books with a great many of their *ſayings*, and *Conceipts*: As *Cato*'s Collection of *Apothegm*'s, &c. Now 'tis an Eaſie matter, to diſtinguiſh betwixt a *Courſe*, and a *Cleanly way* of *Feſting*. The *One*, is *a word in ſeaſon*, only for *Recreation*, and worthy of a man of Honour. The *Other*, not fit for an *Honeſt man*; eſpecially where *filthy Things* are deliver'd in as *Uncleanly Words*. Two Sorts of Raillery, ſcurrilous and facetious.

NAY in our very *Recreations*, we ſhould keep within Compaſs; and have a Care that we do not laſh out into Exceſſes, and paſs the Limits of Modeſty, in the Tranſports of our Pleaſures. The Chace of Wild Beaſts, and the Military and Manly Exerciſes that are Practis'd in our Field, or *Campus Martius*: Theſe I reckon to be Honorable pleaſures; and we need never want theſe ways of Diverſion. Honeſt and Manly Pleaſures.

BUT whatever we do, it ſhould be always in our Thought, the Excellency of *Humane Nature*, above That of *Brutes*; which are only puſh'd on by *Violent Appetites* to *Senſual pleaſures*: Whereas the Enterteinment of a mans Mind, is *Learning* and *Meditation*; which is never Idle, but ſtill employ'd either upon Enquiry, or Action; and charmed with a The Excellency of Man.

delight that ariſes from what we hear, or ſee. Nay the very man himſelf, that is moſt addicted to his Pleaſures: (if he has but the Soul of a Man in him, and not only the *Name*, without the *Effect* (for ſuch there are) Though he may be overcome by his *Luſts*, he yet ſtands ſo right, as to be *aſham'd of*, to *conceal*, and to *diſguiſe* his *Love* of Thoſe *pleaſures*, even for *Modeſty* ſake; which ſhews that the *Pleaſures* of the *Body*, are not worthy of the *Dignity* of the *Soul*; but rather *Contemptible*, and to be *rejected*. But if any man ſhall be found to have a great Regard for Pleaſures, let him be ſure to uſe them with *Moderation*. In our very *Cloaths*, and *Dyet*, we ſhould ſtill keep an Eye rather to matter of *Health*, and *Strength*, then to the humouring of the *Phanſie*, or *Palate*; and if we ſhall but duly weigh, and examine the Dignity, and Excellency of Nature; we ſhall quickly find how ſhameful a Thing it is to diſſolve in a Luxurious ſoftneſs, and Delicacy: And how becoming, on the other ſide, to live Frugally, Temperately, Gravely, and Soberly.

Brutal Pleaſures.

Man has Two Capacities.

EVERY man muſt be underſtood to be inveſted with *Two Capacities*; the One *Common* to *Mankind*, as endu'd with *Reaſon*; and in a preference to *Beaſts*, from whence we do not only derive the Knowledge of Decency, and Virtue; but the very means of finding out our ſeveral Duties. The Other is a Propriety that has a reſpect particularly to *Individuals*. There is a great difference in *Bodies*: One man is better for a *Courſe*, Another for

A great Diverſity both in Minds and Bodies.

for a *Skuffle*; and so in *Beauties*; *One Beauty* is *Imperious*, and *Majestical*; *Another*, *Charming*. Now there are at least as great *diversities*, and *Varieties* in our *Minds*. L. *Crassus*, and *L. Philippus*, were both of them of a *Natural*, Wonderfuly Gentle, and Gracious; and Both these qualities were yet more Eminent; and more Labour'd too, in *C. Cæsar*, the Son of *Lucius*. There was a strange Austerity of of Humour, in *M. Scaurus*, and *M. Drusus*; and in the same Time, and as yet in their Youth too. *C. Lælius* was *Gay*, and *Pleasant*; his Friend *Scipio* more *Ambitious*, and *Reserved*. It is reported, that *Socrates*, among the *Greeks*, was a Gentle and a pleasant Companion; a Wit that lay much upon *Innocent Raillery*, and had an Excellent faculty of speaking his Mind, under an agreeable Disguise. *Pythagoras*, on the other side, and *Pericles*, advanc'd themselves, without any Gayety of Humour at all. Among the *Carthaginians*, *Hannibal*, and among *our Own Commanders*, *Q. Maximus* have the Name of men extremely *Close*, and *Secret*, *Silent*, *Dissembling*; notably good at *Stratagems*; or setting Spies upon an Enemy, and disappointing their Counsels. Those that the *Greeks* have the greatest esteem of, are *Themistocles*, the *Athenian*, and *Jason* the *Pheræan*. But above all, they magnifie that profound, and politique Fetch of *Solon*; who, for the advantage of the Commonwealth, and for his Own security, counterfeited himself *Mad*. There are others now, so far from This Artifice, that they are *Simple* and *Open*: to the degree of not

Several Humours.

not enduring any thing but what's done above board; They will not ſuffer any thing that looks like Treachery. Theſe men are the Servants of *Tryth*, and the Enemies of *Fraud*. There are others again, that will bear any thing, and crouch to any man, for their own Ends; as *Sylla*, and *M. Craſſus*; The *Lacedemonian Lyſander* is ſaid to have been a great Maſter of his Art in This kind; and yet *Callicratides*, that ſucceeded him in his Command of the Navy, is reported to have been quite of another humour. And we find diverſity as well in the *Stile*, and *Faſhion* of *Speaking*, as in the *difference* of *Manners*. As you ſhall ſee men of great Authority, and Parts, that yet wont themſelves to the Phraſe and Language of the Common people: As the *Two Catulus's*, Father and Son, and the like *Q. Mutius Maucinus*, which I my ſelf am a Witneſs of. Nay I have heard old Men ſay, that *P. Scipio* of *Naſica*, had that way with him; but his Father the Clean Contrary; and no Grace of Speech in the World. I ſpeak of him that reveng'd the Commonwealth, upon the *Seditious* attempts of *Tiberius Gracchus*. And no more had *Xenocrates*, the ſevereſt of Philoſophers; and yet Famous, and Eminent for that very Sowerneſs. There are a World of *Other diſſimilitudes*, both of *Nature*, and *Manners*, which are not yet to be deſpiſed. So that every man ſhould do well to ſtick to That Inclination that nature has given him in particular; provided that it be not Vitious; and by ſo doing, he ſhall eaſily more diſcover and attain

tain the *Decorum* which we look for in this place.

BUT yet we are so to behave our selves, that without opposing *Common Nature*, we follow the *Dictates, every man* of his *Own Genius*; and tho' other things may perhaps be weightier, and better, we are yet to take our Measures according to the Bent of our Own Particular. For 'tis in vain to struggle with Nature; or to persue any thing which we cannot attain. From hence it is, that we must gather the Knowledge of what becomes us. For nothing can be *Graceful*, that lays a *Force* upon *Nature*. In short; there is nothing more *becoming*, in humane Life, then an *Equability*, and *Congruity* of our *Actions*; which, if ever we depart from, and pass to the *Affectation* of *another mans Nature*, we lose *our Own*. For as we are to use our Own Native Language, without forcing forreign Words into it (as some people do) and make themselves only ridiculous for their pains) so should we, in our LIVES, and *Actions*, make our selves all of a piece. Nature is the best Mistress.

NAY, so sensible is This difference of Natures, that one man shall be *honour'd* for *destroying of himself*, and another *condemned* for it; all in the same Case; as it was with *Marcus Cato* that *kill'd himself*, and the Rest that *rendred themselves* up to *Cæsar* in *Affrica*. This might perhaps have turn'd to their reproach, if they had laid violent hands upon themselves; For an action so heroical would have born no The same thing Good in one, and Ill in another.

no proportion with the ſoftneſs and facility of their Ways and Manners, but rather have introduc'd an *Incongruity* betwixt their *Lives*, and *Deaths*. But for *Cato*, that was a man naturally *Grave*, and *Severe*, (even to a Miracle) and harden'd to it by a long habit of Conſtancy; a man unalterably *Firm* to his *purpoſe*, and *reſolution*; it made for the *dignity* of his *Humour*, and *Character*, rather to ſupport *death* it ſelf, then the *frown* and *Dominion* of a *Tyrant*. How many miſeries did *Ulyſſes* ſuffer, in that tedious Ramble of his, enſlaving himſelf to Women, (if a body may give *Circes*, and *Calypſo* that name) and a Complaiſance upon all Occaſions to all ſorts of people? Nay at his own houſe, how patiently did he put up the Contempts, and Flouts of the meaneſt of his Servants there? Whereas *Ajax*, according to the report we have of him, would have born a thouſand Deaths, rather then thoſe Contumelies. This Contemplation ſhould make every man look into himſelf, to ſee what he has of his *Own*, and to make his beſt of *That*, without diſguiſing himſelf, to act the part of *Another*. *That which every man has Peculiar to himſelf, is the thing which beſt becomes him.* Wherefore every man ſhould take a true Eſtimate of what he is, and impartially examine his Abilities, and Defects; What he can do, and what he cannot. That we may be, at leaſt, as wiſe in our *Lives*, as *Comedians* are upon the *Stage*; who make *Choice*, not ſo much of the *Beſt Parts*, or *Plays*, as of the *fitteſt* for their *diſpoſition*. He that has the ſtrongeſt Voice, chuſes the Tragedy

Let every man Act his own Part.

Tragedy of *Epigonus*, or *Medea*: The best Actor prefers *Melippe*, or *Clytæmnestra*. *Rutilius* (whom I remember) always acted *Antiope*; and sometimes *Æsopus* play'd *Ajax*. Shall a *Stage-player* now take more care of himself in a *Comedy*, then a *Wise man* in his *Life*? Let every man see in the *first* place, *which way* his Talent Lies; and in the *next*, let him endeavor to *improve* it. But if we should be forc'd at any time, by necessity, to play a Part that we were never made for; let it be our Care, Study, and Thought, so to behave our selves, that at least we may not *lose* our Credit, where we cannot *get* any. So that the best of this case will be to avoid *Shame*, without pretending to get a *Reputation*, by the forcing of our *Nature*.

NOW to those *two parts* already spoken of, that is to say, of *Common Nature*, and *particular Inclination*, there is a *Third*, that is cast upon us either by Time, or Chance, and yet a *Fourth*, which we accommodate according to our own Judgment. For Kingdoms Empires, Dignities, Honours, Riches, with their Contraries, are all of them in the hand of Fortune, and governed by the Revolution of Times. Now it is wholly at our own Choyce, what part we will Sustein. Wherefore One man takes to *Philosophy*, another, to the *Civil Law*, a Third to *Rhetorique*, and a Fourth affects an Excellency rather in *One Virtue* then in *Another*. But for those whose Ancestors were any of them very Famous; They commonly study to get Reputation by treading

Let every man chuse his own Study.

treading in Their Steps: As *Q. Mucius* follow'd his Father *Publius* in the *Civil Law*: And *Scipio Affricanus* emulated his Father in Feats of *Arms*. Some again are not content with the honour they derive from their *Predeceſſors*, unleſs they add ſomewhat to it of their Own. As *Affricanus* did yet Augment and Illuſtrate the Honour of his *Military Knowledge* by his *Particular Eloquence*. And ſo did *Timotheus*, the Son of *Conon*, who being a *Captain* not inferior to his *Father*, made himſelf yet greater by the Addition of *Letters* and *Underſtanding*. But it happens ſometimes that the Son declines the Imitation of the Father, and betakes himſelf rather to ſome Courſe, or deſign of his own; which is a thing often found in men of large minds, that are deſcended from obſcure Parents. All theſe Circumſtances muſt be taken into Conſideration, in the queſtion of *This Decorum*.

Some Courſe of Life muſt be pitched upon.

THE Firſt point in Deliberation is This, what it is that we deſign either to *Be*, or to *do*; and what Courſe of Life to take to. In this Deliberation, there is great hazard, and difficulty. For it is in our Youth, that we are to reſolve, and pitch upon the Condition we propound; at which time, we are leaſt able to judge of it. So that we are commonly engag'd in ſome certain purpoſe of Life, before we are able to diſtinguiſh betwixt a Better and a worſe. For although (according to the Report of *Prodicus*, out of *Xenophon*) ſo ſoon as ever *Hercules* came out of

of his *Minority* (the time for every man to chooſe what Courſe of Life he will Steer) he retir'd into a *Solitude*, and upon the Sight of *Two ways*, the *One*, of *Virtue*, and the *Other* of *Pleaſure*, he ſat a long time conſidering with himſelf, which of the Two ways he ſhould take: Yet this might do well enough for *Hercules*, that was the Son of *Jupiter*, but not for us, I fear, that commonly follow thoſe men ſtill that we like beſt; and take up an affection for Their ways, and Studies. And yet for thoſe that are trained up under the Inſtitution of their Parents; they do commonly and inſenſibly contract an Affection for the Methodes and Cuſtoms of their Education. Others are carried away by the Stream of Popular practice; eſteeming That ſtill to be the Beſt; that pleaſes the *moſt*. And yet ſome there are, that lead the Courſe of Life they ought to do; induced thereunto, either by Providence; a certain Felicity, or Goodneſs of Nature; a Virtuous Inclination, or ſome particular advantage of their Inſtitution: But it is a very rare thing to find a Concurrence of Eminent Wit, and Learning; or to find Either of them, with ſo much Time for deliberation, as is needful for the Election of a profitable Courſe of Life. In this deliberation, a regard muſt be had to That which is moſt proper, and Natural to every particular: For (as is already ſaid) ſince in whatever we do, we muſt enquire into every mans particular *Genius*, before we can ſay what becomes him; ſo we muſt be more Careful yet, in the Eſtabliſhment of our Own Lives,

Lives, to see that we maintain an Equality in the Main; and that we never differ from our selves, or falter in our Duty.

Nature and Fortune to be consulted what course of Life.

BUT since *Nature* has the *greatest* power in *This Case*; and *Fortune*, the *next*; we must consult them *Both*; what Course of Life to fix upon; But *Nature*, in the *first place*: For She is much Firmer, and more Constant; and it is not for *Fortune*, that is *Frail* and *Mortal*, to contend with *Immortal Nature*: Whosoever therefore shall Conform, in the Ordering of his Life, to the Inclinations of an uncorrupted Nature, must keep constantly to that Tenour, which is the *Decorum* of Life; unless he find himself mistaken in his Choice. And in That Case (for it is a Case to be put) there must be a Change admitted of Purposes and Manners. And That change will be more easily and commodiously wrought, under the favour of Times and Occasions: But where the Season is not favourable, it must be Introduc'd by Little and Little; as Wise men say of Inconvenient, and Ill Grounded Friendships; 'tis better to unstitch then to tear them all to pieces on a sodain. But when we have once alter'd our Course, we must be infinitely Careful to make it appear, that we have done it upon good, and weighty Reasons. Now whereas I have, (in what is aforesaid) propounded the Imitation of our Predecessors; let me not be thought to advise an Imitation of them in their Vices: beside that there are many things wherein Nature is not to be Imitated.

tated. As the Son of *Africanus the Elder.* (he that adopted the Son of *Paulus Æmilius.*) It was not possible for him, by reason of the Crazineſs of his body to be ſo like his Father, as the Other was like His. Wherefore if a man be not in Condition to plead at the Bar; to *Harangue* the People in *Publique Aſſemblies*, or to *lead Armies*; there are ſome Duties yet in his power, which he is obliged to perform: as the *Offices* of *Juſtice*, *Faith*, *Liberality*, *Modeſty*, *Temperance*, which Benefits will fairly ſupply the want of the Other. The beſt of *Patrimonies* is the *Reputation* of *Great*, and *Virtuous Actions*, and *Anceſtors*; and the Son that does not uphold the Renown of his Father, is a Shame, and a Scandal to it.

Let every man do all the Good he can.

NOW in regard that there are *ſeveral Duties* properly belonging to *ſeveral Ages*; and many things that becoming a *Young* man, would be ridiculous, in an *Old*; we ſhall ſay ſomething alſo under That diſtinction.

IT is the duty of a *Young man* to Reverence his *Elders*, and to make his Choice of the Beſt, and moſt approved among them, for his Directors and Governors: For the Ignorance, and Folly of Youth ſhould be ordered, and inſtructed, by the *prudence* and *experience* of the *Aged*. But above all things, he ſhould be reſtreined from *Looſe* and *Wanton pleaſures*; and trained up rather in *Laborious exerciſes*; and in the *Fatigues*, and *Toyles*, both of *Body*, and *Mind*. For it makes men *Vigorous*, and *Induſtrious*, as well in *War*, as in *Peace*: and even in the Intervals of Liberty, and Refreſhment,

The Duty of a Young man.

Youth ſhould be Temperate and Induſtrious.

young Men ſhould have a Care of *Intemperance*; and not to paſs the Bounds of *Modeſty*: which will be the more Eaſily atteined, if they be often in the Eyes of their *Seniors* and *Tutors*.

The Buſineſs of Age is Wiſdom.

WHEN we come to be in *Years*, the labours of the body muſt be abated, and we ſhould encreaſe thoſe of the Mind: But ſtriving ſtill, by all means to be ſerviceable to our Friends, and to our Juniors, by our Advice, and Wiſdom; but principally to the Commonwealth.

Beware of Sloth and Luxury.

But above all things, have a Care of a Drowſie, a Languiſhing, and a Laſie Old Age; and ſo likewiſe of a Luxurious; which, as it is reproachful and diſhonorable, in this Caſe it is moſt of all. But if the Intemperance of *Luſt*, be added to it, the Miſchief is Double. *Firſt*, the *Infamy* which it reflects upon *Age it ſelf*; and *Then*, the *Ill Example*, in Authorizing young men to be more Shamleſs and wicked.

IT would not be impertinent, here to ſpeak ſomething of the Duties of *Magiſtrates*, *Private Citizens*, and *Strangers*.

The Duty of a Magiſtrate.

The *Magiſtrates* part, is to conſider himſelf as the *Repreſentative* of the *City*; and to uphold the *Honour*, and *Dignity* of it; to obſerve the *Laws*, and *Cuſtoms*, to do *Juſtice*; and to remember, that all Theſe things are committed to his *Charge*.

A private man.

It is the part of a *Private Man*, to live with his *fellow Citizens*, under *one Common Bond* of *Legal Duty*; neither falling ſo Low, as to make himſelf deſpicable, nor too much exalting himſelf; And never to entertein any Thought,

Thought, but to the Glory, and Peace of the Commonwealth. This is the man that we esteem, and pronounce to be a worthy Citizen. As to the Duty of a *Stranger*; let him mind his Own business, and not intermeddle with Other peoples, but keep himself within his Compass. By these means it will be understood, when it shall come to be diligently examin'd, what is most becoming us, under the several Circumstances of *Persons*, *Times*, and *Ages*: But there is nothing so Graceful, as to behave our selves equally, and steadily, in all our Actions, and Councels. And a Stranger.

BUT this Gracefulness shews it self in all our Words, and Deeds, nay in the very Motions, and Postures, of the body; and consists principally in Beauty, Order, and a kind of Air, or Agreement suitable to every thing we do. 'Tis a hard matter to express This; but it shall suffice, that it may be easily understood. In the Observance of These three Points, we render our selves Acceptable in our Conversation with all People. And so much for This too. The Decorum of the Body.

NATURE has undoubtedly taken great Care in the forming of Mans Body, exposing only Those parts to sight, that are Beautiful, Comly, and Agreeable to the Eye: and keeping Those parts conceal'd, and Cover'd, which would give Offence if they were laid open to View; and serve us only for Unclean, and Common Necessities. There is no question, but the Modesty of the Mind conforms it self, in this particular, to the exquisite fabrique of the The Seeds of Modesty are in Nature.

Body; For whatſoever Nature has conceal'd, all men in their right Wits, do naturally keep out of ſight, and as private as poſſible, in Compliance with their very Neceſſities. Now for Thoſe parts of the body which are of moſt neceſſary uſe to man; we neither call the part, nor the uſe of it, by the proper Name; and that which may be honeſtly done, (if ſecretly) we cannot ſo much as honeſtly name. Inſomuch, that thoſe things cannot be done openly without Impudence: nor ſo much as mention'd, without obſcenity. Wherefore there's no hearkning to the *Ciniques*, or to the *Old Stoiques*, (which are almoſt *Cyniques*) that blame and laugh at us, for reckoning thoſe things to be *foul*, in *Words*; which are *not ſo*, in *Truth*. And yet Thoſe things which we *all agree* to be *foul*, we can yet call by *Their own names*. As *Theft*, *Couſenage*, *Adultery*, are all *diſhoneſt* in the *Deed*; and yet we uſe the *Words* without *Scruple*. To beget Children, is an honeſt Action; but it wears a Courſe name; and we find a great deal more to this purpoſe, againſt Modeſty, in their Diſputations. But we are to follow Nature, and to fly whatſoever may offend either the Eye, or the Ear of a Modeſt man. Nay, in our very Poſtures, and Geſtures; as Walking, Standing, Sitting, Lying; in the very Countenance, the Eye, the Motion of the hands, there muſt a regard be had ſtill to that which is Becoming. In all This, there are *Two things* we ſhould *beware* of. The *One*, not to do any thing that is *Looſe*, *Nice*, and *Effeminate*; The *Other*, to *void* things that look *Harſh*, *Rough*, and

The Obſcene humour of the *Cyniques*.

A Decency in Geſtures and Poſtures.

and *Uncivil*. For why should That which *becomes* an *Orator*, or a *Comedian, misbeseem us?* The Discipline of the *Theatre* has a long time had such a regard to *Modesty*; that no man enters upon the Stage, without *Drawers*, least some part of the body should come to be discover'd by Chance that ought to be Conceall'd. The *Roman Customs* will not allow Sons, when they are Men grown, so much as to Bath, with their Fathers; Or Sons in Law, with their Wives Parent. In these points of Virtuous Modesty, Nature is both our Mistress, and our Guide.

The Modesty of the *Romans*.

OF *Beauty*, or *Agreeableness*, there are *Two Kinds*; the *One* is matter of *Gracefulness*; the *Other*, of *Dignity*; and we may call them *Male*, and *Female*: It is not for a man to be Trickt out with *Fooleries*; or to have any thing that is *Phantastical*, or *Effeminate*; no, not so much as in his very *Motion*, or *Gesture*. How are we disgusted many times, at the Conceipted actions of *Stage-Players?* And the more Odious, and affected Motions of Wrastlers? And yet we Commend that which is Natural, and Simple, both in the One, and in the Other. The dignity of the Countenance is Maintein'd by a good Colour: and That Colour by the Exercise of the Body; and to all This we should keep our selves *Neat* and *Cleanly*; not to the degree of *Niceness*, and *Affectation*, but only so, as not to incur the censure of *Rudeness*, *Sluttery*, and *Neglect*. And the same Rule we should observe in our *Garments*: In which particular,

Of Dignity and Gracefulness.

Affectation is Odious.

A Meane does beſt.

as well as in other things, a *mediocrity* does beſt. In our *walking* we muſt neither march ſo *Slow*, as if we were officiating at a ſolemnity; nor yet make ſuch *poſt-haſt*, as to run our ſelves out of breath, and put the Mouth, or the Countenance into diſorder; which is a ſign of a Light, and Unſteady humour. But we muſt take more peins, yet, to keep the *Mind* in a temper of Conformity to *Nature*; which we may eaſily compaſs, if we can but preſerve our ſelves from Falling into *Tranſports*, and *Perturbations*, and diligently attend to a Conſervation of the *Decorum* here preſcribed. The *Motions* of the *Mind* are *Two-fold*. *Some* are of *Thought*, and others of *Appetite*. Theſe of *Thought* are chiefly employed in the finding out of The *Truth*. Thoſe of *Appetite* puſh a man forward to the *doing* of ſomething. We muſt be careful therefore, *Firſt*, to apply our *Thoughts* to That which is moſt *worthy* of them; and, *Secondly*, to keep the *Appetite* in ſubjection to *Reaſon*.

The Motions of the Mind are Thought and Appetite.

Of Rhetorique, and Ordinary Diſcourſe.

AS to the matter of *Speech*, the Power of it is *Great*; and it is alſo *Two-fold*. The *One* is a Speech of *Contention*; the *Other*, of *Common diſcourſe*. The *Former* is for the *Barre*, for *Publique Aſſemblies*, and for the *Senate*; the *Other*, is for *Ordinary Converſation*, *Caſual diſputes*, *private Meetings* of Company or Friends at the *Table*. The Maſters of *Rhetorique* have given Precepts for the *Former*, but we have none for the *Latter*; altho' perhaps, that might be done too. But there's no body that addicts himſelf That way. For if men would

would but apply themſelves to the Study of it, they would never want Maſters to Teach it. And yet we are all of us Mad upon *Rhetorique*; altho', for what concerns *words*, and *Periods*, the ſame Rules would ſerve Both. It is by the help of the *Voice*, that we *diſcourſe*; and the *Two great advantages* of it, are to be *Clear*, and *Sweet*; We muſt ſtand indebted to *Nature* for them *Both*. And yet *Exerciſe*, and *Practice*, will help us in the *One*; and the *Imitation* of *Smooth* and *gentle Speakers*, may be of uſe to us in the *Other*. What was it but This, that gave the *Catuli* ſo fair a Reputation, both for Judgment and Language? They were *Learned men*, 'tis true, and ſo were *Others*; but Theſe yet were lookt upon as the great Maſters of the *Latine Tongue*; They had a wonderful Sweetneſs of Voice; and their Pronounciation, neither too loud, and open, nor yet muffled betwixt the Teeth. So that it was both Audible, and Agreeable; and without Any Affectation: The Tone, without any Force, and neither too feint, nor too ſhrill. *L. Craſſus*, 'tis true, was a word-flowing Speaker, and no leſs Ingenious; but for well-ſpeaking, the *Catuli* were no leſs eſteem'd. Now for ſharpneſs, and pleaſure of Wit, *Cæſar*, the Brother of the *Elder Catulus*, went beyond them all. Inſomuch that in his ordinary Diſcourſes, he ſurpaſs'd the beſt Pleaders of his Time. All theſe things, ſeverally, muſt be diligently heeded, to make us underſtand what it is that may beſt become us in every thing.

The Voice ſhould be Clear and Sweet.

Inſtances of Excellent Speakers.

Of Familiar Discourse.

IN *Familiar Speech*, the Followers of *Socrates* are most worthy of Imitation. It should be *Gentle*, without being too *pressing*, or *tedious*; and I would have it *pleasant*, and *entertaining*, in all Cases. Nor would I have any man take possession of a Common Right, in such sort as to Talk all himself, to the Exclusion of Others; but in Discourse, as in Other things, every man to take his Turn. The First thing to be heeded, is the subject Matter of the Discourse. If serious, it must be seriously handled; if Matter of Mirth, a Freedom of Raillery, and Lightness, does well enough with it. But above all things, we must be be Careful in the government of our Speech, not to discover any Vice, or Defect in our Manners; wherein a man is most liable to betray himself, when he talks spitefully of the Absent; and either in Jest, or in Earnest, maliciously exposes them to Contumely, and Reproach. The Ordinary matter of *Familiar Discourse*, is either about *Domestique Affairs*, the *Republique*, or matter of *Studies*, and *Learning*. If at any time we pass These Bounds, we must as soon as may be take up again. But be it as it will, it must be thought upon, how far our Discourse may be Grateful to the Company: For we are not Equally pleased with the same things, at all times. And then, as we begin a discourse upon Reason, we must not continue it beyond Measure. But as it is laid down upon very good Grounds, and as a general Rule, that we should keep our selves Clear from Perturbations, or violent

Cautious.

The Subject of it.

Seasonable and not Tedious.

lent Motions of the Mind, that rebel against Reason, so should we in our Speech keep a guard upon our selves against Those Intemperate Motions; and that we do not lay open our Distempers of Anger, Appetite, Lazines, Heartlesness, or the like. We should be very Careful also in our Conversation, to possess the Company with an Opinion of the Reverence, and Good will that we have for them. There are many Occasions wherein we cannot avoid Chiding; and we may be allow'd sometime, a more then ordinary Contention of Voice; and a sharper severity of Words; but yet This is not to be done neither, as if we were Angry; but we are to proceed to this kind of Reproof, as we do to *Laming*, and *Scarifying*, *rarely*, and *unwillingly*; nor ever at all, but upon *Necessity*, and for want of some other way of Remedy; but not in Anger still upon any Terms; for it never does any thing either well or wisely; And yet it may do well enough to use a Temperate, and a mild way of Rebuke; but still accompany'd with Gravity, that the reprehension may be apply'd without Reproach: It must be also signifi'd that the Only Thing intended by the Reproof, was the Amendment of him that suffers it. Nay, it will become us in our differences, even with our greatest Enemies; in despite of all Indignities yet, to preserve a Gravity; to keep our selves free from Passion; for whatsoever we do in distemper, can neither be well done in it self, nor approved by those that are Witnesses to the doing it. It is a leud thing like-

Nor Passionate.

Respectful.

Let Reproof be without Anger.

Ostentation is Odious.

likewise for a man to talk much of himself; especially with *Thraso*, to brag of things that are false, and to make Sport for the Company.

Of Buildings and Palaces.

BEING now to go through all the Points of *Decency* and *Duty* (as That is my design) I shall say something what kind of House I should think fit for a Person of Honour, or a Prince, so as to have it accommodate for use; for That's the Intent of Building it; and there must yet be had a regard to the State, and Dignity of the Person that Inhabits it. I have been told of *Cn. Octavius* (the *first Consul* of *That Family*) that he was highly reverenc'd for a Magnificent Pile that he built upon the *Palatine-Hill*; and that the Reputation he got by so many peoples coming to see it, open'd his way (being but a new man) to the *Consulship*. *Scaurus* afterward caused That to be demolish'd, for the Enlargement of his Own. The Former brought the Consulship first into his Family; and the Latter, (tho' the Son of an Eminent, and famous Person, and the House enlarged) brought into it, not only a Repulse, but Misery and Shame. It does well to have the Dignity of the Master yet further adorned by House; but not that Dignity to be fetch'd altogether from it. The House should be grac'd by the Master, and not the Master by the House; and it is in a House, as it is in Other Cases: a man must have a respect, not only to himself, but also to Others. In the House of a Person of Eminent Condition, where many Guests, are to be received, and men of all sorts to be admitted

Fit the House to to the Master.

mitted; there must great Care be taken that it be Large Enough: But a large house, without People, disparages the Master of it; and especially if it has been more frequented under a Former Possessor; for 'tis an Odious Thing to have Passengers reflect upon it, and say (as in these Times there's too much Occasion) *Here's the* Old House, *but where's the* Old Master? I would have him that sets upon Building, take special Care not to lash out into Magnificence, and Expence, as a thing of Ill Consequence, even in the Example; for there are too many Imitators in This Kind, of the doings of Princes. How many have we that Emulate the Splendor of *Lucullus's Villa's*, (his Country-houses;) but where is the man that Emulates his Virtue? There must be a *Meane* observ'd in These things; and that Moderation must be transferr'd, in all Cases, to the Use, Ornament, and Convenience of Life. But enough of This.

Keep the Expence within Compass.

IN all Undertakings there are three things to be observ'd. *First*, That we govern our Appetites by *Reason*, which is a sure way to keep us to our Duties. *Secondly*, That we take a right Estimate of our Enterprizes, and allow Time, and Peins, neither more nor less then the matter requires. *Thirdly*, That we keep a Measure, even in those things that are matter of Dignity, and Reputation. We cannot do better, then to observe the *Decorum* already spoken of, without moving one

Three Rules for all Undertakings.

one ſtep beyond it. But the Firſt point is the moſt Excellent of the Three.

The *Decorum* of Place and Time.

WE come now to the *Order of Things*, and the *Opportunity of Seaſons*. Under this Science is comprehended that which the *Greeks* call Εὐταξία by which we underſtand the *Harmony of Order*; and not *That Modeſty* that regards *Temperament*, and *Meaſure*. Now to take it as *Modeſty*; the *Stoical Definition* of it is This, *It is the skill of diſpoſing all our Words, and Actions, in their Proper Place.* So that the *Ordering* of things, and the *placing* of them, are much one and the ſame: For they define *Order* to be only the *laying together of things in their due, and fitting places.* But they tell us, that the *Place* of *Action* reſpects the *Opportunity* of *Time*: Now That ſeaſonable *Time* of *Action*, the *Greeks* call Εὐκαιρία, the *Latins*, *Occaſio*. So that *This Modeſty*, taken in the ſenſe aforeſaid, is *the Knowledge of the Opportunities of Times fit for Action.* Which is a definition that may as well agree with the *Prudence* which we have treated of in the beginning. But in this place we are diſcourſing of *Moderation*, *Temperance*, and Virtues of that quality. Wherefore having lodg'd theſe matters which particularly belong to *Prudence*, in their Right places; we come now to thoſe Virtues that refer to *Modeſty*, and the Gaining of a Good opinion, and Eſteem in the World; of which we have ſpoken largely already.

Order defin'd.

IT

IT ſhould be in the *Order* of *Life*, as in That of an *Artificial*, and *well govern'd Diſcourſe*. All the *Parts* of it ſhould be *Equal*, and *Correſpondent* one to another. Many things do well enough over a Glaſs of Wine, that would be moſt ridiculous and ſhameful, upon a Debate. There ſhould be no fooling in ſerious matters. It was well ſaid of *Pericles*, at a Councel of War, to his *Colleague Sophocles*; that was joined with him in the Command of the Army. As they were upon a Conſultation, there happen'd to paſs by, a very fine Youth. *What a delicate Child is there?* (ſays *Sophocles*; in the middle of the Debate.) *Brother*, (ſays *Pericles*) *a* Generals *Eyes*, *ſhould be as Temperate as his Fingers.* But if the ſame thing had been ſpoken at a publique Spectacle, nothing could have been ſaid againſt it; ſo powerful is the Conſideration of *Time* and *Place*. If a man were upon a *Journy*, and going to Plead a *Cauſe*, no body would blame him for thinking of his Bus'neſs, and conning of his Leſſon, by the way; but That penſive, muſing humour, at a Jolly Entertainment, would be looked upon, to be either want of Wit, or Breeding, in the not diſtinguiſhing of Times. Now for things which are very groſs, as for a man to fall a Singing in a Court of Juſtice; or to do any thing that is notoriouſly prepoſterous, or improper: Theſe are abſurdities ſo well underſtood by all people, that there needs no Precept, or Caution, in the Caſe. But there are certain Nicetie's of Converſation, which

Indecencies in reſpect of Time and Place.

are

The Niceties of Converſation.

are indeed ſo minute, that *ſome* make *ſlight* of them; and *others* do not ſo much as *perceive* them. And yet Theſe are the Points that require our moſt diligent conſideration. For as it is in Muſical Inſtruments, let them be never ſo little out of Tune, a skilful Ear preſently takes Cheque at it: and that's the Caſe in the leaſt diſconſonancy of Life. Only the Offence is ſo much the Greater here, by how much the *Agreement* of our *Actions*, and *Manners* is of greater *value*, and *effect*, then a *Conſent* of *Sounds*. Wherefore, as there is no Jarre, or Diſcord in Muſique, ſo ſmall, as to ſcape the animadverſion of a Critical Ear; no leſs quick, and accurate ought we to be in Cenſuring, and Detecting the Venial Errors of Life; Being led to the knowledge of the greateſt matters, even by the ſmalleſt. From the Motion of the Eye; from a Smooth, or a Contracted Brow; from Sadneſs, Mirth, Laughter, Speech, Silence, nay from the very Tone of Soft, or Loud ſpeaking; and a thouſand ſuch Common Circumſtances, we gather the underſtanding of Humane Duties; and of what Naturally becomes us, and what the Contrary.

By Obſerving Others, we may Reform our ſelves.

NOW toward the Erecting of a true Judgment upon things in This Kind, it were not amiſs for us to begin our Obſervations *abroad*: And then to Avoid, or Correct That in our *ſelves*, which we find misbecoming in *Others*. For ſo it is, (I cannot tell how it comes about) that we are much better at ſpying out our *Neighbours Faults*, then our *Own*: and therefore it is a good and a Profitable Method, the

the teaching of Children to do better, by shewing them in imitation how ill it becomes them to do amiss. In Cases doubtful, and hard to be resolv'd upon, it will behove us to consult men of Learning, and Experience, for Direction. Now it is very Natural for men to follow the Byas of their proper Inclinations. So that we are not only to attend to what any body *says*; but likewise to what he *Thinks*; and even to the very Motive that leads him to That Thought. For as it is with Painters, Statuaries; nay, and with Right Poets too; They love to have their Works expos'd, and, as the World finds fault, to mend them. They take advice upon what's amiss, both with Themselves, and their Friends, and are induc'd to the doing, or not doing; to the Changing, or Correcting of many things by the opinion of Others. But for what concerns Customs, and Civil Institutions, there can be no place there for the prescribing, where the matter it self is a Precept. Neither let a man so much deceive himself, as to imagine that the Example of *Socrates*, for the Purpose, or *Aristippus*, in the saying, or doing of any ill thing against Rules of Government, must presently authorize him to the same Licence: For This Liberty, in those Great and Divine men, we are to look upon as a privilege purchas'd by their Virtues. Now for the *Cyniques* (those Enemies of *Shame*, and Consequently of *Honesty*, and *Virtue*) there's no enduring of them. To Magistrates, and Persons in Authority, we are to pay all Honour, and Reverence, and so likewise

Great Virtues are a Privilege to some Mistakes.

likewise to all those worthy Patriots that have spent their Lives in Great, and Honest Actions; and in the service of their Country. We owe a respect also to Grey hairs, and even to Those that are but designed to any Administration in the Government. We must distinguish betwixt a Citizen and a Stranger, and even in a Stranger, betwixt a Private Person, and a Publique. But to summ up all in Word; it is our Duty to Cherish, Maintein, and Preserve Unity, Peace, and Good Agreement, in Humane Society.

A General Duty.

WE come now to the matter of *Trade*, and *Profit*, which we find to be divided into *Liberal*, (or in Vulgar *English*, *Creditable*) and *Sordid*. There are some *Painful Employments* that carry along with them a *General Odium*; as that of a *Tax gatherer*, or an *Usurer*. These, in the first place, I do not like; and I do also look upon all *Mercenary Dealings*, where we pay for the *Work*, and not for the *Art*, to be *Meane*, and *Ignoble*. The very Price of the *Commodity* is a kind of *Covenanting* for *Slavery*. It is also a *Course Business*, That of a *Retayler*, that only buys in a Lump, to sell again in Parcels: For they get their very Bread commonly by Lying; which is a most Unmanly submission. And so for all *Mechaniques*, they are men of Low, and Vulgar business, and we are not to expect any thing that is Clear, and Generous, from the Shop. I am likewise with *Terence*, no friend to those Trades that Minister to Luxury; as *Fishermen*, *Butchers*, *Cooks*, *Pudding-makers*, *Fishmongers*;

Of Trade. Which is either forbid.

And Voluptuary.

gers; nor to the *Voluptuous Arts*, as *Perfumers*, *Dancing-masters*, and the whole Mistery of *Gaiming*. But for those Professions that require a greater measure of *Prudence*, and minister *Advantage* in proportion; as *Physique*, *Architecture*, the furnishing of *Good Instructions*; These are commendable Employments, where they suit with the Condition of him that uses them. And then for *Merchandizing*, the driving of a *petty Trade*, That way, is little better than *Peddling*. But when it comes to be *Large*, and *General*, and to be menag'd back and forward, with *Candor*, and *Credit*: it is no contemptible Application. Nay, on the Contrary, This way of Commerce is highly to be esteem'd; when he that has made his Fortune by it, sits down (not satiated, but) contented; and retires as well from his *Port*, to the *Country*, as he has done many a time from the *Sea* to the *Port*, and there quietly enjoys himself, and his Possessions. Of all *Beneficial Industry*, Certainly there is not any thing more Agreeable, or more Worthy of a Man of *Honour*, and *Reason*, then the *Culture* and *Improvement* of the *Earth*; which being a Subject handled at large in our *Cato Major*, we shall refer you thither for your satisfaction.

Of Candour and Credit.

Here is enough said already upon the *several parts* of *Virtue*, and our Duties arising from thence. It remains now to consider in a Case of *two Duties* before us, *which to chuse*: (a thing that often happens) and of *Two honest Propositions*, which is the *Honester*, is the

Of Two Duties, which to Chuse.

Queſtion: (a Point omitted by *Panætius*.) For ſince there is *no Virtue*, but what iſſues from One of theſe *four Fountains*, and has a reſpect either *to Knowledge, Society, Courage*, or *Moderation*; it muſt neceſſarily be, that upon a *Complication* of theſe *Virtues*, there muſt likewiſe enſue a *Competition* of *Duties*. Now it is my *Opinion*, that Mankind is Naturally more concerned in Offices that relate to the *Community*, then in matters that only affect the *Underſtanding*; which may be thus made out. Take a wiſe man, that has the World at Will, both for Fortune, and Leiſure; let him conſider with himſelf, and comtemplate all things whatſoever, that are worth the Knowing. He would be yet ſick of his Life, for all this, if he were to ſpend his time wholly in ſolitude, and without a Companion.

Wiſdom is the principal Virtue.

The Principal Virtue is (as I have ſaid) That, which the *Greeks* call σοφία, and *Wee, Wiſdom*. But their φρόνησις (or *Prudence*) is quite Another thing; being *the skill of Judging what we are to do, and what not*: Or of diſtinguiſhing betwixt Good and Evil. Whereas *Wiſdom* (which we call the Principal) *is the Knowledge of things Divine and Humane*: wherein is Comprehended a certain Correſpondence betwixt the Gods, and Men, and a Society among Themſelves. Now if *This* be the moſt Eminent *Virtue*, as Certainly it is: So muſt that likewiſe be the moſt Eminent *Duty*, which refers to *Community*. For the *Speculation* and *Perception* of things, is but *lame* and *imperfect*, if it be not follow'd with *Action*; which *Action* is beſt ſeen, in providing for

for the *Common Benefits* of *Mankind*? And must therefore be reduced to the Subject of Humane Society; in preference to the naked Understanding of things. And this does every Good man find to be True, upon his Own Practice, and Observation. For where's the man, that is so transported with a Thirst of Knowledge; or a desire of piercing into the Nature of things, that if he should be call'd upon the sodain, to the Relief of his Country, his Father, or his Friend, that were in danger: Where is the Man (I say) that in the heat and rapture of his most Divine Contemplations, would not quit All, to attend this Duty, even supposing him to be in his Thoughts already numbring the Stars, and taking measure of the Universe? This gives us to understand, that the Offices of *Justice*, conducing to the Common Utility of Mankind (then which nothing ought to be dearer to us) are of so much greater importance, then These of *Study*, and *Science*; and never was any man so taken up in his Life, and Application, with the search of Knowledge, as not yet to have an Eye to his Duty to the Publique; and to Consult the well-being of Sociable Nature: As we see in the Instance of *Lycias* the *Pythagorean*, to the *Theban Epaminondas*; and in That of *Pluto*, to *Dion* of *Syracuse*: and divers others that train'd up their Disciples to the Love, Knowledge, and Exercise of Civil Duties. And for the service, (if any at all) which I my self have render'd to the *Republique*, I must ascribe it to my Masters, and to my Books, that instructed, and fitted Me for

Justice more valuable than Science.

Our Country in the first place.

my Function. For great men do not only teach the Lovers of Learning during their *Lives*; but in their very *Graves* too: Transmitting their Precepts down to after times, for the Use of Posterity. Now to shew how much Their Leisures contributed to our Business; These Eminent men have not slipt so much as any one point apperteining to the Laws, Manners, and Discipline of the Commonwealth; but have still, with all their Faculties, applyed the Fruits of their Labours and Studies, to the well-being of the Publique. So that a Copious Eloquence, joined with Prudence, is much more profitable, then the most refin'd subtilty of *Thought*, without *speaking*. For *Meditation* does only *Circulate* within it self; Whereas *Eloquence* works upon *Others*, and Insinuates it self into the Affections of all that Hear it. We must not imagine that *Bees* gather into Swarms, upon a design to make their *Cells*, but it is in their Nature to *Congregate*, and then they work their *Combs*. And so it is with *Men*, who are much more Sociable by Nature; when they are gotten together, they Consult their Common business. Now for That Virtue (of *Justice*) which provides for the Defence, and Conservation of Men in Society; if it be not accompanied with the *Understanding* of Things, it is but *solitary*, and *Fruitless*. And what is *Courage*, without the softness of Humane *Courtesie*, and *Candour*, but a *Savage*, and *Outrageous Brutality*? From hence we may infer the Excellency of a *Practical Justice*, in the Ordering of *Mankind*: above the force, and effect of a *Speculative*

lative Notion. There are some people that Phansie all Leagues and Associations amongst men, to arise from the need that one man has for another, toward the supplying of our Natural, and Common Necessities: because (say They) if Providence had deliver'd us from This Care of Looking after Food, and Cloathing, by appointing some Extraordinary way for the furnishing of it; no man, of either Brains, or Virtue, would ever trouble his head about Business; but wholly deliver himself up to the attaining of Wisdom. But This is a mistake: For even in That Condition, a man would fly Solitude, and wish for a Companion in his very Studies: he would be willing to Teach, and to Learn; to Hear, and to Speak. So that beyond question, the Duties that defend, and support men in Society, are more to be esteem'd then those, that barely relate to Learning, and Knowledge.

Leagues are more for Society then Defence.

IT may be another Question whether *This Community* which is so Consonant to Nature, be in all Cases to be preferr'd to *Modesty*, and *Moderation*. Now I think Not. For there are some things, partly so foul, and in part so flagitious, that a wise man (even if it were to save his Country) would not be guilty of them. *Posidonius* has made a large Collection of such Cases: But so filthy, so obscene, that a man cannot honestly repeat them. Now why should any man do that for the saving of his Country, which his Country it self would rather perish, that any

Justice and Temperance compar'd.

member of it ſhould do? But however, this is the beſt on't; that it can never be for the Intereſt of the *publique*, to have a wiſe man do any ſuch thing. Let it be therefore concluded, that of All Duties we are to prefer thoſe that tend toward the Mainteining of Society. For a *Conſiderate Action preſumes an Antecedent Cognition, and Wiſdom.* So that it is more to *Do Conſiderately*, then to *Think Wiſely*. But let This ſuffice; for the matter is made ſo plain, that there will be no difficulty to reſolve upon *Two Duties* in *queſtion*, which to *Chuſe*. But then in the Community it ſelf, there are ſeveral Degrees of Duties, in ſubordination one to another. The *Firſt* is what we owe to the Immortal *Gods*; the *Second*, to our *Country*; the *Third*, to our *Parents*, and ſo in Order, ſucceſſively, to Others. Upon a Brief Diſquiſition of This matter, it will appear that the point in debate, is not only which is *honeſt*, and which the *Contrary*: but of *Two honeſt Propoſitions*; which is the *Honeſter*; and then, which is the *Honeſteſt of All*. This (as I have ſaid) was ſlipt by *Panætius*; but let us now proceed.

Degrees of Duties.

The End of the Firſt Book.

TULLY's

TULLY's OFFICES.

The Second BOOK.

IN What manner Duties ariſe from Virtue, and from every diſtinct Branch of it, is ſufficiently explained, (as I conceive) in the Former Book. It remains now (my Son *Marcus*) that we proceed upon ſome certain ſorts of Duty, that have a regard to the ſplendor and Ornament of Life: As to Riches, Power; and a Competent proviſion of things Commodious for the Uſe of Man. The matter in queſtion was, (as I told you) *Firſt*, what is *Profitable*, and what *not*. *Secondly*, What is *more Profitable*, *Comparatively* with that which is *Leſs*: And *Laſtly*, What's *moſt Profitable* of All things, *without Compariſon*. You have here the Subject of This Treatiſe: But

The Subject of This Book.

before I enter upon the Diſcourſe it ſelf, I muſt give you a word or two of my Purpoſe, and Intention.

The Introduction.

THERE are a great many I know that have been excited, by My Books, to the Love of Letters: And to the love, not only of Reading, but of Writing alſo: And yet Philoſophy has gotten ſo Ill a Name in the World, (verily with ſome good men too) that I am afraid ſometimes, of hazzarding my Credit with them; for beſtowing ſo much Time, and Labour, upon This Study. But truely, for my Own part, ſo long as the Management of Publique Affairs paſt thorough thoſe hands, to which the Commonwealth had deliver'd up it ſelf: All my Thoughts, and Cares were directed That way. But when One man came to Graſp all, and that there was no longer Any place for Authority, or Counſel, (thoſe Publique-ſpirited men being gone too, that had been my Partners in the Charge of the Government) It was not for me, either on the One hand, to abandon my ſelf to an Anxious, and irkſome Melancholy; or, on the other, to plunge my ſelf into Pleaſures, below the Dignity of my Profeſſion. Oh! that the Republique might have continu'd ſtill in the Former ſtate, without falling into thoſe hands; that ſought, not ſo much the Change of Affairs, as the Total Ruine of them. For if the Commonwealth were Now ſtanding, I ſhould be doing at this inſtant juſt as I did before. Firſt, my Buſ'neſs would lie more at the Bar, then in my Study; and Secondly,

Secondly, I ſhould now be ſetting down my Pleadings, as formerly, inſtead of theſe Morals: But ſince the Diſſolution of the Government, that took up all my Cares, my Thoughts, my Studies; There's no more Law, or Senate-Imployment. Matters being brought to This Paſs, (and 'tis not for any man that has a Soul, to ſit ſtill, and do nothing) What could I better do, then to betake my ſelf to my Philoſophy; My Firſt Study, and the moſt Innocent, the Honeſteſt Diverſion of my Troubles? It was the Inſtitution of my Youth; and I ſpent a great deal of Time upon't: Till I came afterward to puſh my Fortune in the World, for Offices, and Preferments; and Then I dedicated my ſelf wholly to the Government: But ſtill reſerving Thoſe hours for Philoſophy, which I had to ſpare from the Publique, and my Friends; and Thoſe very hours were ſpent in Reading too; for I had no Leiſure to Write. The Calamity of thoſe Times was Extreme: and yet we have drawn This Benefit from it, that we are now at Liberty to commit thoſe things to Letters, which our Countrymen were very little acquainted with, tho' in themſelves infinitely worth the Knowing. For (*in the name of all the Gods!*) *What is more deſirable then* Wiſdom? *more Excellent; more uſeful to a man? or what more worthy of him?* We call the Lovers of it, *Philoſophers*, from the very *Etymon* of the word: For *Philoſophy*, by Interpretation, is only *the Love of Wiſdom.* The Antients defin'd it to be *the Science of things Divine and Humane; and of their Cauſes.* What will

The Praiſe of *Philoſophy.*

will any man ſpeak well of, I wonder, that reproaches this Study? If he ſeeks either the Delight of his Mind, or the Allaying of his Cares, this is the Study that does it Incomparably above all others: For it furniſhes him, every day, with ſomething or other, toward Atteining, and Enjoying a Virtuous, and a Happy Life. If Virtue, or an Unſhaken Conſtancy, be his Buſ'neſs, it is either to be Compaſſed This way, or not at all. There is not any thing ſo ſmall, but there goes Art, and Application toward the acquiring of it: And ſhall any man be ſo mad Then, as to think that there needs none toward the moſt Important Acquiſition of our Lives? But if there be any Diſcipline of Virtue, where ſhall we look for it; if we depart from This way of finding it out? This Queſtion, as it falls properly under another *Topique*, So we have handled it in another place; and more accurately too; That is to ſay, in our Exhortations to Philoſophy. My preſent purpoſe is only to ſet forth, that having nothing any longer to do, in the Government, I made Choice of This Subject for my Private Entertainment. But I muſt expect to be Here encounter'd, and that by ſome of the Learned too, with a Charge of Contradicting my ſelf. For how does it conſiſt, ſay they, the entring upon *Diſputes*, and delivering *Precepts* of *Duty*, as things *Certain*; and yet at the ſame time, to maintein that we have *no certain Knowledge of any thing?* I ſhould be glad to be a little better underſtood; For I am none of thoſe Roving, Wandring heads, that Live, and Live on;

An Objection anſwered.

on; without propoſing to themſelves any Scope, or Deſign. How Miſerable were That mans mind, or rather his Life, that ſhould be debarr'd the Uſe of his Reaſon, not only in the matter of Argument, but in the main End of his Being? Now for thoſe Points which Others Divide, into *Certain*, and *Uncertain*; it pleaſes me better, that they ſhould be *diſtinguiſhed* by calling them *Probable*, or *Improbable*. And what ſhould hinder me now from Embracing the One, and diſallowing the Other? provided that I keep my ſelf from being either Arrogantly poſitive; or Raſh, and Inconſiderate; Two qualities that hold no fellowſhip with Wiſdom. But our people, on the Other ſide, will Diſpute every thing: For (ſay they) without Comparing *Both parts*, how ſhall any man know which is the *Right*? But This matter (I ſuppoſe) is ſufficiently clear'd, in our *Academical Queſtions*. Now for You, (my Son) tho' you have been train'd up in the moſt Ancient, and Noble ſort of Philoſophy, and under the Inſtitution of *Cratippus*; (an Author not inferiour to the moſt Venerable Founders of it) I would not have you a Stranger yet to your Fathers Writings, which you will not find much differing from your Own. But now to the Point.

The Diſtribution of the Whole Work.

WE have, for methods ſake, made a Diſtribution of *Humane Duties* into *Five Parts*; *Two*, upon the Points of *Decency*, and *Virtue*; *Two more*, with a reſpect to the *Commodiouſneſs* of *Life*; as *Power*, *Wealth*, &c. And a *Fifth*,

Fifth, with a regard to our *Election*, rather of *One*, then *Another*, when *several things*, either *Good*, or *Profitable*, meet in *Competition*. We have already gone thorough the First Branch of this Division, which I must recommend to your particular Attention, and Study. The Point now in hand is That which we call *Profitable*: A word, which by the Corruption of *Time*, and *Custom*, is perverted insensibly to the signification of somewhat that may be separated from *Honesty*: as if any thing could be *Profitable*, that were not *Honest*, or any thing *Honest*, without being *Profitable*; an Error of the most pernicious consequence imaginable to the Life of man. These Three Points, how confused soever they may appear to be, are yet by Philosophers of great Authority, very judiciously, and ingenuously distinguished in the Imagination: concluding in This, that *whatsoever is* Profitable, *is* Honest, *and whatsoever is* Honest, *is* Profitable: And consequently that whatsoever is *Either* of them, is the *Other*. From the not understanding of this matter aright, it comes often to pass, that we have a Cunning, Artificial Sort of People, in great Admiration: mistaking *Craft*, for *Wisdom*. This Opinion is by all means to be rooted out from among men; and this following perswasion erected in the stead of that, there is is no compassing the end we aim at, by Fraudulent, and Indirect Courses, but only by just Dealings, and honest Counsels.

The Word *Profitable* is Corrupted.

***Profitable* and *Honest* are *Convertible Terms*.**

***Craft* mistaken for *Wisdom*.**

NOW

NOW the things apperteining to Conveniences for the Life of man, are either *Inanimate*, as *Gold*, *Silver*, *Minerals*, , and the productions of the *Earth*; or *Animated*, and indu'd with *Impulse*, and *Appetite*; And those again are divided, into *Unreasonable*, and *Reasonable*. Of the former kind, we may reckon *Horses*, *Oxen*, and other sorts of *Cattle*; *Bees*, &c. whose labour Contributes in some measure, to the Use and Necessities of Life; and then for *Reasonable*, we may account the *Gods*, and *Men*. By Piety and Holiness, we make our selves acceptable to the Gods; but in the next place to the Gods themselves, it is in the Power of Men to render themselves most Beneficial to one another. And those things which may be Hurtful, or Injurious to us, do fall likewise under the same Division. But in This Case, the Gods are excepted; as presuming that they will do us no harm. So that the greatest mischief that we are liable to, is from one another. For the very *Inanimate* things we spake of, are most of them, the Effects of Humane Industry and Labour. There goes a great deal of Work, and Art, to the very *preparing* of them; and then there must be Humane Application to the *Using* of them: For neither Physique, Navigation, Tillage, the Reaping and Gathering of our Corn, and Fruits, or the Conservation, of them, could be effected without the labour of *Man*. There would be no Exporting what we have to spare, or Importing what we want, without the mutual Help one of another. How should we fetch up Stones out of

Things Inanimate.

Animate.

Unreasonable.

Reasonable.

One man is the greatest Benefit or Mischief to another.

The Necessity of Mutual Help and Society.

of the Quarries for our neceſſary uſe: or Iron, Braſs, Gold, Silver, out of the Bowels of the Earth, without Labour, and the Hands of men? whence came our Houſes, at Firſt, to defend us from the Injuries of Heat and Cold? or How ſhould we afterward have Repaired, or Rebuilt them, when they come to be laid in Ruines, either by Tempeſt, Earthquakes, or even by Age it ſelf: If the Obligations and Neceſſities of Humane Societies, had not mov'd us to call for Help, one of another? Our *Aquaducts* our *Canals* for the turning of Rivers, and flowing of our Grounds, our Sea Banks, our forced Ports, and Harbours, are they not all of them the Effect of Manual Operation and Induſtry? From theſe Inſtances, and a thouſand more, it appears undenyably that the very advantages which we receive even from Inanimate things would be totally loſt to us; but for That Labour and Endeavor that gives us Profit of them: and to which we are likewiſe indebted for the Benefits that we receive even from Beaſts themſelves. It was undoubtedly the Invention of man too; the Application of them to the Uſe of Mankind; Nor can we at this day either Feed, Reclaim, or Preſerve what we have occaſion for, or make our Beſt of their Service, without the Aſſiſtance of one another. Is it not by the help of Men, that we deſtroy thoſe Creatures that are hurtful to us; and take others, that we may be the better for? What ſhould I ſpeak of thoſe Innumerable Arts, without which we are little better then *Dead*, *Living*? What *Cure* for the *Sick*? What delight for the

the *Sound*? What *Food*, or *Clothing*, without the help of *Arts*, and *Trades*, to ſupply us? This is it that furniſhes, and Sweetens Humane Life; and in our manner of Feeding, and Covering, raiſes us above the Condition of Beaſts. How ſhould *Cities* have been either *built*, or *peopled* without *Correſpondence*, and *Commerce*? And hence come *Laws*, and *Cuſtoms*, the *Equal* and *Univerſal Bounds* of *Common Right*, for the *Comfort*, and *Regulation* of our Lives. And this Communication produces *Gentleneſs of Manners*, and *Modeſty*, and This is it that ſupports us in a ſtate of ſecurity, and furniſhes us in all our Wants, by the Intercourſe of Giving, and Receiving, and by the Exchange of Good Offices, and Conveniences. A great deal of this might have been ſpar'd; For it is Clear to every man, That which *Panætius* has ſo much enlarg'd upon; Which is, that never any Prince or General, either in War, or in Peace, atchiev'd any Great, and Profitable Exploit, without the Concurrence of Humane Aid. He makes his Inſtances in *Themiſtocles*, *Pericles*, *Cyrus*, *Ageſilaus*, *Alexander*; who could never have done thoſe mighty things (he ſays) without the help of Others. But there was no neceſſity of Witneſſes in ſo evident a matter. Now as the Advantages are very Great, which we receive by Communication, and Agreement; So there is no Miſchief ſo deteſtable, which one man does not bring upon another. *Dicæarchus*, a Famous, and an Eloquent *Peripatetique*, has written an expreſs Tract *of the Deſtruction of Men*. He ſumms up all the *Fatalities*

The great Miſchiefs are from one man to another.

talities of *Mankind*; as *Inundations*, *Plagues*, *Desolations*; the sodain *Incursions* of *Wild Beasts*, and *Serpents*, which, according to his Relation, have sometimes devour'd whole Nations: and all This, (he says) is as nothing, to the Calamities, that by *War*, and *Seditions*, we have brought *one* upon *another*. Now since it is without dispute, that we are the Authors both of great Good, and of great Evil, among our selves, it must be the Business, as it is the Property of Virtue, so to mould and fashion mens Minds, as to Create in them, Inclinations of Contributing toward the Common good of Mankind. Now for those Benefits, that we receive from things without Life, or in what kind soever, in the use and ordering of Beasts; they are properly *Mechanical*: and the Works of the *Body*, rather then of the *Mind*. But those Studies, that fit, and dispose us for the Improvement of our Fortunes, are excited by the Prudence and Virtue of excellent Men: For almost all Virtue moves upon *These Three Points*. First, the *Accurate Perception* of every thing in its Naked *Truth* and *Simplicity*; in the Correspondence of Circumstances, and the Consequences of things, with the Rise, and Causes of them. *Secondly*, the Moderating of our *Passions*, and *Appetites*, (which the *Greeks* call πάθη, and ὁρμὰς, and subjecting them to the Government of Reason. The *Third*, is, the Skill of menaging our *Conversation* with so much *Courtesie*, and *Discretion*, as to gain the kindness and assistance of our Acquaintance, toward the furnishing of us with all things that our Nature

Of Prudence and Virtue.

Nature requires, in Competency, and Plenty; Defending, and Protecting us from Violence, revenging our ſelves upon thoſe that affront us, by inflicting ſuch puniſhments only as may ſtand with Humanity, and Juſtice. As to the Means, and Faculty both of Making Friends, and Keeping them, (which we ſhall ſpeak of in due Time, and Place) only a Word, in Paſſage.

The Power of Fortune.

We are all of us ſenſible of the Power of *Fortune*, in the matter of *Proſperity*, and *Adverſity*: When ſhe gives us a fair Gale, our Courſe is ſmooth, and gentle; till we arrive at our deſired Port. But when the Wind blows ſtrong againſt us, we are fain to beat it out, under a thouſand hazards. Now there are ſome Caſualties, leſs frequent, then Others; which are commonly ranged under the Dominion of *Fortune*. *Firſt*, from things *Inanimate*, as *Storms*, *Tempeſts*, *Shipwracks*, *Ruines*; *Conflagrations*; from *Beaſts*, as *Stroaks*, *Bitings*, *Trampling under foot*, &c. Theſe are *Accidents*, as I ſaid, that fall not out *often*. But the Routing of *Armies*; (as of no leſs than Three lately:) the Loſs of *Brave Commanders*, (one Incomparable Perſon but the Other Day) the *Envy* of the *Multitude*, and a World of Gallant, and Deſerving Men, by *Preſcriptions*, *Impriſonments*, and *forced Eſcapes*, ſacrific'd to *Popular Malice*: And on the *Other Side*, *Honours*, *Empire*, *Victory*; tho' theſe things are All Look'd upon as *Fortuitous*; yet neither the *One*, nor the *Other* come to paſs, without the Interpoſition of Labour, and Induſtry. Now ſince thus it is; let us conſider by what fair

Unhappy Caſualties.

Means we may make ſuch Intereſts, and Friendſhips in the World, as may turn to our Advantage. If you ſhall think the Diſcourſe overlong; compare it with the Dignity of the Subject, and perhaps you'll come to wiſh there had been more on't.

The Grounds of Honour and Eſteem in the World.

WHAT good Office ſoever one Man does for Another, whether in the matter of Fortune, or Credit, he does it *either* upon the Accompt of *Good Will*, and *Perſonal Affection*; or of *Reſpect*, as wiſhing well to the Advancement of his Fortune, out of a Veneration for his *Virtue*: Or *elſe*, upon the ſcore of *Truſt*, and *Confidence* in him; as one that is able to give us good *Advice*: Or *otherwiſe*, out of *fear*, perchance, of his *Power*. Or in hope of a *Reward*: (as it is common for Princes, and Popular Pretenders, to ſcatter their *Donatives*.) Or *Laſtly*; Many Men are mov'd by the bare Obligation of *Money*, and *Reward*. The *foulеſt*, and the *baſeſt* of all *Conſiderations*, both to Him that *entertains* the Addreſs, and to the Other, that *makes* it. For Matters are at an Ill Paſs, when that which ſhould be obtein'd by *Virtue*, is attempted by *Money*. But ſince there is, many times, a *Neceſſity* of *That Proviſion*, we will give ſome Directions for the *Uſing* of it. Only ſomething muſt be ſaid in the Firſt place, of Thoſe Things that have a Nearer Affinity with Virtue. There are ſeveral Reaſons for which One Man puts himſelf under the *Power*, and *Government* of *Another*; Either *Affection*, *Obligations*, *Excellency of Endowments*, *Hope of Profit*; *Fear* of being *forc'd* to't

Mercenary Natures.

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Love is the beſt Security of Power.

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other put Life again into the Government. For Men are more ſenſible of the Want of Liberty, than of the Enjoyment of it. Let us therefore imbrace That which moſt Conduces, not only to our *Security*, but alſo to *Wealth*, and *Power*. The Ready way to the attaining of our Deſires, either in Publique Affairs, or in Private, is, to Caſt out Fear, and to preſerve, and maintain Charity. For whoſoever would be Fear'd, muſt neceſſarily be afraid himſelf of all that are afraid of him. What ſhall we think of the Condition of the *Firſt Dionyſius*, under the horrour and the torture of his Terrours? that ſindged his very Beard, becauſe he would not venture his Throat under the hand of a Barber? Or of *Alexander* the *Pheræan*; that Durſt not truſt himſelf with his beloved *Thebe*, without a *Barbarian*, a branded Slave, with his drawn Sword, for his Conducter; and his Guards ſent before him to ſearch all the Womens Boxes, even to their very Clothes and Linnen, for conceal'd Ponyards, or other dangerous Weapons; before he durſt venture himſelf only from his Table, into his Bedchamber? O miſerable Wretch, that could put more Confidence in a *Stigmatiz'd Barbarian*, than in his Own *Wife!* But his Fears fell upon him, for ſhe kill'd him with her Own Hand, upon the Jealouſie of a private *Amour*. Nor is there any Power under Heaven that can long maintain it ſelf againſt a preſſing, and an Univerſal Fear. And This we may ſee in the Example of *Phalaris*; a Tyrant Celebrated for his Cruelty: who was cut off, not like the *Pheræan Alexander*, by ſecret

The Condition and Fate of Tyrants.

Trea-

Treachery; nor yet like *Our Caſar*, by a particular band of *Conſpiratours*: But he was put to Death, by the Unanimous Outrage of the Citizens of *Agrigentum*; in the very *Market-place*. Did not the *Macedonians* abandon *Demetrius*, and go over as one Man, to *Pyrrhus*? Were not the *Lacedemonians*, for their Iniquity, and Miſ-government, almoſt totally deſerted by their *Allies*, at that fatal Battle of *Leuctra*? where they ſtood looking on, as Idle Spectators, till the *Lacedemonians* were wholly routed, and cut to pieces. I had rather make uſe of Foreign Inſtances, than Domeſtique, upon This Subject: But This however let me ſay, ſo long as the Government of *Rome* was influenc'd by Principles of *Gentleneſs*, more than of *Violence*: ſo long as they fought only for their *Friends*, or for *Empire*; the Iſſue of the War was either a Generous Mercy, or at worſt, no manner of Unneceſſary Rigour. The Senate of *Rome* was in thoſe days the Haven, the Sanctuary of Oppreſſed Kings, People, and Nations: And the Magiſtrates, and Captains of Thoſe Times, had no Other Ambition, no Other Pique of Glory in Proſpect, than to defend their Provinces, and to ſupport their Aſſociates with Truth and Equity: ſo that *Rome* did rather affect the *Patronage* of the whole World, than the *Empire* of it. This Cuſtom, and Diſcipline began ſometimes ſince by little and little to decline; but after the Victory of *Sylla*, it was totally extinct: And in Truth, it would not have looke well after ſuch Barbarities exercis'd upon the *Citizens Themſelves*, to have kept Touch in any point

The End of *Phalaris*.

Rome was formerly the Sanctuary of the Oppreſſed.

of Faith and Juſtice, with their *Allies*. Here was a Glorious Cauſe attended with a moſt Impious, and Shameful *Victory*. The Goods of ſo many Honeſt, Worthy, and Eminent Citizens expos'd to Sale in the Market-place: And to heighten the Affront; under the very Title of *Sylla*'s *Booty*. There was Another that came after him; whoſe Cauſe it ſelf was bad; and yet made fouler by the Victory. For not only the Goods of Particular Citizens, but whole Nations and Countries, by One common Act of Calamity, were here upon *Auction*; and after infinite Vexations, and Ruines wrought abroad, we liv'd to ſee the Image of *Marſeilles* born in Triumph: *Marſeilles*, I ſay, without which, we our ſelves could never have carry'd a Triumph beyond the *Alps*; and This was the Condition too of the loſt Empire. I might reckon up Hiſtories without end, of our perfidious Dealings with our *Allies*: but This One ſhall ſuffice; being the baſeſt perhaps, that ever the Sun look'd upon. Now this Judgment upon us, is juſt: For the Sufferance of *many Criminals* made way to the boundleſs Licenſe of *This One*; who has left a great many Heirs of his *Ambition*, tho' but few of his *Fortune*. And there ſhall never want either Diſpoſition, or Matter, for a Civil War, ſo long as *Sylla*'s Succeſſes ſhall ſtand upon Record, for an Encouragement to deſperate Wretches to inrich themſelves by his Example. Thoſe bloody, and proſperous Uſurpations of *Sylla*; which, as they were formerly Acted in the *Dictatourſhip* of his near Kinſman, ſo they were now renew'd ſix and thirty

The Miſeries that befel *Rome*, for Cruelty and Injuſtice.

Proſperous Cruelties are dangerous Preſidents.

thirty years after, with more Outrage, and horrour. He that had been but a *Clerk* under the former *Dictatourſhip*, was now preferr'd, in the *Latter*, to be *City-Treaſurer*. Why ſhould we expect now, ever to be quiet, when Sedition meets with ſuch Rewards? 'Tis true, the Walls of the City are yet ſtanding, and in Being, tho' in continual Dread of the utmoſt of Extremities: But the Government it ſelf is abſolutely ſunk already. And to return to my Subject, all theſe Calamities are fallen upon us, for making it our bus'neſs rather to be Fear'd, than Belov'd. Now if the Power of *Rome* could not ſupport it ſelf under *Tyranny*, and *Oppreſſion*; how ſhould any particular Perſon expect to eſcape? It is ſufficiently made already appear, that the Bonds of *Love* are much ſtronger than thoſe of *Fear*. We ſhall now debate upon the Faireſt Means of obteining that Affection, which we ſo earneſtly deſire, with Honour, and Juſtice. But we do not all of us ſtand in need of it alike: ſo that we muſt accommodate the Matter to every Mans Condition, and Courſe of Life; to ſee whether it be neceſſary to procure a General Eſteem, or that the kindneſs of ſome few may do the bus'neſs. We may however conclude upon This, as the Firſt, and Principal Point: That we contract Faithful Friendſhips; and make Acquaintances with thoſe that Truly Love, and value us. And this is a *Common Medium*, almoſt indifferently, betwixt Great, and Small. And a Rule that holds with Both alike; not as if all Men ſtood Equally in need of Glory, and Reputation,

How to gain a fair Reputation in the World.

but they are good Helps yet (whoever has them) toward the Gaining of Other Advantages, and the making of Friendſhips: which in my *Lælius* I have expreſly handled. And I have written two Books alſo upon the Subject of *Glory*; which yet I muſt touch over again, as a thing of great moment in the Conduct even of our moſt Important Affairs.

What is perfect Glory.

WE are then arrived at the higheſt pitch of Glory, when we have gained Theſe Three Points: The *Love*, the *Truſt*, and the *Reverence* of the *People*: When we can hear them ſay; *That Man is worthy of Honour*. Now to ſpeak ſhort, and Plain; The Method is well nigh the ſame, of Ingratiating our ſelves with a *Single Perſon*, or with the *Multitude*. But yet there is Another manner of Addreſs alſo, toward the Influencing of the Minds, and good Will of the People, in our Favour.

Bounty and Gentleneſs, work much upon the People.

TO ſpeak in Order now, to the three Points before mentioned; Nothing works ſo much upon the Affections of the People, as *Liberality* or *Bounty*. And next to That, is a *Benevolent*, and *Generous Inclination*: Even without the Means of expreſſing it in *Effects*. For the very *Fame* and *Opinion* of a Mans Frankneſs, Bounty, Juſtice, Faith: and briefly, of all thoſe Virtues that Contribute to the Sweetening, and Smoothing of our Manners, has a wonderful Power over the Hearts of the People. There is ſuch a Charm in That *Gracefulneſs* and *Decorum*, which we have already Treated of, that the very Nature, and bare

bare Appearance of it does move us ſtrangely. Beſide that as it receives its Luſtre from the aforeſaid Virtues; wherever we find thoſe Virtues, we cannot but naturally have a good Inclination for the perſon that poſſeſſes them. Theſe are the moſt powerful attractives of Love. Not but that there may be other motives alſo, tho' of leſs moment.

The Power of Juſtice & Prudence.

AS to the Matter of *Truſt* and *Credit*; if we can but get the Reputation of being *Prudent* and *Juſt*, our Bus'neſs is done: For we have naturally a Confidence in thoſe that we think Wiſer then our ſelves; In men of *Providence*, and *Foreſight*, upon whom we may depend for our ſeaſonable direction, and advice; as thoſe that in Caſe of any difficulty, are able to help us out. This is the True, and Profitable *Wiſdom*: As to the *Truſt* now which we repoſe in *Juſt*, *Good*, and *Faithful* Men; we muſt not entertain ſo much as the leaſt ſuſpicion in it, of Fraud, or Injury; Theſe being the men into whoſe hands we do reaſonably commit our Lives, our Children, and our Fortunes. But it is *Juſtice* yet, that creates the greater Confidence of the Two: For *Juſtice* may beget *Confidence*, without *Wiſdom*; but *Wiſdom* can do nothing without *Juſtice*. For take away the Opinion of a mans *Integrity*, and the more *Crafty*, and *Subtle* he is, by ſo much is he the more *Hateful*, and *Suſpected*. *Juſtice*, and *Prudence* in *Conjunction*, will give a man what *Credit* he pleaſes; but taking them *Apart*, *Juſtice*, even without *Wiſdom*, may do very much; but

Wiſdom without Juſtice, is Craft.

but *Wiſdom*, without *Juſtice*, is nothing Worth. Let not any man wonder now at my dividing One Virtue from Another, as if it were poſſible for a man to be *Juſt*, and yet not *Prudent*; when the Philoſophers are all agreed upon't (and my ſelf too for one) that he that has one Virtue, has All. For it is One thing, the Nicety of hitting a Truth in a Philoſophical Deciſion; and another thing to make a Diſcourſe in Words accommodated to Vulgar acceptation: And That's my Intent in this place, when I ſay that one is *Valiant*, another *Good*, a third *Wiſe*. For theſe are popular Opinions, and muſt be clothed in Common and Popular Terms; which was alſo *Panætius*'s way of expreſſing himſelf. But to reſume my Purpoſe.

Admiration produces Eſteem.

THE Third point recommended toward the acquiring of Glory, is This: So to behave our ſelves that people may hold us in Admiration, and accompt us Worthy of all honour. The Common people are Generally admirers of all things that are Great, and beyond their Underſtanding: And ſo they are in particular Caſes too: Where they find more Good in a man then they expected. But where they Phanſie any Virtues Peculiar, and Extraordinary, they extol men to the Skies, and behold them with a kind of Veneration, deſpiſing, and villifying ſuch, on the Other ſide, as they find wanting either in Virtue, Strength, or Courage. But they cannot yet be ſaid to *Deſpiſe* all that they have an *Ill Opinion* of. For there is a Lewd, Backbiting, Couzen-

Couzening, Quarrelsom Generation of men, which tho' they do exceedingly *Dislike*, they do not yet *Contemn*: For those Only are properly to be taken for *Contemptible*, that lead a *Lazy*, *Droning*, *Heedless Life*; without any Benefit, either to Themselves, or Others. The Admirable Spirits are such as have the Repute of a Preeminence in Virtue; and keep themselves not only from doing Mean and Dishonourable things, but clear even of those Vices, which others cannot easily resist. For by the Charms of Pleasures our Minds are Dissolv'd, and withdrawn from Virtue; And we are as much discomposed and shaken, on the the other hand, with the Burnings, and Tortures of Pein. It is a prodigious power that the Consideration of Life and Death, Riches and Poverty, has over the Weakness of Flesh and Bloud. But how Glorious then, and how Admirable must That Virtue be, that takes so absolute a Possession of the Soul of man, in the Contemplation of Great and Honorable things? As in that elevated state of mind, to make him look down upon all the Circumstances of Fortune, with *Indifference*, and *Scorn*. This Bravery of mind never fails of moving Great Admiration: Especially accompany'd with *Justice*; which single Virtue constitutes the very Character of a *Good man*; and makes him wonderful in the Eyes of the People; and not without reason neither: For no man can be *Just*, that either Fears *Death*, *Pein*, *Banishment*, or *Poverty*; Or that Values before *Equity*, the Comforts that stand opposed

Great Virtue produces great Admiration.

As Magnanimity.

Justice.

Contempt of mony.

ſed to theſe Calamities. But the higheſt Veneration of all is paid to him that holds out againſt *Mony*: And whereſoever they find ſuch a man, they think they can never do enough for him. So that by *Juſtice* we gain all thoſe points that lead to *Reputation*; As *Benevolence* by Obliging as many as we can; *Repute* and *Admiration*, by the *Contempt* and *Neglect* of thoſe things which the greater part of the World purſues with *Greedineſs*, and *Paſſion*.

NOW in my Opinion, there is not any Deſign or Condition of Life wherein one man does not ſtand in need of Another; And eſpecially, as to the matter of *Familiar Diſcourſe*, and *Converſation*: which a body ſhall hardly find to his ſatisfaction, but under the appearance of an *honeſt man*. Nay, the very *Opinion* of *Juſtice* will ſtand a man in great ſtead, even in the ſtricteſt ſolitude, and retirement imaginable; and more perhaps in That State, then in any other, as living, in ſome ſort, out of Protection; and more expoſed to Affronts; which, under the Notion of an Impious perſon, people will be forward enough to put upon him: And then for men of *Buſ'neſs* and *Commerce*, as Buying, Selling, Hiring, Letting, there can be no dealing without *Juſtice*. Nay ſo great is the force of it, that common Highway-men, and thoſe that ſupport themſelves only upon Rapine, and Violence, cannot yet ſubſiſt without it. Inſomuch that if one Thief does but Steal from Another of the ſame Troop, he's expell'd the Society, as a man of no Faith, And if the Captain

The very Opinion of Juſtice gives a man Reputation.

Juſtice is ſacred, even among Thieves and Pirates.

Captain of the Band ſhews but any partiality in the Diſtribution of the Booty, he is at leaſt deſerted by his Party, if it does not alſo coſt him his Life; For there is a Diſcipline even among Pirates themſelves: And their Laws are duly executed, and obey'd. *Theopompus* writes of an *Illyrian Robber*, (one *Bargulus*) that was celebrated for his Juſtice to his Partners, and made himſelf a great Fortune by't; but not ſo great a one yet as *Viriatus* the *Portugueſe*; of whoſe Power, and Courage ſome of our Armies, and Generals felt the ſad Effects; till the *Prætor Lælius* (ſurnamed the *Wiſe*) defeated and ſcattered his Forces; and finally put ſuch a *Cheque* to his Undertakings, that he left but little work for Thoſe to do that came after him. How great now muſt the force of *Juſtice* be in a *Regular*, and *well order'd Government*, which of it ſelf alone is able to Advance, and Eſtabliſh even a *Piratic Power*, without any other ſupport.

Kings choſen for their Virtues.

HERODOTUS tells us that the *Medians* choſe their Kings Originally, for the Probity of their *Manners*; and in hope of enjoying the Benefits of *Common Juſtice*: Which I am perſuaded was the End, and Practice likewiſe of our Predeceſſors. For when in old time, the Weaker were Oppreſſed by the Stronger, the people preſently betook themſelves to one more Excellent then the reſt, for their Protector: And it was his part to relieve the diſtreſſed, and to make ſuch Proviſions, that common right might be done Indifferently betwixt all Parties. And in the making

Making of their *Laws*, they had the ſame Proſpect, as in the Choice of their *Kings*. The thing propounded, was an *Equal*, and a *Common Right*; and in Truth, it could be no Right, without being ſo qualifi'd. If under the Adminiſtration of ſome *One Man* that was *Juſt*, and *Good*, they atteined That End, they were well contented There to reſt: But in Caſe of failing, there were Laws Invented, which to all, under them, and at all times, ſhould ſtill pronounce one and the ſame ſentence. This now is Clear, that in all Elections, the People have ſtill had a Care to pitch upon him for their *Governour*, that was moſt reverenc'd for his *Juſtice*: Always provided, that he were a Man of *Prudence* too. And what is it that a Nation would not believe it ſelf able to Compaſs, under ſo Auſpicious a Conduct? We are therefore obliged to Cheriſh, and to preſerve *Juſtice*, by all manner of Means. *Firſt*, for its Own ſake, (for otherwiſe, it were not *Juſtice*;) And *Secondly*, for the Augmentation of our *Honour*, and *Glory*. But it is in *Glory*, as it is in *Money*; there muſt care be taken, both in the *Getting* of it, and in the *Laying of it out*; for we ſhall have perpetual Occaſions for it; and we muſt provide for Uſes of *Dignity*, as well as thoſe of *Neceſſity*. It was a great thing ſaid, That of *Socrates*; *The neareſt way to Honour* (ſays he) *is for a Man ſo to live, that he may be found to be That in* Truth, *which he would be* Thought *to be*. 'Tis a groſs miſtake, for any Man to think of getting a laſting Reputation in the World, by falſe Appearances of Things. Vain Oſten-

A Notable Saying of *Socrates*.

Oſtentation, or ſtudy'd Forms of Looks, and Words. *True Glory* is rooted in the very *Soul*, and brings forth fruit in our *Actions*. All Diſguiſes paſs away, and ſhed, like Flowers; and nothing can be durable, that is Counterfeit. This might be confirm'd by Inſtances in Abundance; but for Brevity ſake, I ſhall Content my ſelf with an Obſervation only upon One Family. The Name of *Tiberius Gracchus* the Son of *Publius*, ſhall be famous to Poſterity, ſo long as there ſhall be any Memorial left of *Rome* it ſelf: But for his *Sons*, they were neither Beloved, *Living*, nor Lamented, Dead; All good Men agreeing in a Deteſtation of their Lives; and approving the Juſtice of their Executions: He that would make himſelf truly Eminent for the Love of *Juſtice*, muſt diſcharge the *Duties* of it; of which Duties, we have treated in the former Book. But how eaſily ſoever we may make our ſelves known to Others for what we are, (tho' in truth the main point reſts in being ſuch Men, as we would be thought to be) it will not be amiſs yet to lay down ſome Certain Precepts concerning this Matter. He that comes into the World under any Remarkable Circumſtance to make him taken notice of, either in reſpect of Fortune, or Family; as the Son for the purpoſe of ſuch or ſuch a Father, (which I take (my *Cicero*) to be your Own Caſe:) All Mens Eyes are preſently upon him, and every body enquiring into his Life, and Manners: He Lives, as it were, in Open View, and all his Words and Doings are made Publique. Now for Thoſe, who by reaſon of their Obſcure

Some are Born Remarkable.

Others make themselves so.

ſcure Extraction, are in their tender Age not ſo much known in the World, I would have them prompted Early toward great Undertakings; and bend their Endeavours directly That way; which they will do the more Vigorouſly, in regard that Young Men are ſo far from being *Envy'd*, that they are rather Cheriſhed, and Encourag'd in Virtuous, and Generous Inclinations.

Let a Young Man ſtudy the Uſe of his Arms.

THE Firſt Leſſon that I would give to a *Young Man* for the Advance of his Credit with the People; ſhould be to addict himſelf to the Study, and Practice, of *Arms*; at leaſt where there were any *Glory* to be gotten by *Military Virtues*. Our Predeceſſors, that were almoſt Continually in War; made themſelves Famous by This Profeſſion: But it has been Your Lot (my Son) to come into the World amid the Broyls of a Divided State, where the One ſide was Extreamly Wicked, and the Other as Unfortunate. And yet in the Command you had under *Pompey*; even in This very War, you acquitted your ſelf, as *a Man at Arms* to all Purpoſes; an Excellent Horſeman; a Perſon of Indefatigable Induſtry; and all This, to the Common Satisfaction both of the Glorious General, and the Whole Army. But the Commonwealth it ſelf ſunk here, and ſo did your Glory. It is not upon your Particular, but a General Accompt, that I have taken up this Diſcourſe: Wherefore I ſhall now proceed to that which remains.

AS

AS the Operations of the *Mind*, are in All Caſes much more Noble than thoſe of the *Body*; ſo are the things that we compaſs by the Faculties of our *Reaſon*, and *Underſtanding*, of much greater Value then thoſe things that we bring to paſs by *Corporal Force*. The *Firſt* point that recommends us to a good Eſteem in the World, is *Modeſty*; After that, comes *Piety*, and *Reverence* to our *Parents*; and then follows a Tenderneſs of *Affection* to our *Relations*, and *Friends*. It is a promiſing Sign, when a Young Man applies himſelf to perſons of Eminence for Wiſdom, Authority, and Good Affection to their Country: For it Creates an *Opinion*, and *Expectation* of *Great Matters* from him that propoſes to himſelf the Imitation of *Great Examples*. It was every Bodies Judgment, upon *Publius Rutilius*, that if he liv'd, he would make a *Famous Civilian*, and an *Honeſt Man*. And what was This grounded upon, but the frequent Converſation that he had in his Youth with *Publius Mucius*? But *Lucius Craſſus*, I muſt confeſs, without the help of any borrow'd Reputation, advanced his Own Fame, and dignifi'd himſelf in that Generous and Memorable Accuſation of his. He was at That time, of an Age to be rather held by Flatteries and fair Words to his very Exerciſes, than left to himſelf. And yet at That Age, with *Demoſthenes*, the things which he had ſo happily conceiv'd at Home, he did with no leſs Honour Execute in Publique.

The Virtues of the Mind are more Noble than thoſe of the Body.

Of Modeſty and Piety.

It is a good Sign when a Man loves good Company.

Of Speech. WE may divide *Speech* into *Familiar Diſcourſe*, and matter of *Argument*, or *Pleading*. The *Latter* undoubtedly is of the greater Efficacy toward the purchaſing of *Glory*: And This is it which we call *Eloquence*. And yet there is a Certain *Affability*, and *Gentleneſs* of Faſhion too, that does wonderfully work upon the Affections of all People. There are yet Extant ſome Epiſtles of *Philip* to *Alexander*; of *Antipater* to *Caſſander*; and of *Antigonus* to *Philip*; (Three Perſons highly eſteemed for their Wiſdom:) And they do all of them preſcribe the Uſe of *Courteſie*, and *Fair Language* to him that would Ingratiate himſelf with the *Multitude*; and only the Careſs of ſome Frank and Familiar *Name*, or *Compellation*; (as *Fellow-Souldier*, or *Camarade*) to the *Commander* that would endear himſelf to the *Souldiery*. But then it has another kind of force, the Faculty of *Haranging* the *Multitude*; when with *One Speech* ſometimes a Man gets an *Eternal Fame*. It is wonderful, the Tranſports that are wrought by the Power of *Eloquence*, and *Wiſdom*: And the Veneration that is paid by the Auditory, to a Perſon whom they take to be ſo much Wiſer, and Intelligent, than other Mortals. And yet there is a *Mixt way of ſpeaking*, that does wonders too; Eſpecially with a Concurrence in it of both *Weight* and *Modeſty*; which, in a Young Man, makes it ſtill the more Admirable. There are many Occaſions that require *Eloquence*; and many of our Country-men, (and Young Men too) that are highly eſteemed for it, both at

Affability.

Eloquence, the Power of it.

at the *Bar*, and in the *Senate*. But that which I look upon to be the most *Effectual*, and *praise-worthy*, is the *Eloquence* of the *Bar*; and the Subject of it, is either *Accusation*, or *Defence*: the *Latter* is the more *Laudable* of the Two, and yet in many Cases, the *Other* is likewise to be *Approved*. As in what I said just now of *Crassus*; and *Anthony* also, when he was a Young Man, did the same thing. *Publius Sulpicius* raised the Glory of his Eloquence by his Charge against *C. Norbanus*, a Seditious and an Unprofitable Citizen. But this is not a thing to be done often; nor, in Truth, is it to be done at all, unless on the behalf of the *Government*, as the *Two Luculluses*: Or in favour of the *Oppressed*, as I my self did for the *Sicilians*: *Julius Cæsar* did as much for the *Sardinians*; and *Fusius* shew'd his Skill too against *Manem Aquilius*: so that it may be once done, but no more; unless a Man be call'd to it by his Duty to the Commonwealth. and in the very Case of *Publique Enemies*, there may be an excuse for *Frequent Accusations*: But even There too, we must keep within the Bounds of Moderation: For it is the part of an Ill-natur'd Man, (or I might rather say, scarce of a Man) to make a Trade of hunting People to Death. And beside the danger that it brings upon the Persecuter, it is an Infamous, and a Rascally *Character*, that of an *Informer*. It was the *Nick-name* that was given to *Marcus Brutus*, (the Son I mean of the Eminent Civilian) and it cast a Blemish upon the very Lustre of his Family. And moreover, be sure to observe this Duty, as Inviolable,

The Subject of it.

It is a base Office that of an Informer.

Have a Care of Innocent Blood.

and Sacred; *Never to have any thing to do in the Expoſing of Innocent Blood.* For it is a Crime, that no Colour in the World can juſtifie; for what can be ſo Inhumane, as to turn the Faculties of Reaſon, and Eloquence, that were given us for the Benefit, and Conſervation of Mankind, to the Ruine, and Deſtruction of Honeſt Men? But it does not follow yet, becauſe we muſt not upon any terms perſecute the Innocent, that therefore we may not in ſome Caſe defend the Wicked, and the Guilty: For it is a thing many times agreeable to the Will of the People; to Cuſtom, and to Humanity, ſo to do. It is the part of the *Judge*, conſtantly to follow the *Truth*; but the *Advocate* is not ſo ſtrictly ty'd up to the *Preciſe Truth*, as not to make his beſt ſometimes of that which carries ſome near *Reſemblance* of it. I ſhould not take This Freedom upon This Subject, if I had not the Authority of *Panætius*, (one of the Soundeſt of the *Stoiques*) to ſupport me in it. The greateſt Favour and Renown is gotten by a *Defenſive Eloquence*; and it is ſo much the Greater, as the Power, and Oppoſition of the Adverſary is the Stronger; and according to the Streights, and Exigencies of the Party reliev'd. We have brought off many, and particularly, in our younger days, we defended *Sextus Roſcius Amerinus* againſt the Force and Authority of *L. Sylla* himſelf: The Oration you know is ſtill Extant.

HAVING

HAVING already set forth the Methods by which a Young man may advance his *Reputation* in the World; we shall now discourse the matter of *Liberality*, and *Bounty*, which is *Twofold*; For we oblige those that stand in need of our Help, either by our *Labour*, or by our *Mony*. The *Latter* is the *Easier* way; especially where the *Benefactor* is Master of an *Estate*; but the *Other* is the more *Honorable*, and *Splendid*, and better becoming a Clear and Generous Mind. For tho' the Will may be Frank enough in Both, yet the one Obligation is rather a Debt to his *Fortune*, but the other to his *Virtue*. And then by These Pecuniary Bounties, the very Fountein is drawn dry, and one Bounty is destroy'd by Another; and in the very Act, we lose the Means of Obliging. But he that is Liberal of his *Peins*, that is to say, of his *Industrie*, and *Virtue*, the more Good he has done already, the more Friends will he find to assist him toward the doing of more: And then by the Custom and Practice of doing good Offices a man does not only learn the *Way* of *Obliging*, but gets the very *Habit* of it. It is a Notable Reprehension, that of *Philip*, in a Letter to his Son *Alexander*, for endeavouring to ingratiate himself with the *Macedonians* by the Force of *Mony*, *What is it*, (*with a mischief*) says he, *that should make you expect Faith from those People whom you your self have Corrupted? Is it that instead of their Prince, you would be look't upon only as their Servant, or Purse-bearer?* An Office so much below the Dignity of

Liberality is Twofold, Labour and Money.

A Generous Reproof.

a Monarch! Such a Bounty could not have been better expreſt, then by calling it a Corruption: For the very Receiver is the worſe for't, and the more he gets, the more he looks for. This Epiſtle was written only to his Son; but it may ſerve as a Precept to Mankind.

The Bounty of Labour is the faireſt of the Two.

NOW as there is no queſtion, but that the Bounty which conſiſts in *Labour*, and *Induſtry* is the *Fairer* of the two, and the more *Extenſive*, becauſe more men are the better for't; we meet with ſeveral Occaſions yet, and many proper Objects for the Exerciſe alſo of the *Other ſort* of *Bounty*, which in ſome Caſes muſt be put in Practice,

Give within Compaſs.

but with Choyce, and within Compaſs: For there are many people that ſquander away their whole Eſtates upon Inconſiderate Gratuities. Nor can any thing be more ſenſeleſs, then for a man to take peins to put himſelf out of condition to do the thing that he loves to do. And theſe Unadviſed Liberalities are commonly follow'd with Extortion too; for when men are brought to Want, by Over-giving, they fall to the repairing of their *Profuſions* upon *Some*, by *Violence* upon *Others*: And the Friends they get by *Giving*, on the *One* ſide, will not ballance the Enemies they raiſe, by *taking away* on the *Other*. Wherefore, as I would not lay my Fortune in Common, ſo neither would I refuſe a Part of it to my Friend, but ſtill in Proportion to the whole. We have a Common ſaying which is grown by uſe into a Proverb, *Bounty has no Bottom*, and it is worth remembring. For what Mean can be There expected,

where

where by the Cuſtom of *Giving*, and of *Receiving*, both the *Giver* and the *Receiver* come to deſire the *ſame thing*.

OF *large Givers* there are *Two ſorts*; the *Liberal*, and the *Prodigal*: The *Prodigal*, they laſh out upon Treats, Popular Doales, Prizes, Publique Sports, and Spectacles, and other Entertainments, which are no ſooner paſt, then forgotten. The *Liberal*, they employ their Expences upon Redeeming of Slaves, ſetting a Friend out of Debt, or helping him out in the beſtowing of a Daughter, in the Getting of a Fortune, or in the Encreaſing of it. I cannot but wonder what put it into *Theophraſtus*'s head, in his Book of *Riches*, that among ſo many Excellent things, he ſhould be guilty of one ſo very groſs an Abſurdity. His Diſcourſe runs much upon the Honour, and Magnificence of Popular Shews, and Preſents; and he makes this to be the great Advantage of an Ample Fortune, that it Furniſhes a man with means to be at That Exepnce. Now in my Opinion, the Fruit of Liberality is much more Certain, and Conſiderable, in the Few Inſtances I have before mentioned. It is a Grave, and a Pertinent Reproof, that of *Ariſtotle*'s, upon This Subject: *We make nothing* (ſays he) *of our Profuſions upon the Humouring of the Common People, but to hear of* Ten Crowns *given in a* Siege *for a* Bottle of Water, *what a wonderment is made* of it, as a thing Incredible: till upon ſecond Thoughts, we find the Price excus'd by the Neceſſity? But in the Other Extravagant Spoil, and Exceſſive Prodigality, where there is neither

Prodigality.

True Liberality.

Honour, nor Neceſſity Conſulted in it, and the very Pleaſure paſſes with the Spectacle; we can find nothing there to wonder at. And who are they but the weakeſt of the People that ſtand affected with this Vanity? And no ſooner are they ſatiated, then the Delight it ſelf is forgotten. And who are they that are ſo much taken with theſe Fooleries, but Women, Children, and Slaves; that is to ſay, people either of ſervile Condition, or of ſervile Minds, ſcarce any man of Senſe, Judgement, or Conſideration, approving of them? I know very well that it is an Ancient Cuſtom in This City, for the *Ædile* to exhibit Shews to the People, upon Entering his Office; and that very good men expect it from him. *P. Craſſus* the *Rich* (as well in his *Fortune*, as in his *Name*) made a very *Magnificent Entry*; and ſo did *L. Craſſus*, after Him; tho' join'd with *Q. Marius* too, a man of ſingular Moderation. And then *C. Claudius*, the Son of *Appius*, with a great many more; as *Lucullus*, *Hortenſius*, *Silanus*; which were all outdone by *P. Lentulus*, in My Conſulſhip, and *Scaurus* Emulated him. But the moſt Pompous, and Expenſive Solemnity of all, was that of our Friend *Pompey*, in his *Second Conſulſhip*; This is enough to ſhew you my opinion in all theſe Caſes. But yet however, we muſt have a Care on the Other hand, not to incur a ſuſpition of *Avarice*. *Mamercus*, (a very Rich man) was repulſed when he ſtood for *Conſul*, becauſe he had refuſed the Charge of *Ædile*. Wherefore, if the People call for it, on the One ſide, and

Fine Shews are only for Women and Children.

In what Caſes Profuſion may be allowed,

and wiſe men be not againſt it, (tho' they do not deſire it) on the Other; the thing ought to be done: But according to our Abilities, as it has been my Own Caſe: Or otherwiſe, where we may reap ſome Advantage by it, that will more then Countervail the Charge. As it turn'd much to the reputation of *Oreſtes*, not long ſince, the publique Dinners that he expos'd in the Streets, to the Multitude, under Colour of Dedicating his Tenths to *Hercules*. Neither did any man blame *M. Seius*, for ſupplying the people in a great Scarcity with Corn, at about a Groat a Buſhel: when by ſo doing, he delivered himſelf from the great and inveterate hatred of the Multitude; and (being *Ædile* too) by a Liberality, that was neither Diſhonorable nor Burthenſome. But it was a moſt Glorious, and Memorable Action my Friend *Milo's* engaging of the *Sword-players* for the *Publique ſafety*, which in my own particular I was not a little concern'd in: And by Means whereof, all the Attempts and Outrages of *Claudius* were Cruſht, and diſappointed. So that Bounties ſhould be grounded either upon Neceſſity or Profit; and even in Theſe Caſes too the beſt Rule is Mediocrity. *L. Philip* the Son of *Quintus*, (a perſon of great Worth, and Underſtanding) was want to make it his Vaunt, that it never coſt him one penny of Mony to the People, the obteining of all the Favours that were ever conferr'd upon him. *Cotta* ſaid the ſame thing, and without Vanity, ſo might we our ſelves too, in ſome degree; for the expence of my *Ædileſhip* was ſo

But ſtill within Bounds.

so small, that it could not signifie any thing toward the gaining of those Offices which were afterward conferr'd upon me as by a Common Consent; And That in my own year too: which is more then any of those before-named, can boast of. I take that mony to be best laid out which is employed upon Common Walls, and Ramparts, Docks, Havens, Aquaducts, and other Works, for the good of the Publique. Those Bounties give more of present satisfaction, I must confess, that are laid down upon the Nail, as I may say; but the Other will find better acceptation with Posterity: As for Theatres, Walks, Galleries, Temples, I shall speak the more Favourably of Them, for *Pompey*'s sake: But Learned men, I perceive, do not approve of them; and *Panætius*, for one, whom in this Discourse I have rather Followed, then Interpreted: and then there is *Phalereus Demetrius*, who was very sharp upon the famous *Pericles*, for his Extravagant Profusion upon the Porch of the Temple of *Pallas*. But I have handled this Subject at large in my Discourse of a *Commonwealth*. Now for a Conclusion; This kind of *Liberality*, upon the whole matter, is stark naught; and yet by the Circumstances of Times, and the like, it may be render'd Necessary; But in all Cases there must be observ'd a *Mediocrity*, and a *Proportion*.

Of Privater Liberality.

AS to the Other sort of *Bounty* that arises from *Liberality*, we must accommodate our selves to the Occasion, and in Differing Cases use Differing Methods. One man lies under the Pinch of a Pressing Calamity: Another

other man's Condition is not much amiss perhaps already, but yet he would be glad to make it better. My Charity binds me in the First place, to assist the Miserable Person; at least if he did not make himself so by his own fault. And yet I would not be so hard neither as not to help him also, that is Well already, in order to his Further Advantage; But this is a Point that requires singular Care and Judgment in the Choice. It was well said of *Ennius*, *A Benefit misplaced turns to a Crime.* But in That which is bestow'd upon a Good, and a Grateful man, there's, First, the Conscientious Comfort of the Virtue it self; and then the Satisfaction that it brings us in Other respects; For the most acceptable thing in the World is a discreet Liberality; and the Reputation of it must needs be great, when the Goodness of every man in Power is the Common Sanctuary of Mankind. How to bestow them.

WE must have a regard also to the Benefit, as well as to the Person; and that it may be of such a Quality as to Descend in the memory of it to the Children and Posterity of the Person Obliged, that there may be no place left for Ingratitude. For all Mortals have a Detestation for it, and every man looks upon himself as Injur'd in the discouragment of Bounty: And the Guilty in this Case, are reputed the Common Enemies of the Needy. Beside the Benefit that this Piety of Disposition brings to the Publique, in the Enriching of the Poor, and the Redeeming of Captives, which, as *Crassus* delivers at large in One of his Orations, was many times the A Regard to the Benfit as well as to the Person.

Work

Work of the Senate it self. And is not this now a Nobler way of Obliging then the Casting of our mony away upon *Pageantryes*, and *Popular Spectacles*? This is an Expence for a man of Sense, and Honour; whereas the Other is only a Fawning application by Chargeable Fopperies to tickle the Phansies of the Common People.

Our Obligations should be Frank.

AS we are to Oblige with Frankness; so we are not to Exact any thing again with Rigour, but in all our Dealings, as buying, selling, letting, hiring, &c. to behave our selves toward our Neighbor and Acquaintance, with Candor, and Respect; tho' to the prejudice sometime of our Own Right: Avoiding Law-Suits as much as may be, and a little more perhaps then needs; For it is not only Generous, but Profitable too, for a man in some Cases to remit somewhat of the straitness of his Just due: But in so doing he must have an Eye yet to his Family, or Estate, which it were Impious not to defend; but in such a manner too, that there appear nothing of Harshness, or Greediness in the Dispute. For a man cannot employ his Mony better, then to do others good with it; with a regard still to the Maintening of his Own.

Of Hospitality.

It is with great Reason that *Theophrastus* recommends *Hospitality*; for in my Opinion it is a very Honourable Fashion for the Houses of Noblemen to be ever Open to Illustious Guests; and it gives no small Reputation to our Commonwealth, that Strangers can never want That sort of Beneficence in This City. But then for those that would make an Honest Interest

Intereſt abroad in the World, it is a very great Advantage, the Favour, and Recommendation which they get among Foreign Nations through the Friendſhip of thoſe they meet with upon This Occaſion. *Theophraſtus* writing of the Hoſpitality of *Cimon* of *Athens*, tells us that he gave ſtrict Order to his Servants in the Country that his Houſe ſhould be ſtill Open, to whatever *Lacian* (or *Townſman* of his) paſt that way.

Obligations of Care and Induſtry.

NOW for Thoſe Obligations that are only the Effect of *Care*, and *Induſtry*, without *Money*, they are both *Publique*, and *Private*: Extending from the *Commonwealth* it ſelf, to every *Particular Member of it*: For what readier way can there be in This World to Eminent *Wealth*, and *Preferment*, than the Skill of Directing, and Adviſing in Difficulties of *Law*; together with the Power of Obliging ſo many upon That Score? Wherefore, among the Excellent Qualities of our Fore-fathers, the Knowledge, and Interpretation, as well as the Conſtitution of the *Civil Law*, was ever had in great Eſteem: And reſerved (until This Confuſion of Affairs) as a Matter Sacred, in the Poſſeſſion of Men of Higheſt Authority and Wiſdom. But the Glory of This Science, as well as That of our Ancient Nobility and Virtue, is now quite Extinct: And to aggravate the Indignity, this fell out in the time of a Perſon not inferiour in *Honour* to all that went before him, but in *Letters* much their Superiour. So that This is a Study generally acceptable, beſide that it puts us in the way of doing a thouſand Good Turns.

The Reputation of the Civil Law.

And

Some Affinity betwixt a *Civilian* and an *Orator*.

And there is some Affinity or Resemblance too betwixt the Art of a *Civilian*, and That of an *Orator*: Only the *Latter* has more in it of *Vigour*, *Agreeableness*, and *Elevation of Spirit*. There is not any thing that moves the Soul, like *Eloquence*. It fills the Hearers with *Admiration*; it gives *Hope* to the *Miserable*; it creates as many *Friendships* as there are Persons that it Defends; and our Predecessors accounted of it as the most Honourable of all Professions. It is a General, and Publique Blessing, when men of Eloquence, and Industry, (after the Example of our Forefathers) undertake the Patronage of so many as stand in need of it, without either *Grudging*, or *Reward*. I should take Occasion here, over and over to Lament the Discontinuance, if not the utter Loss and Destruction of this Divine Faculty, if it were not for appearing over much concern'd in my own Interest and Case. And yet we cannot but take notice how many brave Orators we have lost; how few we have any hope of, among those that are growing up; and the smaller number yet, of those that are left; tho' 'tis true that we have men of Boldness without Knowledge in Abundance. Now since we cannot be all of us either *Orators*, or *Lawyers*, (having indeed but few great men in either Faculty) we may do a world of good services yet, by Recommending, or Soliciting on the Behalf of Petitioners, or Clients; and by Employing our Interests either with the Bench, or with the Counsel, for their Behoof. Whosoever takes This Course, shall be sure to Oblige a great many men,

The Force of Eloquence.

The Decay of Orators.

and

and consequently by a great many to be well spoken of. But then we must have a Care (which every man will look to in his Own Discretion) that while we would Oblige One man, we do not Offend Another. For it happens many times that either through Heedlesness, we disoblige some body that does not Deserve it, or out of Rashness provoke some Other body that may make us rue it. In which Case, we ought to excuse our selves, as well as we can; for the least offence given to any man, even where we never intended it; by shewing him the Inevitable Necessity that forc'd us upon it, and the desire we have, upon any favourable Occasion, to make him some favourable Amends.

Disoblige no man.

IN the Conferring of *Good Offices* we have usually a regard either to Peoples *Manners*, or to their *Fortunes*; and therefore we have the Common saying ready at our Tongues end, that *'tis the* Man *only that we consider, and not the* Estate. This is a handsom Flourish, but where is the Man yet that does not more willingly bestow his Time and his Peins, upon the service of a Powerful, and a Wealthy Person, then in the Support and Protection of the best Poor man that ever was born? For we are naturally inclined to lay out our services where we may reasonably hope for the speediest, and the most Certain Return. And This proceeds from a Mistaken Estimate of the Nature of Things. For what if *That Honest Poor man* cannot requite us in *Kind*, He may do it yet in *Thankfulness*

In Benefits consider the *Man*, not the *Fortune*.

fulneſs of Heart, and in *Juſt Acknowledgments*? It was well enough ſaid, (whoever ſaid it) *He that* Has *my Mony*, *has not* Reſtor'd *it*; *and he that has* Reſtor'd *it*, *Has it no longer*. *But in the Caſe of* Good Will, *he that has* Paid *it* Has *it ſtill*; *And he that* Has *it ſtill*, *has* Paid *it*. Now for thoſe men that value themſelves upon their Titles, or Poſſeſſions, and have the World at Will; they are ſo far from accounting themſelves under any Obligation for a Benefit Received, that they look upon the very Acceptance of it, (let it be never ſo Great) as an Obligation laid upon the other ſide. Nay they will not ſtick to be Suſpicious, and Jealous of it, as a Prologue to ſome Petition, or further Deſign. But to tell them, *that ever they ſtood in need of*, *or were Beholden to any man*, is to ſtrike then to the very Heart. Whereas the *Poor man*, that takes all Friendly Offices to himſelf, without any reſpect to his Condition; *This Poor man* (I ſay) makes it his Bus'neſs, not only to expreſs his Gratitude to thoſe that have already obliged him, but to ingratiate himſelf likewiſe to thoſe which he hopes hereafter May be Kind to him; as having Occaſion for many Friends. And if it be his Good Hap to render his Patron a Profitable Service; His Humility makes the Value of it to be Leſs then it is, rather than Greater. And it is further to be Obſerved, that upon the Defence of a Great man, the Acknowledgment terminates either in Himſelf alone, or, at the Utmoſt, in the Effect it may have upon his Children, and Family. But in the Protection of a poor Creature, that is yet

The Pride and Vanity of Great Men.

The Poor mans Gratitude.

is yet Virtuous, and Modeſt, a man makes to himſelf an intereſt in all the poor honeſt men in Nature; which is no Inconſiderable Party out of the Body of the Common People. So that it turns to a better account to oblige the *Good*, then the *Fortunate*. We ſhould do our beſt however to leave no ſort of men unſatisfy'd; and if This point ſhould come in queſtion, let *Themiſtocles* decide the Controverſie. It was put to him *Whether a man ſhould rather beſtow his Daughter upon a* Poor man *that were* Honeſt, *or upon a man that had* More Wealth, *but* Leſs Integrity. And his Anſwer was This; *I had rather beſtow her upon a* Man *that wants* Mony *then upon* Mony *that Wants a* Man. But our Minds and Manners are now-adays corrupted and depraved with the Love of *Mony*: And yet, as to the matter of *Superfluity*, what is any man the *Better* for't? It may be of ſome uſe perhaps to him that has it; but that is only at *Some Times*, and in *Some Caſes* too. Or taking the advantage of it for Granted, it ſerves only to make a man the more Powerful, but not one jot the more Honeſt. Not that I would ſerve a good man ever the Leſs, for being *Rich* over and above. But I would ſtill ſerve him for his *Virtue*, and not becauſe of his *Wealth*: and govern my ſelf by the Judgment I make upon the Qualities of his *Mind*, without Calculating upon his *Fortune*. Now with one Precept more I ſhall Conclude: We muſt never Employ our Faculties and Endeavors, either to *upbold Iniquity*, or to *overthrow Juſtice*. For *Juſtice is the Foundation of an Everlaſting Fame*,

A Wiſe Saying of *Themiſtocles*.

Juſtice is the Foundation of a Laſting Fame.

and there can be nothing Commendable without it.

Of Publick Bounties.

HAVING already treated of Benefits with a regard to *Particular Persons*; we shall now Discourse of That sort of Bounty, which respects the *Universality* or the *Commonwealth*. Of This Bounty there are Two Kinds. The *One* concerns the whole *Body* of a City, or the *Community*; the *Other*, the *Particular Members of it*: And the Latter is the more acceptable of the Two. It is our Duty, as much as in us lies, to consult the Common Satisfaction of Both: Or however, to take Care of Particulars: but in such manner that the whole may be the Better for it; Or at least not the Worse. *Caius Gracchus*'s *Excessive Largesse* of *Corn* to the People, was *Mischievous*; for it exhausted the *Treasury*; but the *Moderate Donative* of *M. Octavius* was both *Tolerable* to the *Government*, and *Necessary* to the *People*; and consequently both the Republique it self, and the Citizens were the Better for't.

The Propriety of Particulars most be protected.

IT should be the Principal Care of him that has the Administration of Publique Affairs, to see that every Individual be Protected in his Propriety; and that Private men may not be dispossess'd of their Rights and Estates, under the Pretext of a Publick Good. It was a Pestilent Proposition, That of *Philip*'s, in his *Tribuneship*, about *an Equal Partition of Lands*; But then it was a great Instance of his Modesty, the letting of it fall so

Easily

Easily again. He did many Ill things, to curry Favour with the People; and he dropt one lewd speech too, *that there were not Two thousand men of Estates in the whole City.* What a desperate Hint was That toward the bringing of all things to a Level, and all Conditions of men to a Parity: One of the greatest Plagues that can befal a State? For it was the main End of the Founding and Establishing of Cities and Publick Bodies, that Particulars might be secur'd in their Possessions, and every man safe in the Enjoyment of his Own. For though men Associate by an Impulse of Nature, it was Desire and Hope yet of keeping what they had gotten, that made them Build Cities, for their Protection. It has been a Great Inconvenience that our Fore-fathers have been often put upon, the charging of the People with Extraordinary Taxes; which happened either through the Lowness of the Treasury, or the Expence and Burthen of a Continual War. This is a Course by all means Possible to be Avoided, by laying in of Provisions Beforehand; but if ever any Commonwealth should fall under This Necessity (for I had rather foretel it of any Other, then Ours; as I speak This only by way of General Discourse) it will be highly necessary that the People be punctually enformed of the Exigent; and that there is no way for them to subsist, but by complying with such a Necessity. It behoves all Governors to furnish the Publique Stores with Necessaries, before the Danger presses them; in what Proportion and of what Kind, is a matter so well known,

The danger of Levelling Principles.

No Extraordinary Taxes.

that it is sufficient the bare mention of the thing thus by the By.

Corrupt Magistrates are the Bane of any Government.

BUT above all things, let all men in Publique Administration keep themselves clear from the least suspition of *Avarice*. *I would to the Heavens* (says *C. Pontius* the *Samnite*) *that Fortune had reserved me for another Age, and kept me from coming into the World, till the* Romans *had begun to take Bribes. If this had been, I should quickly have put an end to their Empire.* Truly he must have staid a good while then; for 'tis but of late that *Rome* has been teinted with This Evil. Now if *Pontius* was a man of such a Resolution as he appears to have been, it is well for us that he came into the World when he did. The first Law that ever we had against the *Corruption of Magistrates*, is not as yet of *a hundred and ten years standing*? and That was *Piso*'s. But we have had a great many Others since That time; and every one still more severe then the Other. How many Criminals have we had? How many Condemn'd? What a Confusion upon the *Social War* in *Italy*? And That War excited too merely by the *Guilty*, to save themselves from *Punishment*? There was no longer any Course of Law, or Justice; but our Friends and Allies, lay exposed to Seisure and Pillage, without Relief: And if we are not Totally ruin'd, it proceeds more from the Weakness of Others, then from our own Virtue.

The *Abstinence* of *Africanus*.

PANÆTIUS extols *Africanus* for his *Abstinence* in the matter of *Money*: And why not? But still he might have found greater Virtues in him then That: For That Abstinence of his

his was not the Virtue of the *Men* only, but of the *Times*. *Paulus Æmilius*, upon his Victory over *Perseus*, made himself Master of all the *Macedonian Wealth*, to an Infinite Value; and brought so much Money into the Publique Treasury, that One Captain's Booty deliver'd the People from any further need of Taxes. And This he did without any Other Advantage to his Family, than the Honourable, and Immortal Memory of his Name and Action. *Africanus* the Younger (in imitation of his Father) got as little by the Destruction of *Carthage*; and his *Fellow-Censor*, *L. Mummius*, as little as either of them, by the Ruines of the Magnificent City of *Corinth*: But his busines was rather the Ornament, and Lustre of his *Country*, than That of his *House*: Although in giving Reputation to the One, he could not fail of doing the like to the Other. But to go on where I left.

Avarice a Detestable Vice.

THERE is not certainly a more Detestable Vice (especially in Princes, and Publique Magistrates) than Covetousness: And it is not only a Mean thing, but an Impious, to make a Prey of the Commonwealth. That which the *Pythian Oracle* deliver'd in the Case of *Sparta*, looks like a Prediction, not only Applicable to the *Lacedemonians*, but to all Opulent Nations also whatsoever: To wit, that it was not in the Power of any thing in the World, but *Avarice*, to Destroy That Commonwealth. There is no surer way in Nature for Men in Power to gain upon the Affections of the Multitude, than by *Frugality* and *Moderation*. But yet

The Power of Frugality in Publique Administrations.

yet when out of an Affectation of Popularity they come to propound such a *Levelling Division of Lands* as is above-mentioned; and either to Force the Right Owners out of their Possessions, or to the remitting of Just Debts; these People shake the very Foundations of Government; In the First place Dissolving the Bonds of Concord and Agreement, which can never consist with This way of taking Moneys from Some, and Discharging Others. And what's become of Common Equity then, when no Man is left the Master of his Own? For it is a Privilege Essential to a Community, that it be Free, and every Man secur'd in the Enjoyment of what belongs to him. Neither does This way of Confounding all things create that Interest and Reputation among the People, which the Projectors may Imagine: for it makes the Loser still your Enemy; and the very Receiver will hardly thank you for't neither: Or at best, so coldly, as if it were a thing he had no great mind to: Especially dissembling the Inward satisfaction of being forgiven a Debt; for fear of being thought unable to Pay it. Whereas the Injur'd Party will never Forget it, but carry the purpose of a Revenge in his Heart. Or what if there should be more to whom we Unjustly Give, than there are from whom we do as Unjustly Take away? This does not mend the matter One jot: for we are not to judge in This case by Number, but Weight. What colour of Equity is there for a Man that never Had an Estate, to Dispossess another of an Estate that has been many Years (nay Ages perhaps) in the Possession

The Danger of Invading Proprieties.

ſion of it, himſelf and Family; and that he that Has an Eſtate, ſhould have it taken from him? It was for this way of proceeding that the *Lacedemonians* Baniſh'd *Lyſander*, and put their King *Agis* to Death, beyond all Preſident of former times. And there follow'd ſuch Broils upon it, that their Beſt Men were Baniſh'd, a *Tyranny* introduced in the place of an *Ariſtocracy*, even to the utter Diſſolution of one of the beſt-Conſtituted Republiques upon the Face of the Earth. And *Sparta* did not fall alone neither; but the Contagion of Thoſe Tumults ſpread it ſelf ſo far, that the reſt of *Greece* was wholly Ruin'd by That Example. What ſhall we ſay of our *Gracchi*? (the Sons of the famous *Tiberius Gracchus*, and Grandchildren of the *Elder Affricanus*) It was this very point of Controverſie about *Lands*, that Deſtroy'd Them too. But on the Contrary, how much Honour has *Aratus* worthily acquired to himſelf, by his Exploit upon *Sicyon*? It had been Fifty Years under the Dominion, and in the Poſſeſſion of *Uſurpers*, when he recover'd it by a ſurprize from *Argos*, ſuppreſs'd *Nicocles* the Tyrant, Reſtor'd ſix hundred of the Wealthieſt Citizens that had been Baniſh'd, and ſet the City it ſelf at Liberty. But finding great Difficulty at laſt how to accommodate the bus'neſs of Lands and Poſſeſſions; and conſidering that it would be hard on the One ſide for thoſe that he reſtor'd to their Town to live ſtill in want, while Others enjoy'd Their Eſtates; and little Better, on the Other ſide, to break in upon, and take away Poſſeſſions of Fifty Years ſtanding;

A Generous Account of *Aratus*.

wherein ſo many ſeveral Intereſts were concern'd, by Purchaſes, Portions, Settlements, and the like, and without any Injury by Them done to the Right Owners: He concluded it Unreaſonable either to take from the One what they were poſſeſs'd of, or not to ſatisfie the Other, in ſome degree, for their Juſt Pretenſions. Wherefore he bethought himſelf, and reſolv'd upon a Journey to *Alexandria*; giving Orders that all things ſhould continue in the ſame ſtate he left them, until His Return: So that he preſently poſted away to his Old Friend, and Acquaintance, *Ptolomy* the *Second, King* of *Alexandria*. He had no ſooner inform'd that Generous Prince of his Bus'neſs, with the Deſign he had, and in what Manner, to Deliver his Country; but without any difficulty, this Illuſtrious Perſon prevail'd upon him for a large Sum of Money. This Treaſure he carry'd with him back to *Sicyon*, and then pick'd out Fifteen of the Principal Perſons of That place, to adviſe with upon This Affair, and to take a ſtrict account, as well of thoſe that were poſſeſs'd of Other Mens Eſtates, as of thoſe that had Loſt their Own. The Matter was ſo handled, that, upon a reaſonable Eſtimate of the Lands, ſome were perſwaded to content themſelves with the Value in Money, and to yield the Land; and Others choſe rather to take Money for their Land, than to Conteſt for the Recovery of it. So that in the Concluſion, the Controverſie was Compounded, and Both Parts abundantly ſatisfi'd with the Accord. What Pity was it that this Great Man was not born a Citizen of

of *Rome*? This is the right way of proceeding in such Cases; without exposing the Persons and Goods of Citizens (as it has been Twice in Our Days) to *Proscriptions*, and *Outcries*. This *Grecian*, like a Brave, and a Wise Man, consulted the Common Welfare: And it is the Highest point of a Good, and a Prudent Magistrate, to Maintein the Properties of the People, and not to Invade them; but keeping all within the Bounds of Common Equity. Why should any Man dwell *Gratis* in My House? as if I were to Purchase, Build, Repair, and Defend it, for Another (in despite of my heart) to reap the Fruits of My Labour, and Expence? For This is the Case in taking away from me That which is my Own, and giving to another That which does not Belong to him. And what's the End of these *Letters of Protection*, (if I may so call them) but that you shall buy Land with my Money; you Keep the Land, and I Lose my Money?

No Debts to be permitted, that may endanger the *Publique*.

IT is a matter therefore of great Moment, that no Debts be permitted, which may endanger the Publique. And This may be several ways prevented, if such a Course be taken, that Prodigals and Debtors may not raise their Fortunes upon Defrauding their Creditors; the One losing their Own, and the Other getting what belongs to Another Man. There is nothing that upholds a Commonwealth like Faith, and Credit: which can never be expected where People do not lie under a Necessity of paying their due Debts; a thing

thing which was never ſo violently preſt, as when I was Conſul: All Sorts and Degrees of Men were even in Arms about it: And yet I reſiſted all Motions tending That way, to the very Rooting of This Evil out of the Commonwealth. There was never more Money ſtirring, nor ever was there ſurer, or better Payment: For where the Hope of Deceiving is cut off, Men muſt neceſſarily keep Touch. It is true, that *Cæſar*, (who was in Thoſe days ſubdu'd, tho' now a Conqueror) that *Cæſar*, I ſay, did put his former Purpoſes in Execution, even when he had no need ſo to do: His very Appetite being ſo Vicious, that he took pleaſure in the Evil it ſelf, without any other Inducement. It is the Duty then of all good Patriots to keep themſelves Clear of this ſame Perverſe ſort of Liberality, that Takes from One, and Gives to Another: And in the firſt place, to provide that all Men may be Equally ſupported in the Enjoyment of their Own, by Law, and Common Juſtice. And that the Poor, and Simple, may not be Circumvented, or Oppreſs'd by Power, nor the Wealthy Obſtructed in the holding or receiving of their Dues, by the Envy and Maligenity of the People. And moreover, they ſhould by all means endeavour, both in War, and Peace, to advance the Republique, in Empire, Poſſeſſions, and Revenue: Theſe are the proper Offices and Atchievements of Great Men, and This was the Study, and the Exerciſe of our Forefathers. Thoſe that addict themſelves to theſe Duties, gain great Glory and Good-Will to their Own Particulars, beſide

ſide the Profit that they bring to the Publique. *Antipater* the *Tyrian* (and a *Stoique*) that lately Deceaſed at *Athens*, charges *Panætius* with leaving out Two Branches touching Health, and Money in theſe Precepts concerning Benefits. But I ſuppoſe that they were rather paſs'd over by That famous Philoſopher, as things well enough underſtood, and needleſs to be further inculcated, how advantagious ſoever.

A Caution in Matter of Health and Eſtate.

IT is a good means of preſerving *Health*, for every Man to underſtand his own Conſtitution; and to obſerve what Agrees with him, and what not: To live Temperately in all reſpects, as well in our Diet, and the Care of our Bodies, as in our Pleaſures: Uſing the Common Helps of Phyſique alſo, in Caſe of Need. In the gathering of an Eſtate, we muſt do nothing but what is Warrantable, and Honeſt: And when it is fairly gotten, it may be preſerv'd, and improv'd by Parcimony, and Caution. This Point is excellently well handled by *Xenophon* (the *Socratiſt*) in his *OEconomiques*; which I my ſelf, at about your Age, turned out of *Greek* into *Latin*.

Two Profitable things meeting in comparison.

THE Concurrence of Two Profitable Things in Compariſon, (which was the Fourth Conſideration, omitted by *Panætius*) is a Caſe which very often Happens: For ſometimes *Bodily Goods* fall in Competition with the Goods of *Fortune*: Sometime *Outward Goods* with Thoſe of the *Body*: And ſometime again, One of either of them is compar'd with Another

ther of the ſame Kind. As in the *Firſt* Inſtance, I had rather have *Health*, than *Money*: In the *Second*, I had rather have a *Great Eſtate*, than a *Robuſt Strength* of *Body*. And ſo forward: I had rather enjoy *Health*, than *Pleaſure*; I had rather be *Strong*, then *Nimble*. And then in the Colluſion of *External Things*, I had rather have *Honour*, than *Wealth*; and a Fortune in the *City*, rather than in the *Country*. The Compariſon that we find in the *Elder Cato*, was of This Quality. The Queſtion was put to him, What he look'd upon as the greateſt Convenience in a *Country Life*? His anſwer was, In the *Firſt Place*, *Good Paſturage*. What *next* then? *Paſturage* that was *Indifferently Good*. And what *then*? *Paſturage* ſtill, tho' a Degree *worſe* than the Other. And what again? *Tillage*. What do you think of *Uſury*? (ſays the *Enquirer*.) And what do You think of *Murther*? (ſays *Cato*.) By This, and abundantly more, we cannot but underſtand that Things Profitable came often in Competition: And that This Fourth Enquiry was not at all Impertinent. But as to the matter of Getting, Diſpoſing, or Uſing of Moneys, it is a Subject fitter for a Scrivener than a Philoſopher; and better underſtood by the Good Men upon the *Bourſe*, than by the Learned Men in the *Schools*. It is a thing needful however to be known, as apperteining to the Buſineſs of *Profit*: Of which having diſcourſed ſufficiently in This Book, we ſhall now proceed to what remains.

The End of the Second Book.

TULLY's

TULLY's OFFICES.

The Third BOOK.

I T was the saying (my Son *Marcus*) of *Scipio Africanus* the *Elder*, (as we have it from *Cato*, his Co-temporary) that *he was never Less* Idle, *or* Alone, *then when he most* appeared *so to be*. It was a Noble thing said, and worthy of a Great, and of a Wise man; to shew that in all his Leisures, his Thoughts were still taken up with Business; his Solitudes, in Discourses to himself, without any Loss of Time: And

A famous saying of *Scipio Africanus*.

And without need ſome whiles of any other Company. Inſomuch, that the Two things which commonly make Other people Liſtleſs, and Heavy, did even ſet an Edge upon him: That is to ſay, *Solitude*, and *Leiſure*. Now tho' I cannot come up to the Imitation of that Illuſtrious Perſon, I am not much Behind him yet in my *Good Will* (I would I could ſay as much of my ſelf, as he does in *Effect*.) For ſince I have been driven by the Force of Impious Arms from my Station in the Government, and the Buſ'neſs of the Bar; I have apply'd my ſelf to a Life of Leiſure too: upon That very Conſideration, quitting the Town, and betaking my ſelf to the Privacy and Solitude of a Country Life. Not that I compare either This Leiſure, or Solitude with That of *Africanus*. For His was only a Voluntary Retirement from the Importunities of Company, when he had a mind to give himſelf ſome Reſpite from the Honourable Charges he ſuſteined in the Commonwealth, by withdrawing into a Receſs, as a man ſometimes puts into a Port: But my Leiſures proceeded not from a deſire of Reſpite, but from want of Employment. For ſince the Diſſolution of the Senate, what is there to be done, either in the Palace, or in the Hall, that is worthy of us? The world ſwarms everywhere with Criminals; and after a life ſpent in ſo Eminent a Poſt, and in the Open View of the People, I am e'en forc'd to hide my head, and live (in a manner) quite alone to avoid the very ſight of them. I have heard Wiſe men ſay that we are not only to chuſe the leaſt of

Cicero's Retreat.

Neceſſary

Neceſſary *Evils*, but out of all Evils themſelves to extract ſomewhat of *Good*. I ſhall therefore make the beſt of my Repoſe, tho' not ſuch perhaps as he has deſerv'd from his Country, who hath formerly contributed ſo much to Their Quiet. And tho' this be a Solitude wholly of Neceſſity, not Choice; I would not yet have it abſolutely Fruitleſs. *Africanus* (I muſt Confeſs) gained to himſelf a Faire Reputation, but we have no Monuments of his Thoughts, committed to Writing: No Remains of his Leiſures, and Solitude that we find Extant. But we may Conclude however, that he was neither Idle nor Alone, from his Glorious Actions, which were only the Product of Deliberation and Thought. But Alas! I have not that ſtrength of Mind to *Think* away my Solitudes, and ſupply the want of Company with bare Meditation. So that My whole Diverſion is to paſs away my Time, and my Cares upon Writing: and I have done more that away Now, in a little while, ſince the overturning of the Government, then I did in many years before, while it was in a flouriſhing Eſtate.

Cicero compares himſelf with *Africanus*.

NOW (my Son) tho' Philoſoyhy be Profitable and Fruitful from one end of it to the other, without any Waſte, or Deſert: there is not any place yet in the whole Extent of it that yields greater Advantage, and Benefit, then that Part of it which treats of *Civil Duties*, and the Rules of a Steady, and a Virtuous Life. Wherefore, tho' I doubt not either, of the Great and Excellent *Cratippus*'s

Of Civil Duties and a Virtuous Life.

Care

Care in the inculcating of this Leſſon daily to you; or of your own Diligence, and Attention in the receiving of it; it is not amiſs yet to be often minded of ſo neceſſary a Point; and (which way ſoever you turn your ſelf) to have this voice ſtill ſounding in your Ear, even, if it were poſſible, without hearing any thing elſe. This is a thing for every man to do, that propounds to himſelf an Honeſt Courſe of Life; and it is your Intereſt perhaps as much as any bodies; becauſe the world expects it from you, that you ſhould ſucceed to the Induſtry, the Honours, and (if I may ſo ſay) in ſome meaſure to the Reputation of your Father. And you have a great deal to anſwer for upon the ſcore of *Athens*, and *Cratippus*. For what could be more Diſhonorable then after ſo ample a Commiſſion granted you to the famous *Staple* of the whole World, for *good Manners* and *Letters*, to come back Empty; to the Diſparagement both of the Maſter, and the City? Wherefore you muſt Labour with all the Faculties of your Soul, and Body, to make good This Expectation: (if I may call That a Labour, which is ſo great a Pleaſure) and let it never be ſaid that after all other ſupplies from your Father, you were only wanting to your ſelf: But let This ſuffice: having written ſo much, and ſo often to you already, upon This Subject. We ſhall now return to the remaining part of the Diviſion propounded.

P A-

PANÆTIUS is the man, without Diſpute, that has the moſt accurately handled This queſtion: and Him have I chiefly follow'd, with ſome amendment and additions of my Own. He lays down *Three Propoſitions* that men are want to deliberate and adviſe upon, in the Caſe of *Duty*. *Firſt*, whether the matter in queſtion be *Honeſt*, or *Diſhoneſt*. *Secondly*, whether it be *Profitable*, or *Unprofitable*. *Thirdly*, where *Two things* meet in *Competition*, the *One* of them appearing *Honeſt*, and the *Other Profitable*; how to Diſtinguiſh. He has written Three Books upon the Two former Heads; and promiſed a Diſcourſe upon the Third; but he has not been ſo good as his word: which I do the more wonder at, becauſe I find in his Scholar *Poſidonius*, that he lived Thirty years after the Publiſhing of Theſe Books. And I am in ſome Admiration too, that *Poſidonius*, in his Commentaries, ſhould paſs the matter over ſo ſlightly; eſpecially making This Remarque upon it, that of the whole Body of Philoſophy, This is the moſt neceſſary Part. There are ſome that will not have This to be an *Overſight* in *Panætius*; but a Point left out upon Conſideration; as a thing wholly Impertinent. But I am of another Opinion. The Reaſon they give, is This. *Honeſt*, and *Profitable* (they ſay) are *Convertible Terms*; and not to be ſo much as Imagined in Oppoſition. From hence there may ariſe another Queſtion, whether the Third Branch of *Panætius*'s Diviſion ſhould not have been abſolutely rejected, without any mention of it all. But

Panætius of Civil Duties.

Cicero excuſes an Omiſſion of *Panætius*.

it is Certain however, that he did at first undertake it, and then let it fall. He that makes a Tripartite Division, and goes thorough with Two Parts of it, is undoubtedly answerable for the Third: And he passes his word over and above toward the latter end of his Third Book, that he will go on with it. And we have the Authority of *Posidonius* himself to Witness as much; writing in a certain Epistle what *Publius Rutilius Rufus* (an Auditor of *Panætius*) was wont to say. As there was never any Peinter (says he) that durst venture upon Finishing the Picture of *Venus*, which *Apelles* had begun (such was the Delicacy of the Face, that there was no hope of matching it with a suitable Body) so in the Case of *Panætius*, the Excellency of those things which he did perfect, was so Transcendent, that no man after him durst ever attempt the supplying of what he either Omitted, or left Imperfect. So that of *Panætius*'s Intention there can be no longer any Doubt. But yet whether he did Well or Ill in adding the Third member of his Division, may perhaps bear a Dispute: For taking it either according to the *Stoiques*, that no thing can be *Good* but that which is *Honest*; or with the *Peripatetiques*, that *Honesty* is the *Sovereign Good*, to such a degree, that all other Goods are as nothing in the Ballance Against it; they do both of them however agree in This, that *Profit* can never be admitted into a Competition with *Honesty*. How does *Socrates* Curse the First Dividers of *Honest*, and *Profitable*, in *Imagination*, which are so

Nothing can be Profitable, but what is Honest.

ſo *Inſeparable* by *Nature?* And the *Stoiques* go ſo far along with him too, as to hold that nothing can be the One, without being alſo the Other. But if *Panætius* were one of thoſe that will have *Virtue* to be *Therefore* Eſteem'd, for the *Profit* that ſhe brings us; meaſuring things *Deſirable*, either by *Pleaſure*, or *Freedom* from *Pein*; he might then be allow'd to erect the Notion of a *Poſſible Repugnancy* of *Profit*, to *Honeſty*. But being of Another Opinion; and that the *Only Good* is That which is *Honeſt*: and that whatſoever ſtands in Oppoſition to it, under the Shew of *Utility*, a mans life is neither the *Better* nor the *Worſe* for it, either With it, or Without it: He ſhould not ſo much as have put the Caſe, methinks, where *Profit* and *Virtue* ſhould appear in the *Compariſon*. For to Live according to *Nature*, which the *Stoiques* account for the *Sovereign Good*: is nothing elſe. (as I underſtand it) then to lead a life Congruous to *Virtue*: And in all Caſes whatſoever, to follow the Direction of *Nature* in a Conformity thereunto. The matter ſtanding Thus; ſome men are of opinion that This Compariſon was not properly introduced; and that there was not any need of preſcribing in This Kind, at all.

True Honeſty and True Wiſdom are Inſeparable.

NO man can be *Truly Honeſt*, but He that is *Truly Wiſe*; and there is no ſeparating the One from the Other. There may be an *Imperfect Honeſty*, 'tis True, with an *Imperfect Wiſdom*; which is rather the *Reſemblance* of *Honeſty*, then *the Thing it ſelf*. And there-

Middle Duties.

fore all those Duties that we treat of in this Discourse, the *Stoiques* call *Middle Duties*: which are Common indifferently to Mankind; and of a large Extent: and some people attein the knowledge of them by a Felicity of Nature; others, by a Progression, and advance upon Study. But those which They call *Right Duties*, are Complete and Consummate in all the Parts (or numbers as they express it) and This Perfection is only to be found in a Wise man. But he yet that acquits himself in the Discharge of these *Middle Offices*, goes for Current with the *Multitude* for a *good* and a *Wise man* in the *Abstract*: They not being able to distinguish betwixt what is *Perfect*, and *Defective*. Wherefore, so far as They understand the Business, there is nothing wanting. We see many times in Poems, Pictures, and a World of Other Instances, how strangely the unskilful are delighted with them, and yet for the most part commending the least masterly stroke in the Piece: which arises from This Ground, (I suppose) they find something in the whole that pleases them; but they are not able to judge of the Imperfections of the several Parts: But when they come to be better instructed, they are easily brought to change their First Opinion.

The Duties here Treated of, are with the *Stoiques* a kind of *Second-rate Honesty*; and not *peculiar* to *wise men*, but *Common* to *Human Nature*: And therefore they affect all people that have in them the least spark of Good Nature, or Virtue. Now when we speak

ſpeak of the *Magnanimity* of the *two Decij*, or the *Scipio's*, or of the *Juſtice* of *Fabricius*, or *Ariſtides*; we do not propoſe their Example as the Standard of That *Courage*, and *Equity* that is required in a *Wiſe man*. For I do not look upon either of them to have been *Wiſe* to the Degree of *Wiſdom here intended*; no, nor thoſe very Perſons upon whom the World has beſtowed both the *Reputation*, and the *Name* of *Wiſe men*. I ſpeak of *Cato*, *Caius Lælius*, or the *Seven Sages* themſelves. But by the Frequent exerciſe of *Middle Offices* they had ſomewhat of the *appearance*, and *Reſemblance* of *Wiſemen*. So that we muſt neither Compare *Profit* in Oppoſition to that which is *truly Honeſt*; nor oppoſe any matter of *Gain* to that which we commonly call *Virtue*; whereupon theſe people value themſelves, that would be accounted *Good men*. And we muſt as well uphold and preſerve That Practical Honeſty that falls under our Capacities; as That which in Strictneſs and Truth, is only the Honeſty of Wiſe men: For Otherwiſe, how ſhall we know what progreſs we make toward Virtue? And ſo much for thoſe that by doing *Good Offices* get themſelves the Reputation of being *Good men*.

No man Good or Wiſe in the Abſtract.

BUT for thoſe that Meaſure all things by the Common Intereſt of *Gain* and *Beneſit*, and will not allow *Honeſty* to take place; it is ordinary for Them to put *Mony* in the Scale againſt *Virtue*; which no Good man will ever do. I ſuppoſe therefore, that *Panætius*, when he ſays that men are wont to make ſome Doubts upon the Compariſon, means only

The *Epicureans* meaſure *Honeſty* by *Profit*.

(as he says) that they are *Wont* to do so; and not that they *do well* in *so doing.* For not only the Preference of Profit to Honesty, but the very Comparing of them, and the making a Doubt in the Case, is a shameful Bus'ness. But what is it that we doubt upon? Or what's the Ground of our Consideration? It is (I presume) upon the Quality of the Point in Question: For that which is Dishonorable at One time, may be Warrantable at Another. As for Example, upon a supposition more at large; What fouler Villany can be imagin'd then the Killing not only of a Man, but a Familiar Friend? And yet the People of *Rome* do not only Absolve any man that destroys a *Tyrant*, tho' his Famil ar Friend; but they reckon upon it as the most Glorious Action of an Honorable Life. Is it in This Case that *Profit* prevails over *Honesty*; Or rather that the *Honesty* follow'd the *Profit*?

Circumstances alter the Case.

THE Certain way to keep us Right in our Judgments upon the Concurrence of *Profitable*, and *Honest*, will be the Establishment of such a Rule as upon the Comparing of things will direct us in our Duty: which Rule I would have to be squar'd to the Reason and Discipline of the *Stoiques*: And This is the Rule which I shall observe in This Treatise; Because tho' the Ancient *Academiques*, and the *Peripatetiques* also, (which were formerly all one) give a Preference to that which is *Honest*, before that which seems to be *Profitable*; the matter is yet more Generously handled by the *Stoiques*, that make *Profit* and

A Rule keeps us Right,

Honesty

Honesty Reciprocal, then by those that Imagine a thing may be either *Honest*, and not *Profitable*, or *Profitable*, and not *Honest*. Now our *Academy* allows great Liberty, and gives us a Right to defend That which appears most *Probable*. But to Return to my Rule; To take away any thing wrongfully from any man, or to make my Own Fortune by the empoverishing of Another, is more Contrary to *Nature*, then Death, Beggery, Pein; or whatever else can befal a mans Body, or Estate. For at First Dash it destroys all Neighborhood and Society: For if we come once to entertain an Opinion that One man for his Own advantage may Assault, or make a Prey of Another; there follows necessarily an Absolute Dissolution of Human Society, and a Violation of the most Certain and Powerful Dictate of Nature. Put the Case that One Member should draw to it self the Health, and Good Blood of the Member next unto it; the whole Body must, of Necessity, Consume and Perish: In like manner if every man should take from Another what he can get, and apply his Neighbors Goods to his Own Use, This would undoubtedly put an end to all Friendliness, and Fellowship among men. It is natural Enough for a man to provide Necessaries for Himself, in the First place; But it is yet against Nature for him to furnish himself with Mony or Provisions, by Spoil and Rapine: And it is not only by the Dictate of Nature, or the Rights of Nations, but by the particular Laws and Constitutions of all States, that it is declared Unlawful for One

In our Judgments of *Profitable* and *Honest*.

Fraud and Rapine are against the Laws of Nature and Nations.

man to do any Mischief to Another for his Proper Benefit. It is the Express Care, Will, and Intent of all Laws to maintein the Duties of Society, Safe, and Inviolate: and they punish the Transgressors of these Rules with Death, Banishments, Prisons, and Fines: And much more does Nature her self Exact this from us: *Nature* (I say) which is the *Law Divine* and *Humane, Both in one.* Whoever obeys Her Dictate (as all men will, that propose to live in a Conformity to the Principles of a Reasonable Being) will never agree to the Coveting of what is Another mans, or to the taking away from his Neighbor, and Giving to himself. For Greatness of Mind, Gentleness, Justice, and Liberality are much more Consonant to Nature then Pleasure, Life, or Riches: which, in Comparison with the Common Good, are by all men of Brave and Exalted Minds, neglected and despised. Whereas, on the Other side, to Spoyl my Neighbor for my Own Advantage is more Contrary to Nature, then Death, Torments, and the like. As it is more according to Nature for a man to undergo all sorts of Labours and Troubles for the Service and Conservation, (if it were Possible) even of the whole World: After the Example of *Hercules*, whom the Gratitude of *Men* has placed for his Virtues among the *Gods:* All This (I say) is more Agreeable to Nature, then to live in Solitude; and not only free from Cares, but even wallowing in Pleasures, and Plenty; with all the Advantages of Strength and Beauty, over and above.

This

This is it that makes all Great and Glorious Spirits, ſo much to prefer Difficulty and Action, before a Life of Idleneſs and Sloth. From hence it comes to paſs, that according to Nature, One man can never hurt another. And beſides, he that wrongs another for his Own Advantage, he does either imagine that this is not againſt Nature; or elſe he ſuppoſes that Death, Poverty, Pein, Loſs of Children, Kindred, and Friends, are more to be avoided, then the doing of Injuries. But if he conceives that one man may do an Injury to another without an offence to Nature, there's no diſputing with One that has loſt his Reaſon; and in effect, Ejected all that is Man even out of Himſelf. But what if he thinks the *One* to be *Bad*, and yet the *Other*, *Worſe*? He is in a Grievous Miſtake, to Phanſie any Calamity of Body or Fortune Comparable to the Diſorders of his Mind.

The Intereſt of the *Whole*, is the Intereſt of every *Part*.

WE ſhould all of us therefore agree upon This Common Propoſition, That the Intereſt of the *Whole*, is the Intereſt of *Every Part*; and that whoever draws more to himſelf then belongs to him, is an Enemy to the Publique. Now if it be the very Preſcript of Nature, that for Humanity ſake, one Man ſhall take Care of another; it does neceſſarily follow, that the Welfare of the Publique, is the Intereſt of Every Particular, according to the ſame Principle. Let but This be admitted, and we are all of us equally under the Government of the ſame Law: And then taking That for granted; to do an Injury to any Man is againſt the

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the Law of Nature. The Former is certainly True; and so is the Other, by Consequence. It is a Ridiculous Shift, to say, that I would not take away any thing from my Father, or from my Brother, to put in my Own Pocket; but to take from Other people, is quite another Case: as if every Individual were not concerned in the Protection of the Whole: An Opinion utterly Inconsistent with the Rules of Government.

THERE are some again will have the *Citizens* Provided for, but not *Strangers*: And These Men tear up the very Foundations of Human Society. For take away That once, and there will be no longer any Good Nature, Liberality, Honesty, or Justice, to be found upon the Face of the Earth. And whosoever brings Matters to That pass, is to be accounted an Enemy to the *Gods Themselves*, for breaking That Union among Men, which was no other than a Constitution of *Divine Appointment*. It is the strongest Band of Society, a General Agreement in This Position, that it is a greater Offence to Nature for me to take any thing from Another, for my Own Advantage, then to suffer all the Miseries that can possibly befal any Man in his Body or Estate: Nay, that can befal the very Mind it self; saving the single point of Justice, which one Virtue is the Mistress, and the Princess of all the rest. But what? (will some say) Shall a Wise Man rather Perish for want of Bread, than take a Loaf from another Man that's good for nothing, to keep himself from Starving?

Better suffer any Calamity than do an *Injury*.

This

This must not be done yet; no not upon any Terms: Life is not so dear to me as my Duty; and my Resolution not to wrong any Man for my Own Benefit. Suppose an Honest Man almost frozen to death might save his Life by taking away the Cloak of *Phalaris*; (a Barbarous and a Bloody Tyrant) should he not do it? This is a Case easily determin'd: For the taking of any thing away from another, for a Man's Own sake, is Inhuman, and against the Law of Nature, let the Man be never so worthless. But in the Case of a Person whose Life may be of Eminent Use and Service to the Commonwealth, to take any thing from such a Worthless Person to preserve so necessary an Instrument to the Publique; and to take it purely upon That Consideration, it is not blame-worthy: But Otherwise, I must rather bear my Own Misfortunes, than Relieve my self by what I force from another Man: so that it is not more against Nature to be Sick, or Necessitous, than to Seize upon, or Covet the Goods of Another: But the Abandoning of the Common Good is an Offence to Nature; for it is Unjust; and therefore the Law of Nature, that Regulates and Provides for the Common Welfare of Mankind, does in a manner direct the Translation of Necessaries from a slothful and unprofitable Wretch, to the behoof of a Wise, a Good, and a Valiant Man, and whose Loss might be of great damage to the Government: Provided that it be done meerly out of such a respect, without any Vanity, or Self love, or making use of a Publique Pretext for a Colour to a Particular Injustice.

justice. In so doing, I keep my self still upon my Duty, consulting the Benefit of Mankind, and (that which I often Inculcate) of Human Society.

AS to the Case of *Phalaris*, the Decision is Obvious: For a Tyrant is rather an Enemy, then a Member of Human Society; and there can be no Crime in the Dispoiling of an Usurper, whom it is Lawful to Kill; and it were well if the whole Race of this impious and pestilent sort of Men were Exterminated from having to do with Mankind. For as we cut off Mortifi'd Limbs, when the Blood and Spirits have in a manner forsaken them, and that they grow dangerons to the Rest: so should that fierce and outrageous Brutality be separated, if I may so say, from the Common Humanity of the Publique Body. Of This Quality are all those Questions of Duty, whereof the Resolution depends upon the Circumstances of Times: which I presume, *Panætius* would have persu'd, if somewhat of accident or busnes had not taken him off from his Purpose. We have said enough in our former Books upon This Matter; to shew what we are always to shun, as evil and shameful in it self, and what we are Not obliged always to avoid, because it is not *always*, either *Mis-becoming*, or *Dishonest*.

Certain Principles to be given for granted.

BUT being now about to Crown the Work we have begun, I must deal with You, (my *Cicero*) as the Mathematicians Do with their Disciples. They lay down certain *Postulata*, to

to be taken before-hand for granted, without the Trouble of diſcourſing the Points; to the end that they may make themſelves more eaſily underſtood. So muſt I require of You (my *Cicero*) to yield me This Point, (if you can afford it) that *Nothing is deſirable for it ſelf, but what is Honeſt*. Now if *Cratippus* will not allow of the Propoſition whole as it lies; This yet, I preſume, will not be deny'd, That *Virtue* is *Chiefly*, if not *Only* to be *deſired*, and *for its own ſake*. It is all one to me, which of the Two you take, for they are Both of them more Probable than any thing elſe: And Firſt, let me vindicate *Panætius*, in This, that he never ſuppoſed a *Competition* of *Utility*, and *Virtue*; (nor could he have juſtifi'd it if he had) but he is to be underſtood of things that *ſeem* Profitable; for over and over in all his Diſcourſes he ſtill makes *Utility*, and *Virtue* to be *Convertibles*, and repreſents it to be the moſt Peſtilent Errour that ever enter'd into Human Life, the Opinion that Divided them. And therefore he introduced a Repugnancy, betwixt *Appearances*, and *Truths*; not as *ſeparating* the *Profitable* from the *Honeſt*; but for our Caution, and Inſtruction, that we might judge betwixt them. We ſhall therefore diſpatch this remaining Part without any help from others; and upon our own Account, (as we ſay:) For ſince *Panætius* left This Subject, I have ſeen nothing yet that has given me any ſort of ſatisfaction.

WE are all of us apt to be moved upon any thing that preſents it ſelf unto us, under the appea-

Nothing can be beneficial, that is dishoneſt.

appearance of Profit. But if upon looking narrowly into it, we find any thing that is dishoneſt, or ſhameful, annexed thereunto; we are not to leave it then, as a thing *Profitable*, but as conſidering that *Utility*, and *Diſhoneſty* cannot ſtand together. For if there be nothing ſo *Contrary* to *Nature* as the *One* or ſo *Agreeable* to it, as the *Other*; (for Nature affects what is Right, Convenient, and Conſtant, and deſpiſes the Contrary) it is impoſſible that they ſhould Both meet in the ſame Subject. Again; If we are born for *Virtue*; either (according to *Zeno*) *Virtue is to be deſired for it ſelf alone*, or (according to *Ariſtotle*) *it weighs down all other things*: then does it follow, of Neceſſity that *Virtue* muſt be either the *Only*, or the *Supreme Good*. So that whether way ſoever it be taken, that which is *Good*, is certainly *Profitable*; and that which is *Profitable*, is certainly *Good*. Thoſe Men therefore are very ſhort-ſighted, that preſently lay hold of that which *appears Profitable*, and conſider it *apart* from that which *is Honeſt*. From Hence come Murthers, Poyſonings, Forgeries, Thefts, Publique Cheats, Oppreſſions, Squeezing of the People, or our Confederates: From Hence come the Intolerable Inſolencies of Men of over-grown Fortunes; and finally, Ambition, and the Thirſt of Dominion; then which nothing can be more Ruinous, or Pernicious in a Free City. They take falſe Meaſures of the *Value* of things, without ſo much as dreaming of the *Puniſhment*; not the *Puniſhment* of the *Laws*, (for That they can with Eaſe break thorough) but

That

That of the *Conſcience*, which is the bittereſt of all. Wherefore This ſort of Men ſhould be excluded Human Converſation, (as moſt Execrable, and Impious) even for barely deliberating whether they ſhould, either follow That which they ſee to be *Honeſt*, or knowingly pollute themſelves with *Villany*. The very *Doubt* and *Deliberation* is *Criminal*, though without advancing to the Act it ſelf. Wherefore we ſhould never deliberate at all, where the very Deliberation it ſelf is Shameful. The great Puniſhment is that of Conſcience.

AND then in all our *Deliberations*, we ſhould not entertain any Hope, or Deſign, of Concealing, or Diſguiſing Matters; for we ſhould take up This for a Maxim; (at leaſt, if we be ever the better for our Philoſophy) that *if we could carry things ſo Private, as that neither God nor Man ſhould diſcover us, we ſhould yet have ſuch a Reverence for our Selves, as not to let any thing of Injuſtice, Uncleanneſs, or Immodeſty, Eſcape us.* A Divine Precept.

Plato's Fable of *Gyges*, is not impertinent to our Purpoſe. The Story has it, that a Torrent having eaten a Hollowneſs in the Ground, *Gyges* went down into it, and there obſerv'd a Brazen Horſe, with Doors in his Sides. Upon the Opening of theſe Doors, he diſcover'd the Dead Body of a Man, of a Prodigious Size, with a Golden Ring upon his Finger. *Gyges* boldly pluckt it off by force, and put it upon his Own, and being the King's Shepherd, he went his way, and joyn'd himſelf with Other Shepherds. Finding, that upon turning the Stone of the Ring, *Inwards*, he became Inviſible to *Others*, and yet ſaw every The Fable and Moral of Gyges's Ring

ry thing *Himself*; and that upon turning it *back again* he became *Visible*, as *before*; by the Advantage of this Ring he made his way to the Enjoyment of the Queen, and by her Assistance, Murther'd the King, his Master; and in a short time remov'd all out of the way that he thought stood betwixt Him, and the Crown. All this Lewdness he Committed by the help of this *Ring*, and so made himself King of *Lydia*. Now if a Wise Man were the Master of such a Ring, he would reckon himself no more Privileg'd to do an Ill thing with it, then without it; for an Honest Man considers the *Goodness* of the *Action*, not the *Privacy* of it. It is objected by some (that shew themselves to be better *Men*, then *Philosophers*) that this Story out of *Plato* is only a Tale; as if any Man would report it for a thing either True, or Possible: but see however the Force, and Scope of This Ring, and of This Example. How many things are done out of Avarice, Ambition, Pride, Lust, that no body knows of, or so much as suspects? Suppose that This Impiety could be kept so secret, that neither God nor Man should come to know it: Would you commit it? *'Tis a thing impossible*, (they say, whether it be so or not.) But what, would they do (say I) if they could do the thing, which they say they cannot? They return you the same senseless Answer over again: they say 'tis *Impossible*; and there they stick: not at all comprehending the Drift, and Import of the Question. For in asking what a Man would do if he could *Conceal* it, I do not ask whether he can *Conceal* it, or *no*:

But

But I put the Question, as if it were in Case of the *Torture*. If they make answer that *if they were sure to scape Punishment, they would do what they found most Expedient*, they confess themselves to be *Criminals*; and if they *deny* it, 'tis a Concession that *all evil things are to be avoided, even for Themselves*. But to return now to my purpose.

THERE fall out divers Cases, that under an Appearance of Profit, many times disorder our Thoughts, and trouble us in our Resolutions: not as upon a Deliberation whether a man should strain a Point of *Honesty* in regard of the *Greatness* of the *Benefit* in prospect; (for That were *Mean*, and *Dishonest*) but whether That which seems so *very Profitable* may be done without *Dishonour*. It might look like an unjust thing in *Brutus*, the Deposing of *Collatine*, his *Fellow-Consul*, who in the Expulsion of the Kings, was both his *Partner* in the *Advice*, and his *Assistant* in the Execution: But when the whole Body of the Principals of the City had agreed together to extirpate the whole *Family*, and the *Relations* of that Proud Prince, as well as the Name of the *Tarquins*; (which was a Resolution of Publique Advantage) This was so Honest, and Just an Action, that *Collatine* himself was Obliged to approve of the Proceeding: so that this Utility was valu'd for the Honesty sake, without which, in truth, it had not been Profitable. But This did not hold in the Case of that Prince that Founded our City: For he was so wrought upon by the shew of Profit, that he kill'd his Brother upon the

The appearance of Profit oftentimes distracts us.

appearing Advantage of rather Governing Alone then with Company. He cast off all Piety and Humanity, for the obteining of That which seemed unto Him to be Profitable, tho' it proved the clear Contrary. The *pretended Honesty* in the Action, was to punish the Affront of his Brothers leaping in scorn over the Wall; but it was neither Competent, nor Likely. Wherefore, under favour of either *Quirinus* or *Romulus*; (no matter whether) it was undoubtedly a Crime.

How far we may look to our selves.

AND yet we are not to neglect our own Advantages neither; or part with any thing to Others, when we want it our selves. But every man should attend his own Profit, as far as may be without Injury to Another. *Chrysippus* had many Witty sayings, whereof this was one. *In the running of a Course*, (says he) *a man may be allow'd to strive, and Contend his Utmost: but to trip up his Antagonists Heels, or to lay hands upon him, this is a thing not to be done upon any terms. So for any man to get That which may serve for the use of Life, is very Fair, and allowable; but to take it away from Another, is not Lawfull.*

Many Niceties in Friendships.

IN Friendship, 'tis true, there are many Niceties as well in the not doing of any good Office which may Honestly be done, as in the doing of any thing for a Friend Contrary to Justice. But one short Rule will serve upon this whole Matter, and it is no hard one neither. Those things that seem Profitable; as Honours, Riches, Pleasures, and Other Circumstances of the like Kind; these things are never

never to be preferr'd before Friendſhip: But no Good man will do any thing for a Friend, that is either againſt the Commonwealth, his Oath, or his Word: No not if he were himſelf to be a Judge in his Friends Caſe; for he lays down the Perſon of a *Friend*, where he takes up That of a *Judge*. I would have him with that his Friend may have *Juſtice* on *his ſide*; and I would have him allow him all the Favour in point of *Time*, that the Law will permit; but when he comes to paſs his *Sentence*, let him remember, and conſider, that he calls God to witneſs; or (as I ſuppoſe) his Own Conſcience, the Divineſt thing Heaven it ſelf ever beſtow'd upon a Mortal. It was therefore a Worthy Practice of our Anceſtors; They never ask'd any thing of a Judge (and I wiſh we did ſo at This day) but upon Condition that it might conſiſt with Juſtice. This Requeſt has relation to thoſe things which (as I ſaid e'en now) a Judge may Fairly allow to a Friend; for if a man muſt of Neceſſity do all things that a Friend would have him do, this is no longer a Friendſhip, but a Confederacy. Let me be underſtood only of Common Friendſhips: For among men that are Wiſe, and Perfect, there can be no ſuch thing. The Story goes of *Damon*, and *Pythias*, (*Pythagoreans*) ſo great was the Kindneſs they had for one another, that when *Dionyſius* had ſentenced one of them to death, the Party Condemned only deſired a few days reſpite to put his Affairs in order; and the Other became Surety (Body for Body) for his Appearance. The Priſoner return'd at

The Generous Friendſhip of *Damon* and *Pythias*.

his day, and the Tyrant fell into such admiration at their *Generosity*, and *Justice*, that he requested them to receive Him as a Third man, into that Friendship. Wherefore in all Friendships, where the Profitable and the Honest meet in Comparison we should never consider the Profit, but square our actions according to the Honesty. But whereso'ever any thing shall be required in *Friendship*, which does not stand with *Honesty*, in that Case *Religion*, and *Faith*, must take place of *Friendship*. This is the Rule by which we are to make Choice of the Duty here in Question.

Publique Mistakes under the appearance of Profit.

WE are Liable also to many Publique Mistakes under the Appearance of Profit; as our Countrymen were to blame in the Irrecoverable Destruction of *Corinth*. And the *Athenians* did yet worse, in cutting off the Thumbs of the people of *Ægina*, only because they were good Seamen, and they reckon'd that this might turn to their Advantage, and Security, because of the Neighborhood of *Ægina* to one of their Principal Ports. But nothing can be *Profitable* that's *Cruel*; for we are to follow the Dictate of *Nature*, and nothing is more *Contrary* to *Nature*, then *Cruelty*.

Humanity to Strangers.

THEY do very Ill also, that either Prohibit, or Banish Strangers from among them; as *Petronius* did of Old; and *Papius*, not long since. It is well enough not to suffer him that is *no Citizen*, to pass *for a Citizen*, (accor-

cording to the Law of our Conſuls *Craſſus* and *Scævola*, who were Wiſe men.) But it is undoubtedly moſt Inhuman, abſolutely to deny the Common Benefit of Protection, and Intercourſe in a City, to Strangers. Thoſe are Great and Remarkable Caſes wherein the *Shew* or *Colour* of *Publique Utility* is deſpiſed, in compariſon with *Honeſty*. We have in the Story of our Commonwealth, a World of Eminent Examples. How many times have we (and eſpecially in the *Second Punique War*, after that Miſerable Diſaſter at the Battle of *Cannæ*) ſhew'd greater Courage in our Diſtreſs, then ever we did in our Proſperity? There was not the leaſt ſign of Fear among us, nor any Mention of Peace; ſuch is the Power of Honeſty, that nothing of Profit can appear againſt it! The *Athenians*, when they were no longer able to reſiſt the force of the *Perſians*, came to a Reſolve of putting all their Wives, and Children into *Trœzen*; to abandon the City, and maintain the Liberty of *Greece* with a *Navy*. There was one *Cyrcilus* that adviſ'd them rather to ſtay in the City, and receive *Xerxes* into it; but they Ston'd him to death for his Counſel. He gave them the advice which he took to be moſt profitable; but it ceaſes to be *Profit*, when it ſtands in oppoſition to *Honeſty*. *Themiſtocles*, after his Victorious War againſt the *Perſians*, declar'd in Council that he had thought of ſomething that might be of great Advantage to the Commonwealth; but it was not convenient to be made Publique, and therefore deſir'd them to appoint ſome body to whom

he might impart the matter in Private. They named *Ariſtides*; and he told him that the *Lacedemonian* Fleet, which was laid up at *Gytheon* might eaſily be Fir'd by ſurprize, which would very much weaken the *Lacedemonians*. *Ariſtides*, when he had heard it, came into the *Senate* where they were all big with Expectation, and made his Report that *Themiſtocle*'s Counſel was very *Profitable*, but not *Honorable*: wherefore the *Athenians* would not allow it to be *Profitable* neither, if it were not likewiſe *Honeſt*; and ſo rejected the Propoſition, only upon the Report of *Ariſtides*, even without Hearing it. How much did theſe people go beyond us; that ſuffer our *Pirates* to go *Free*, while our *Confederates* are *Tributaries*? Let it be taken therefore for granted, that nothing can ever be *Profitable* that is *Diſhonorable*; no, not in the very Poſſeſſion of That which we account ſo to be. Nay it is a great Infelicity of Judgment, to Imagine that any thing can be *Profitable*, that is *Diſhoneſt*.

A ſcrupulous point of Honour.

BUT there fall out many Occaſions (as I have ſaid before) wherein the *Profitable*, and the *Honeſt* may fal in *Competition*: In which Caſe we ſhould conſider how far they ſtand in direct Oppoſition, and wherein they may be fairly reconcil'd: As for Inſtance, upon theſe Queſtions. An Honeſt man ſets ſail from *Alexandria* to *Rhodes* with a Lading of Corn; the *Rhodians* in great diſtreſs for want of it; and the Commodity bearing an Exceſſive Price. This Perſon knows that there are other

Some nice Caſes of Conſcience.

other *Alexandrian* Ships under way, and bound for the ſame Port, and with the ſame *Cargo*: whether or no ſhall he tell the *Rhodians* now, that there are other Merchants coming with Relief, or ſay nothing of it, and make the beſt Market of his Corn that he can? We put this Caſe, ſuppoſing him to be a *good* and a *Wiſe man*, and the matter to be under Deliberation. If he thinks it an *Ill* thing to *Conceal* this from the *Rhodians* he will not do it; but he makes ſome doubt whether it be *Ill*, or *No*. In Difficulties of This Nature, *Diogenes*, the *Babilonian*, (a Grave and Famous *Stoique*) is of One Opinion; and his Diſciple *Antipater* (a very acute man) is of another. *Antipater* will have all the Circumſtances laid Open; ſo that the Purchaſer may not be kept Ignorant of any thing, which the Other knows. *Diogenes* ſays that *the Vender is bound to Diſcover all the Faults*, ſo far as he is obliged to it by the *Civil Law*; and to manage his Bargain without Fraud. So that being to ſell the Commodity, he may without Deceipt make the beſt on't. *Here* (ſays he) *I have brought my Corn*; *I have run the Riſque on't*; *and I ſet no higher a rate upon the Commodity then Others do*; *nay perhaps I offer it Cheaper*: *If you can have it any where elſe, wher's the Injury?* Now *Antipater*, on the other ſide, Reaſons it Thus. How is That? (ſays he) It is our Duty to Conſult the Good of Mankind, and to ſerve Human Society; and we came into the World under That Obligation. We have Principles of Nature, which we are bound to Follow and Obey; and we are to account nothing

Profitable to our selves, that is not so to the *Publique*: And likewise, to account of the *Publique Profit*, as our *Own*. Shall we conceal That then from a *Society* of men, which so much concerns their *Commodity*, and *Supply*? *Diogenes* will reply (perhaps) that it is one thing to *Conceal* a matter, and another thing not to *Tell* it: Do I tell you (at this Instant) what is the Nature of the Gods, or the end of Good men; which are things much more Profitable to be known, then the Price of Wheat? And yet you will not say that I Conceal This from you. But it is not absolutely necessary for me neither to tell you every thing which may be Profitable for you to hear. But the Other will tell you *Yes, it is necessary*; if you remember that men are naturally link'd together in *Society*. Well (says the Other) I do not forget it: But will you have it to be such a Society then, as that no man shall have any thing particular in it of his Own? If it comes to That once, there's no longer any *Buying* and *Selling*, but only *Giving*. You see in this whole Dispute, that it is not said, tho' This or That be *Dishoneſt*, I will yet Do it, because it is *Expedient*: But it must be so *Expedient*, that there be nothing *Dishonorable* in it. Now (on the Other hand) out of that very Consideration that it is *Dishonorable*, it is therefore *not to be done*. Suppose an Honest man has a mind to put off his House for some fault or inconvenience in it, only known to himself: As a *Contagious Air*; (for the Purpose) tho' it may (perhaps) pass for *Healthful*; all the Rooms annoy'd with

Ver-

Vermin, Ill-built, or Ruinous, which is only known (as I ſay) to the Maſter of the Houſe. The Queſtion is, if he Conceals theſe faults to get a better Rate for his Houſe then he could otherwiſe have done, whether he does *well*, or *ill*, in That *Concealment*? *Antipater* will have it to be very *Ill done*, and near the Caſe of *not ſetting a man Right that's out of his way*. A Crime which was puniſh'd at *Athens* by a Formal Solemnity of Publique Execrations. Is not This the Suffering of the Purchaſer to ruine himſelf, and to fall into the worſt of Snares, by a Miſtake? Nay it is worſe yet, then the *not ſhewing of the way*, for one man to lead another knowingly, and wilfully, into an Errour. *Diogenes* asks, on the Other ſide, who forc'd you to buy it? Nay he did not (ſays he) ſo much as Adviſe you to't. That which did not pleaſe the One, he expoſed to Sale, and the Other bought that which he had a mind to. If he ſhall not be taken for a Cheat, that ſets up a Bill of a very good Farm to be Let or Sold, and well built, and in repair, tho' it be neither the One, nor the Other, much leſs ſhall he be accounted one, that does not ſo much as Commend his Houſe; for where the Purchaſer uſes his own Judgment, what Fraud can there be in the Seller? But if we are not obliged, in all Caſes, to make good every word we ſay, how ſhould we be oblig'd to make good That which we do not ſay? Nor can any thing be more Ridiculous then for a Merchant to publiſh the Faults of the Commodity he expoſes to Sale. What would be

more

more senseless then to make Proclamation by a Common Cryer, *Here's an Infected House to be Sold?* Now so it falls out, that in some doubtful Cases, the *Honesty* of the Action may be defended, on the One hand, and the *Benefit* of it so qualifi'd on the Other; that it may not only be *Honourable*, to do that which appears *Profitable*, but even *Dishonorable*, to *Omit* it. This is a Point that comes often into question betwixt things *Profitable* and *Honest*.

Resolutions upon the former Cases.

THESE Difficulties must be set right: for it is not our *Business* to start a question, but to give a Resolution. It is my Opinion, that neither in the Case of the *Rhodian Corn-Merchant*, nor in That of the *House* offer'd to *Sale*, the *Concealment* there supposed was *Justifiable*. For it is not properly the *Concealing* of a thing, to say nothing of it; but the keeping of another man, for our own advantage, in Ignorance of that which he is very much concern'd to know. What kind of a Concealment This is, and the Quality of the man that uses it, who does not discern? This is not the Practice undoubtedly of an Open, a Frank, a Sincere, a Just, or a Good man: but rather of a Shifting, a Close, a Deceitful, a Malicious, a Sly Shuffler, and of a very Jugler. How can any man expect to Get by the Bargain, that wears these foul Names, and lies under all these Reproaches.

A Pleasant Cheat.

BUT if the saying *Nothing* in this Case be so Blameable; what shall we think of Them then that speak *False*? *Caius Cannius* (a Knight of *Rome*, and one that wanted neither Wit nor

nor Learning) going ſometimes to *Syracuſe*, not upon Bus'neſs (as he was want to ſay) but for his diverſion; he gave out that he had a great mind to buy ſome Gardens there, where he might enjoy his Friends when he had a mind to't, without interruption. When this came to be talk'd of, there was one *Pythius*, in *Syracuſe*, that drove the Trade of a *Banker*. *I have Gardens here* (ſays he) *tho' not to be Sold, but however if* Cannius *pleaſes, he may uſe them as his Own:* And ſo he invites *Cannius* to thoſe Gardens, the next day, to Supper. Upon *Cannius*'s promiſe to come, *Pythius* (whoſe bus'neſs gave him a great Intereſt there, among all ſorts of People) ſent for the Fiſhermen; and directed them to meet next day, and Fiſh juſt before his Gardens; and ſo gave them their Leſſon what to do and how to behave themſelves. *Cannius* came at his time, where he found a Magnificent Entertainment that *Pythius* had provided for him. There were a great many Boats before the Gardens, and every man brought the Fiſh he had taken, and laid them at *Pythius*'s Feet. What's the meaning of all this (ſays *Cannius*) ſo many Fiſhes, and Boats? *Pythius* told him, there was no great wonder in't; For there is not any Fiſh (ſays he) in *Syracuſe* which is not to be had in this place. They take in their Water here, and the Town cannot be without This Convenience. This ſet *Cannius* agog upon the Purchaſe, and nothing would ſerve but *Pythius* muſt ſell him the place; He ſeem'd, at Firſt, very unwilling to part with it; but without more words they

they came at last to an Agreement: *Cannius* was a Rich man, and presently struck up a Bargain (for the Gardens, and every thing that belong'd to them) with *Pythius*, at his own Price: Security was given for the Mony, and the bus'ness finish'd. *Cannius* invited some of his Familiar Friends thither the next day: and he himself coming betimes, and finding no Boats there, enquir'd of the Neighborhood whether the Fishermen kept Holyday that day, because he saw none of them There. Their Answer was, that They knew nothing of any Holy-day, nor of any Fishermen that us'd to be There: Insomuch that they wonder'd what brought them thither the day before. This put *Cannius* into a Rage: But what Remedy? For my Friend and Collegue *Aquilius* had not as yet made any Provision against *Dolus Malus*, or *Couzenage*. Upon my Demand to *Aquilius* what was intended by that fame *Dolus Malus*, he told me, that it was *the pretending of one thing, and doing another*. Which truly was a Full and Clear Definition of it, and worthy of a Wise man. Wherefore *Pythius*, and all like him, that *Pretend one thing*, and *do another*; are to be accounted *Perfidious, Wicked*, and *Deceitful*; So that nothing can be *Profitable* to us, that is polluted by so many *Crimes*. But if *Aquilius*'s Definition be True, there must be no Feigning or Dissembling allow'd of in Human Society: And a Good man will neither do the One nor the other, either to Buy or Sell, to more Advantage. And That Deceipt was punishable also by the Laws: As in the Case of *Guardianship* by the

Twelve

Twelve Tables. And ſo was the *Circumvention* of *Minours* puniſhable by the *Latorian Laws.* And ſometimes by *Arbitration*, even *without a Law*; where the Queſtion was matter of Faith, and Truſt. But of all other Judgments the Words that are uſed in the *Formulary* of an *Arbitrement* upon a *Marriage-Agreement* are moſt remarkable: As * *MELIUS, ÆQUIUS*, the *Better*, the *Juſter*: and in matters of *Contract*, or *Confidence*, *INTER BONOS BENE AGIER*; *Fair Dealing among Good Men.* Can there be any Mixture of *Fraud* now in *BETTER*, and *JUSTER*? Or what place is there for *Colluſion*, or *Iniquity*, in *Fair Dealing among Honeſt Men*? * Words of Form.

NOW the *Dolus Malus*, or Deceipt appears either in *Simulation*, which is a Pretence of ſomething that is *not*; or *Diſſimulation*, that is to ſay a *Diſguiſe*, or *Concealment* of ſomewhat that *Is*. Wherefore there muſt be no *Lye* admitted in any Buſineſs, or Contract; Nor ſhould there be any Underhand ſubſtituting of a Buyer, or a Seller, to enhance, or to bring down the Price; but Both Parties ſhould ſay *at a Word* what they will *Give*, or *Take*. *Q. Scævola*, the Son of *Publius*, being upon a Purchaſe, bade the Proprietor tell him in One Word what he would have for the Eſtate: He did ſo: And *Scævola* told him he had under-valu'd it, and ſo gave him *Two Thouſand Crowns* more than his Bargain. There is not any Man but will confeſs that This was the part of a *Good Man*, tho' in the Opinion perhaps of ſome People, not of a *Wiſe Man*: As if the Other had Simulation and Diſſimulation.

A Generous Scruple of *Scævola's.*

had set it lower than he could afford it. This is a mischief therefore, that *Some* Men are accounted *Good*, and *Other* Men *Wise*, as if they could be *separated*. *Ennius* says that a Man's *Wisdom* serves him to little purpose, if it be not *Profitable* to *himself*. This may be true Enough, if it were but agreed with *Ennius* what it is to be *Profitable*. I find *Hecaton* the *Rhodian* (*Panætius*'s Scholar) telling *Q. Tubero* in his Books of *Offices*, that *It is the part of a Wise Man to do nothing against Publique Customs, Laws, and Institutions; and withal, to take good heed to his Fortune, and Family*: For we should not propound to be Rich, only to our Selves, but to our Children, Relations, Friends, and chiefly, for the Service of the *Republique*: For the Estates and Provisions of Particulars, are the Wealth of the City. The proceeding of *Scævola* above-mentioned would never suit with *Hecaton*: For he only says that he would not do any thing for his own Profit that were Unlawful: and truly he deserves little Thanks, or Commendation for his pains. But allowing both *Lying*, and *Dissembling* to be this same *Dolus Malus*, or *Deceipt*, there are very few things clear of That Fraud. Or if he be only the Good Man, that obliges as many as he can, and hurts no Body; such a Good Man will not be easily found. It can never be *Profitable* to do an *Ill Thing*; because it is always *unallowable*, and *shameful*. And it must ever be *beneficial* to be a *Good Man*, because it is always *Honest*.

IT is an Ordinance of the *Civil Law* in the Matter of *Eſtates*, that the *Vender* ſhould ſtill tell the *Purchaſer* the *Defects*, or *Inconveniences* of the *Eſtate*; for it being ſufficiently provided by the *Twelve Tables*, that every Man ſhould make good what he promiſes or declares by *Word of Mouth*, upon the Penalty of *Double Damages* for *Denying* it. The Civilians have alſo ſet a Puniſhment upon *Concealments* too; by enacting, that if the Seller of an Eſtate knew any Fault or Errour in it, without expreſly acquainting the Purchaſer with it, he ſhould be obliged to make it good. As in the caſe of the *Augurs Tower*; where they were to take their Obſervations from the Flight of Birds. *Titus Claudius Centimalus*, having ſome Houſes upon the Hill *Cælius*, the *Augurs* commanded him to pull them down, becauſe they hinder'd their proſpect. *Claudius* expos'd Thoſe Houſes to Sale, and ſo put them off; and *Publius Calpurnius Lanarius* was the Purchaſer. The *Augurs* found the ſame fault ſtill with the Houſes, when they were in His Poſſeſſion: ſo that he pull'd them down. And coming afterwards to underſtand that *Claudius* had made ſale of thoſe Houſes, after that the *Augurs* had appointed the demoliſhing of them; fore'd him upon an Arbitration, what in point of Conſcience was to be done in That Caſe. *Marcus Cato* paſt the Sentence, (the Father of This *Cato* of ours) For as we denominate Others from their Fathers, we ſhall make mention of the perſon that gave this Light to the World, as accounting from the Son.) The Sentence was

Conceal-ments puniſhable in Bargains for Eſtates.

This

This, That since upon the Sale of That Estate, he had not told the Other of the Inconvenience which he knew it was expos'd to; he should indempnifie the Buyer of it; Concluding, that the Proprietor was bound in Conscience to tell the Purchaser what damage might ensue upon it. Now if This was a Just Judgement, it was not Warrantable either in the *Corn-Merchant*, or in him that sold the *Infected Houses*, to conceal as is above supposed. But it is not possible for any Law to reach all the various Cases of these *Concealments*: And yet however, so far as they go, they are diligently observ'd. *Marcus Marius Gratidianus* sold to *Caius Sergius Orata* those very Houses which he himself had bought of him but a few years before. These Houses paid a Duty to *Sergius* (which was out of his mind.) But *Marius* made no mention of it in the Conveying of his Right. The Cause was brought into the Court; *Crassus* was for *Orata*, and *Anthony* for *Gratidianus*. *Crassus* insisted upon the *Law*, because the Seller knew that he ought to have acquainted the Purchaser with this Incumbrance, but did not do it. *Anthony* insisted upon matter of *Equity*, because That Incumbrance was not unknown to *Sergius*, who sold the Houses, and so there was no need to say any thing of it; neither could he be said to be deceived, that knew what Title he had bought. Now to what End is all This, but to shew, that our Forefathers were not pleas'd with Wiles, and Shifts?

BUT

BUT Laws and Philoſophers provide againſt Frauds ſeveral wayes: The Laws regarding only matter of *Ouvert Act*, whereas Philoſophers judge according to *Equity*, and *Reaſon*: which Reaſon does it ſelf require of us, that we do nothing perfidiouſly, or with Falſe Pretence, or Deceit. But ſhall we call it a Treachery to contrive a Pitfall, or ſet a Toyl, without either driving, or hunting any thing into it? Well, but the Beaſts many times fall into it, without a Perſuer. He that offers a Houſe to Sale, what is his *Bill*, but a *Snare* laid for the Purchaſer? His Houſe is Faulty, and he would fain put it off, and ſome body is caught at unawares. Now tho' I underſtand that according to depraved *Cuſtom*, and *Manners*, this is not accounted *Diſhonorable*; and that there is neither *Law*, nor *Civil Right* Againſt it: It is nevertheleſs yet forbidden by *the Law of Nature*. For, as I have often ſaid already, and muſt ſay oftener, *Society*, in the *largeſt Extent*, is that which is *Common to all men*; next under That is the *Society* of thoſe of *the ſame Nation*, and after That, of the *ſame City*. Wherefore our Fore-fathers diſtinguiſh betwixt the *Law* of *Nations*, and the *Law Civil*. For the *Civil Law* is not conſequently the *Law* of *Nations*, but the *Law* of *Nations* does neceſſarily comprehend the *Civil*. Now to ſay the Truth, we have not among us any ſubſtantial or expreſs Image of the *True Law*, or *ſincere Juſtice*: So that we are fain to make uſe of *Shadows*, and *Figures*; and it were well if we could keep up, even to Them too: For they are Tranſlated out of the *beſt*

Laws and Philoſophers provide ſeveral ways againſt Fraud.

The Law Civil, and the Law of Nations.

Originals, of *Truth*, and *Nature*. How glorious is that Proviſional Condition for the making of good Contracts! *Provided that by your means, and depending upon your Honeſty, I may not be deceived and brought into a ſnare.* And then that Golden Sentence, *we muſt live Honeſtly among Good men, and without Fraud.* But then who are the *Good Men*, and what it is *to do well*, is a Great queſtion.

Of Good Faith.

Q. Scævola the High Prieſt was wont to aſcribe a very great force to all thoſe Arbitrations that were grounded upon *Good Faith*; Accounting the very *Name* it ſelf to be of a Large Extent: As having a reſpect to *Guardian-Ships, Societies, Truſts, Mandates*, things *bought*, or *ſold, hired*, or *let*, relating to the Community, and Entercourſe of Life. He muſt be a great Judge, that in theſe Caſes can determine (eſpecially meeting in moſt of them with Contrary Opinions) how One man is to behave himſelf towards Another, under theſe Circumſtances. Wherefore all Tricks and Artifices ſhould be avoided: And That *Craft* alſo which impoſes upon the World for *Wiſdom*; how far from it ſoever. For *Prudence* is placed in the *Choice* of *Good*, or *Evil*; but *Craft* prefers *Evil* before *Good*; at leaſt if things that are *Diſhonourable* be *Evil*. And 'tis not only in *Lands*, and *Houſes*, that the Civil Law, in Conformity to That of Nature, forbids Fraud, and Circumvention; but even in the very dealing for *Slaves*, the Seller ſhould act as frankly as in Other Caſes. For he that is preſum'd to know whether the *Slave* be *Healthful*, *Honeſt*, a *Fugitive*, or the like; the

the *Rhodes Law* makes *That Maſter* anſwerable for the *Servant*. But This does not hold in the Caſe of an *Heir* that found ſuch a *Slave*, or *Servant* in the *Family*. From hence it may appear, ſince *Nature* is the Fountain of *Juſtice*, that it is alſo according to Nature, that no man ſhould make Advantage to himſelf of another mans Ignorance. Nor is there any greater Peſt, in Human Society, then a perverſe *Craft*, under the Maſque of *Simplicity*: And from thence proceed thoſe Innumerable Caſes, where the *Profitable* comes in Concurrence with the *Honeſt*. For, where's the man that would ſtick at any *Injuſtice*, if he might but hope for *Impunity*; or come off, under a pretence of *Ignorance*? Let us examine the Matter if you pleaſe; and in Thoſe Inſtances where the Common people, perhaps, are ſcarce ſenſible that they do amiſs: For we do not ſpeak in This place, of *Murthers*, *Poyſonings*, *Forgeries*, *Robberies*, or *Embeſilments* of the *Publique Treaſure*, which ſhould rather be ſuppreſt by *Priſons*, and *Fetters*, then by *Words*, and *Philoſophical Precepts*: But let us here rather conſider what we find commonly to be done, even among thoſe that have the Reputation of *Honeſt* men. There were ſome people that brought out of *Greece* to *Rome* a forg'd *Will* of *Q. Minutius Baſilius*, (who was a very wealthy man) and to make the bus'neſs paſs the better, they put into the Teſtament, *M. Craſſus*, and *Q. Hortenſius*, two of the moſt conſiderable men of the City; as *Joint-Heirs*, together with *Themſelves*. They did, Both of them, ſuſpect it to be a *Counterfeit*; and yet having

No Peſt like Craft under the Maſque of Simplicity.

A Caſe of Conſcience about a Forgery.

having no hand in it themſelves, they were well enough content, to make advantage of Other peoples Wickedneſs. And what then? Is it ſufficient that they Themſelves had no hand in it? I am of Another Opinion; altho', for the *One* of them, I *lov'd* him while he was alive, and and I do not *hate* the *Other* now he is Dead. But when *Baſilius* had made his Siſters Son (*Marcus Satirius*) his *Heir*, and would have had him take his *Unkles* Name upon him; (I ſpeak of That *Satirius* that to the Shame of the Age had the Patronage of the *Picenians*, and *Sabines*) it was a moſt unreaſonable thing that the Chief men of the City ſhould carry away the *Teſtators Eſtate*, and leave nothing to the Right Heir but his *Name*. Now if he ſtands guilty of an *Injuſtice*, that neither *keeps off* an Injury from his Friend by way of *Prevention*; nor *Repulſes* it when he may, (as we have ſaid in our Firſt Book) what ſhall we think of him that does not only not Repel an *Injury*, but even Helps it on and promotes it? Nay, for my Own part, let the *Inheritance* be never ſo *Lawful*; yet if it be gain'd by *Craft*, *Flattery*, *Servile Offices*, or *Falſe Pretences*; even That *Lawful Succeſſion* I cannot approve. But in ſuch Caſes men are many times extremely miſled, in taking One thing to be *Honeſt*, and Another *Profitable*; for the ſame Rules holds in Both; And He that is not ſenſible of This, lies open to all ſorts almoſt of *Fraud*, and *Iniquity*. For whoſoever ſays thus to himſelf, *This* is *Honeſt*, 'tis true, but the *Other* is *Expedient*; he takes upon him to *divide* thoſe things by

by a *Miſtake* that are *coupled* by *Nature*; which opinion is the fountein of all Deceipts, Crimes, and Evil Deeds. Wherefore if a Good man, for the very holding up of a Finger, could get himſelf made Heir to a Conſiderable Eſtate, which he has no Title to; he ſhould not do it, tho' upon a Certainty that no man could ever ſo much as ſuſpect him for it. But if *M. Craſſus* could get an Eſtate upon the ſame Terms, upon my Credit he would leap out of his skin at it. But a *Juſt*, and ſuch a one as we can allow for a *Good* man, will never agree to the taking of any thing away from *Another*, and transferring it to *himſelf*; And whoever wonders at This, does as good as confeſs himſelf Ignorant of what a good man is.

No Dividing of what Nature has Coupled.

BUT he that will thoroughly examine the Secrets of his Own Soul, will be able to tell himſelf that only He is a *Good* man, who does as much good to *Others* as he can, and harms *no body* without ſome Injurious provocation. How's That? He that ſupplants the Right Heir, to get himſelf into his place, has not that man as much to anſwer for as if he had remov'd him by Poyſon? But what (will ſome ſay) *may not a man Do that which is Profitable and Expedient for him?* Yes, yes, If he will take This along with him, that it is not poſſible for any thing to be *So*, that is *Unjuſt*. He that has not learn'd This Leſſon, can never be a *Good* man. I remember, when I was a Boy, I heard my Father ſpeak of *Fimbria* the *Conſul*: who was appointed Judge in the Caſe of *Marcus Luctatius Pythias*, (a Knight of *Rome*, and a very *Honeſt man*) who undertook,

Who is a Good man.

dertook, upon the Forfeiture of a Sum of Mony, to prove himself a *Good* man: but *Fimbria* did absolutely refuse to pass Judgment in That matter; least he should either derogate from the Reputation of a person so much Esteemed, if he gave it Against him, or appear, on the Other side, to Pronounce any man to be Good, considering the Infinite Circumstances of Qualities, and Offices to make him so. So that neither *Fimbria*'s *Good man*, nor *Socrates*'s, will allow any thing to be *Profitable* that is not *Honest*: And such a man will not only fear to *Do*, but not dare so much as to *Think* any thing which he would not frankly own in Publique. Is it not a Shame now, for *Philosophers* to *Doubt*, where the *Common people* themselves are *Resolv'd*? For the Old Thredbare *Proverb* is *Their's*; when they would express a man of an exact Sincerity and Justice, *You may play at* * Love *with him in the Dark*, they say; and what is the meaning of This, but to teach us, that nothing can be *Expedient* that is not *Honest*, tho' he might gain it, and the World never the Wiser for't? In the Moral of this *Proverb*, we are taught, that neither *Gyge*'s way is to be endur'd, nor so much as a Finger to be mov'd, (as in the case formerly supposed) tho' a man might make himself Master of the whole World by so doing. For whatsoever is *Shameful*, and *Dishonorable*, let it be never so *Secret*, nothing can make it *Honest*; and that which is *not Honest*, it is as impossible to render it *Profitable*, in a *Repugnancy* and *Opposition* to *Nature*.

* A Little Play with the Finger.

BUT

BUT where Criminals find great *Rewards*, there is alſo a great *Temptation* to *offend*. When *C. Marius* appear'd out of all hope of the *Conſulſhip*, and (having lyen ſtill, for ſeven years after his *Prætorſhip*) no man imagin'd that he would ever have offer'd at it: *Q. Metellus* (a great man, and an Eminent Citizen) ſent *Marius* (being his Lieutenant) to *Rome*. Where *Marius* publiquely charg'd his *Principal* before the People, with prolonging the War, and told them that if they had made Him *Conſul*, he would in a very ſhort time have deliver'd up *Jugartha*, either Alive or Dead, into the power of the people: whereupon they made him *Conſul*. But This was a Proceeding contrary to *Faith*, and *Juſtice*; by a falſe Suggeſtion to draw an Envy upon ſo Brave a man, and ſo Famous a Citizen: Eſpecially *Marius* being *Metellus*'s *Lieutenant*, and by his order ſent to *Rome*. Neither did our Kinſman *Marius Gratidianus* in his *Prætorſhip* diſcharge the Office of a *Good* man. The *Tribunes* of the Common people Conſulted the College of *Prætors* about ſome Common Standard for the Valuation of their *Moneys*, which were then ſometimes up, ſometimes down, at ſuch a rate, that no man knew what he was worth. They join'd unanimouſly in a *Decree*, with a *Penalty* upon any man that ſhould not ſubmit to't; and ſo they *Adjourn'd* for That *Morning*, reſolving to meet again *After noon* for the Publiſhing of it. When they were gone, ſome, One way, ſome another; *Gratidianus* ſtept preſently from the *Bench* to the *Tribunal*; and there made *Proclamation*

A Mean Action of *C. Marius*.

clamation by *Himself alone* of that which was the *Common Act* of the *Court*: which you will find (if you observe the Story) to have given him great Reputation; the people setting up his *Statues* every where up and down, with *Incense*, and *Tapers*: In one word, no man ever render'd himself more *Popular*. These are Points that may puzzle a man sometimes in his Deliberations; especially when the Matter is but small, wherein any Violence is offer'd to Justice; but yet the Consequence seems to be of great Importance. It did not appear to be so very foul, for the *One Marius* to prepossess himself of the Favour of the People, by preventing his *Collegues* and the *Tribunes*: And then it was, in appearance, a matter of great Advantage to the *Other Marius* to advance himself to the *Consulship* by the Means he had propounded. But there is *One General Rule* that I would have you take special Notice of; See *First* that what you account *Profitable*, be not *Dishonourable*; and *Then* if it be *Dishonourable*, let nothing perswade you that it is *Profitable*. But what Then? Shall we pronounce either the *One Marius* or the *Other* to be an *Honest man?* Set your Wits at work, and try, and consider with your self what is the *Image*, the *Character*, and the *Notion* of a *Good Man*? Will a *Good man* tell a *Lye*, *Calumniate*, *Supplant*, or *Deceive?* Certainly nothing less. Is there any thing then on the Other side, so *Profitable* or so *Desirable*, as that a man would forfeit the Reputation and the Glory of a *Good* and a *Wise man* to gain it? Can That thing which we

Small matters may be of great Importance

A Good man will not do an Ill thing.

we call *Profit*, bring us any Advantage to Countervail what it takes *from us*, in depriving us of the very *Name* of *Good men*, and divesting us of *Faith*, and *Justice?* What difference is there betwixt the turning of a *Man* into a *Beast*, by a *Real Metamorphosis*, and the bearing the *Figure*, and *Fierceness* of a *Brute* in his *Mind*, under the *Shape* of a *Man?* They that neglect and make light of all things that are *Honest*, for the Acquiring of *Power*, do they not do the same thing with *Pompey* that marry'd *Cæsar*'s Daughter to make himself *Great*, under the Boldness and Protection of his *Father in Law?* But he lookt upon't as a thing Advantageous to himself to augment his *Own* Power by the Envy that was born to the Other: but how *Unjust* This was to his *Country*, and how *Dishonourable* to himself, he did not consider. His Father in Law had often in his Mouth those *Greek* Verses of the *Phœnicians* out of *Euripides*, which I'll tell you as well as I can, not so gracefully perhaps, but so as to be Understood.

To get a Crown, *a man would* break a Trust.
If break't at all: *everywhere else, be* Just.

It was a Lewd and Horrible thing done of *Etheocles* (or rather of *Euripides*) to make That the *Exception* of a Crime, which of all Crimes is it self the most *Abominable*. But what do we talk of Petty things, as Inheritances, Trafficques, Fraudulent Bargains? What do you think of Him rather, that having the Ambition

The Ambition of *Julius Cæsar*.

tion to make himself the Master of the People of *Rome*, and the Emperor of the World it self, accomplish'd his Ends? No man in his Wits will pretend to justifie This Ambition: for in so doing he passes an Approbation upon the Subversion of our *Laws* and *Liberties*; and reckons, as a point of *Honour*, that *Ignoble*, and *Detestable Oppression*. But he that confesses the Unlawfulness of any mans Usurping a Dominion over a City that both has been Free, and ought so to be; and yet supposes it a thing Profitable to him that can compass it; I would spare no Reprehension; nor, in truth, any Reproche, to reclaim such a man from his Error: For (I appeal to the Immortal Gods) what *Profit* can any man find in the Foul and Execrable *Destruction* of his *Country*; albeit he that is Guilty of it should come afterwards to be stil'd the *Father* of it, by the *oppressed People? Utility* should therefore be guided by *Honesty*; and in such manner, that tho' the *Words differ*, the *Thing* should be still the *same*. I do not find any thing more *Profitable*, in the Opinion of the *Common People*, then *Power*, and *Empire*: Neither, when I look narrowly into the Matter, do I find any thing more *Unprofitable* to him that *Unjustly atteins it*. For what *advantage* can it be to any man, to live in *Anxiety*, *Carefulness*, *Fears*, Day and Night; and to lead a Life that is beset with *Snares*, and *Dangers*? There are more treacherous, and unfaithful men in a Kingdom (says *Accius*) then there are good. But of what Kingdom does he speak? even of That which is reported unto us of *Tantalus* and

Utility should be guided by Honesty.

and *Pelops*; a Kingdom that proceeded by a Lawful Deſcent. How much greater then is the Number of the Unfaithful to That Prince, who having oppreſt *Rome* it ſelf by a *Roman Army*, and a City, not only *Free* in its own Conſtitution, but giving Laws to others; brought That City, at laſt, into ſubjection to Himſelf? How ulcerated a Conſcience do you think This man muſt needs have? What wounds in his Soul? Or how is it poſſible that This mans Life ſhould be Profitable to Himſelf, when ſuch was the Condition of it, that Poſterity will ever have a Veneration, and Eſteem for thoſe that took it away?

NOW if thoſe things that carry the Faireſt Appearance of *Profit*, fail yet of being what they ſeem to be, becauſe they are full of Shame and Diſhonour; This, methinks, ſhould Convince any man, that nothing can be *Profitable*, that is not likewiſe *Honeſt*. Now as This has, in Many Caſes, been determin'd; ſo moſt remarkably, by the Senate of *Rome*, and by *Caius Fabricius*, in his ſecond *Conſulate*: For when King *Pyrrhus* made War upon *Rome*, and the Quarrel was *Empire* too, and That with a *Powerful*, and a *Generous Prince*; there came a *Fugitive* from *Pyrrhus* into the Tents of *Fabricius*; and promiſed him, upon Condition of a Conſiderable Reward, that he would convey himſelf back, as privately as he came; and Poyſon the King. *Fabricius* order'd this man to be carried back to *Pyrrhus*; and the *Senate* applauded the Reſolution. Now if a man ſhould regard the *Appearance*, and *Opinion* of *Profit*, This One *Fugitive* might have put a Period to

Fabricius's Generoſity to Pyrrhus.

to That hazardous War, in the removal of the moſt Conſiderable Enemy of the Empire. But where the point in Controverſie was *Honour*, it would have been a Scandalous and an Impious practice to have encountred a Noble Enemy with *Baſeneſs*, and *Treachery*, inſtead of *Reſolution*, and *Virtue*. Now which was the more Profitable, either to *Fabricius* (who was as Eminent in *Rome*, as *Ariſtides* was in *Athens*) or to our *Senate* (that never ſeparated Profit from Honour) to ſubdue an Enemy by *Arms*, or by *Poyſon*? If *Empire* be deſirable for *Glories* ſake, let there be no *Treachery* or *Injuſtice* in the Attempt: For therein can be no *Glory*.

Wealth it ſelf may be Unprofitable.

And we muſt have a care too how we compaſs *Wealth it ſelf*; for it can never be *Advantageous* to us with *Infamy*. And therefore it was no Profitable Advice, that of *L. Philippus* (the Son of *Quintus*) to Tax thoſe Cities over again, which *L. Sylla* had diſcharg'd, for a Sum of Mony, by a *Decree* of the *Senate*: And This too, without their Mony again, which they had already paid for their *Liberty*. The *Senate* however took his Counſel, to the Scandal of the Empire. At this rate, there's more *Faith* to be found among *Pyrates* then among *Roman Senators*. Well! But the Revenue was increas'd, and it was therefore Profitable. But how long ſhall we dare to call any thing *Profitable* that is not *Honeſt*? How is it poſſible that *Hatred*, or *Infamy*, ſhould ever be *Profitable* to any Government, that muſt ſupport it ſelf by its *own Reputation*, and the *good will* of its *Confederates*? Nay, I have had many a diſpute, upon this Point, with my Friend *Cato* him-

himself, for insisting too rigorously upon the Interest of the *Publique Treasury*, and *Revenue*: He was too hard methought to the *Officers*; for we ought to be Bountiful to the *One*, and treat the *Other* as we were wont to treat our *Colonies*: And so much the rather, because the Connexion of the *Parts* did much contribute to the Preservation of the *Whole*. And *Curio* did very Ill too; who, tho' convinced that the *Transpadans* were in the Right, still concluded *Vincat Utilitas, Let* Utility *carry it*. Now he should rather have said that it was not *Just*, because it was not *Profitable* to the *Commonwealth*, then allowing it to be *Profitable*, to conclude that it was not *Just*.

In *Hecaton*'s *Sixth Book* of *Offices*, we find a great many Questions to our purpose. As for Instance, he puts the Case, *Whether in a great Scarcity of* Corn, a Good Man *be not oblig'd to Maintein his Servants?* He Reasons it *Pro* and *Con*; but at last, concludes the *Duty* with a regard rather to *Profit*, then to *Humanity*. He puts another Question, *Whether, in the Extremity of a Storm at Sea, a Man should rather throw over a Serviceable Horse, or a Servant of little Value*. And here his private *Interest* draws him *One* way, and *Humanity*, *Another*. And again, *Suppose that, upon a* Shipwrack, *a* Fool *should get hold of a* Plank; *whether or no may* a Wise Man *take it from him, if he can?* He's upon the *Negative*, because the thing is *Unjust*. But what if it were the *Master* of the Ship? Shall not he take his *Own?* No, by no means: He may as well throw a Man over-board, that is

Instances of Good and Profitable in Competition. Their Servants were Slaves.

is at Sea in *his Ship*, becauſe the *Ship* is his *Own*: For till they come to the End of the Voyage, the *Ship* is rather the *Paſſengers* then the *Maſters*. *But what if there ſhould be but* One Plank, *and* Two Men *equally* Wiſe, *and* Deſerving, *in danger to be drown'd? Whether ſhall* Neither *of them take it, or ſhall* Either *of them yield it to the* Other? I would have it yielded to him that may do moſt Good, either to the *Republique*, or in his Own *Particular*, by *Living*. *But what if they be* both alike? I would have no Contention; But let the One render to the Other as if the point had been decided by Lot. *What, if my* Father *ſhould Riffle a* Church, *or Dig a Paſſage under ground to Rob the Treaſury?* Whether or no ſhould the *Son* give an Information of it to the *Magiſtrate?* This were an Unhappy Caſe; but I would however *Defend* my *Father*, if he were *Accuſed*. *But is not my* Duty *to my* Country *above* all other Duties? Yes, it is. But then my *Country* it ſelf is concern'd, that the People in it ſhould bear a Reverence to their *Parents*. *But what if a* Father *ſhould Deſign the betraying of his Country; or the getting of the* Government *into his own Hand? Shall the* Son Conceal *it?* I would have him earneſtly deſire his *Father* to *Deſiſt*; and if That will not do, he's bound to Accuſe him. But I would have him threaten him Firſt; and, in the Concluſion, if he finds his Country in danger, he is to value the ſafety of it before That of his *Father*. He puts another Queſtion, *if a* Wiſe, *and* Good man, *ſhall by overſight take* Falſe mony, *whether or no may he put it off again in Payment, after he knows*

Caſes of Conſcience.

knows it to be Counterfeit? *Diogenes* ſays he may: *Antipater* is againſt it. With whom I do rather agree of the Two. *Suppoſe a man ſells a Piece of Wine, knowing that it will not keep; Is he bound to tell this or no? Diogenes* ſays he needs not; but *Antipater* ſays that a Good man Will tell it. Theſe are the Propoſitions in Controverſie, among the *Stoiques*. *In the ſelling of a* Slave, *whether or no am I bound to diſcover all his faults?* Only thoſe which the *Civil Law* obliges me to diſcover, or to take him again. But for Diſcovering him to be a *Lyer*, a *Gameſter*, a *Thief*, a *Drunkard*; *Some* are *For* the telling of it, and *Others*, not. *What if a man ſhould ſell* Gold, *believing it to be* Copper? *Is* a Good man *that knoweth it to be* Gold, *bound to tell him it or no? Or whether can any man Juſtifie the buying of That for* One Penny *which is worth* a Thouſand? I have now clear'd my own Opinion; And what are the Points in Controverſie among the Philoſophers before-named.

Conſcience in Contracts.

WE come now to conſider how far *Thoſe Offices* and *Contracts* are to be obſerv'd, that are neither Extorted by *Force*, nor (as the Law has it) *Dolo malo*, or by *Circumvention*. *I have a Remedy given me for the* Dropſie, *upon This Condition, that if it Cures me, I am never to uſe that Medicine again: Within a few years, and after I have been once Cur'd of it, I relapſe into the ſame Diſeaſe, and the perſon with whom I contracted will not give me leave to make any further Uſe of it: What am I to do in This Caſe? It is an* Inhumanity *in Him to* refuſe *me*; *beſide that my Uſing of it does Him no Hurt*: In this Caſe,

Caſe, we muſt Conſult the Means of *Life*, and *Health*. Well! *Suppoſe a Wiſe man ſhould be made* Heir to a great Eſtate, *upon This Obligation from the* Teſtator, *that before he touches one penny of the Profits of it, he ſhould dance publiquely before a Court of Juſtice, or in the Market place? He promiſes accordingly ſo to do; and without paſſing That Promiſe, he could never have been entitled to that Eſtate:* Should he do it or no? I could wiſh he had not promis'd it; and my Opinion is, that it would better have become his Gravity not to have done it; but in regard that he has paſt his Word, if he accounts it a *Shameful*, and *Diſhonourable* thing to diſcharge That Condition, he may break his word with a better Grace by making *no Benefit* of the *Eſtate*, then *Otherwiſe*; unleſs peradventure the Benefits of it might be converted to ſo Great, and Publique an Advantage, that it would be no longer *Diſhonorable* ſo to do, as being *Profitable* to his *Country*.

Some Promiſes better broken than kept.

Neither is a man (*always*) bound to keep thoſe Promiſes that are of no Advantage to thoſe to whom the Promiſe is made. *Phœbus* (to come back to Fables) having promis'd his Son *Phaeton* a Grant of whatever he ſhould ask; *Phaeton* demanded the Government of his Fathers Chariot; he had his Deſire, and in his full Carriere *Jupiter* caſt him down with a Thunderbolt. Had not this *promiſe* of his Fathers now been better *broken* then *kept*? And then the Promiſe that *Theſeus* extorted from *Neptune*, what became of it? *Neptune* accorded to him *Three Wiſhes: One* was the Deſtruction of *his Son Hippolitus*, upon a ſuſpicion

cion of his Familiarity with his own Mother-in-Law; and the Granting of That Wish was the greateſt Affliction that ever came near to *Theſeus's* Heart. And what was *Agamemnons Vow* to *Diana*, in promiſing her the moſt beautiful Creature that ſhould be born within his Dominions that year? which proved to be own his Daughter *Ifigenia*; whom he accordingly ſacrific'd, as the faireſt Creature which That year produc'd. How much better had it been if This Promiſe had never been made, then ſo horrible a Crime admitted? Wherefore ſometime we ſhould not paſs a Promiſe: Nay a *Depoſitum* it ſelf is not in all Caſes to be reſtor'd. A man leaves a Sword in Truſt with me when he's *Sober*, and calls for't again when he's *Mad*; Now to *Reſtore* it, in ſuch a Caſe, were a *Crime*, and the *Refuſal* of it, a *Duty*. *What if I ſhould lay up Mony for him, and then find that he's about to make War upon his Country? Shall I render it?* I think not; becauſe it is againſt the *Republique*, which we ought to prefer. So many things that ſeem *Honeſt* enough in *their Own Nature*, are yet made *Unwarrantable* by *Time*, and *Occaſion*: To make good a Promiſe, ſtand to a Bargain, deliver up a Truſt; when it comes to be rather *Hurtful* then *Profitable* becomes *Diſhoneſt*. This is enough ſaid of thoſe *Utilities* againſt *Juſtice* that are cover'd with a *Pretext* of *Reaſon*. But as we have drawn all Duties from the four Fountains of Duty in our Firſt Book, we'ell keep ſtill to our Subject; and Shew, how thoſe things that *ſeem* to be *Profitable*, and *Are* not, ſtand in the greateſt Oppoſition

to Virtue. Here is enough said of *Prudence*, and of the *Counterfeit* of it, which is *Craft*; and likewise of *Justice*, which can never fail of being *Profitable*.

Of Fortitude.

THE *Two remaining Parts* of *Honesty* follow, the *One* is seen in the *Greatness* of an *Excellent Mind*, the *Other* in a Conformity and Moderation of *Continence*, and *Temper*. It seemed *Profitable* to *Ulysses*, the Counterfeiting himself *Mad*, to avoid the War, as the *Tragedians* would perswade us. (For there appears no such suspition of him in *Homer*, who was an Eminent Author.) This was no *Honest* Counsel, but it may be said perhaps, that it was a *Profitable* one, to stay at Home, and Govern, in an Easie, Lazie Life at *Ithaca*, with his Wife, his Son, and his Relations; But do you Imagine, that in *daily Labours*, and *Hazzards*, there can be any *Dignity* that is to be compar'd with *This Tranquility of Life*? And yet I cannot but have a Contempt for such a *Retreat*, because those things that are not *Honourable*, I cannot allow to be *Advantageous*. But what do you think the World would have said of *Ulysses* if he had gone on in that Disguise; who notwithstanding all his *Brave Exploits* in the *War*, did yet suffer these reproaches from *Ajax*, in the *Tragedy*?

He that contriv'd the Oath, and made us take it,
Was th'only man, Himself, you know, that brake it:
Playing th' Mad, Driv'ling Fool, under That Blind
To sleep in a whole skin, and stay behind:
And the bold Cheat had past, without all doubt,
But for sly Palamede *that found it out.*

NOW

NOW it was much better for him, to encounter, as he did, not only Enemies, but likewise Seas and Tempests; then to abandon *Greece*, which was then by one Consent carrying a War among the *Barbarians*. But to pass over things Fabulous and Foreign. Let us now come to our own Country, and Affairs. *Marcus Attilius Regulus*, in his second *Consulship*, when he was surpriz'd, and taken prisoner in *Affrica*, by *Xantippus* the *Lacedemonian*, a Commander under *Hamilcar* the Father of *Hannibal*; (who was then General) he was sent to the Senate, under an Oath of rendring himself again at *Carthage*, unless certain *Carthaginian Noblemen* should be releas'd in exchange. Being come to *Rome*, he had before him a fair Colour of *Profit*, but as the Story makes it out, he found it *Vain*, and *Idle*. The condition of it was, that he might stay in his Country, live at home with his Wife and Children, suffering the Calamity he was fallen into as the Common Fortune of the War, and still reteining the Honour of his *Consular Dignity*. Will any man deny these things to be *Profitable*? Or what shall we say, when *Courage*, and *Magnanimity* oppose it? What Greater Authority or Security would a man desire? For it is the Property of these Virtues not to fear any thing; to despise all accidents; and to reckon nothing Intolerable, that can befal a man. The Case of *Regulus*.

But what did he do? He came into the Senate; told them his business; but refus'd to to give his Opinion; for so long as he was under an *Oath*, he was in the Condition of a His Honour and Justice.

Priſoner to an *Enemy*, and not of a *Senator*: But (like a Fool as he was (as ſome will ſay) and one that ſtood in his own light) that which he did ſpeak was againſt himſelf: He would not allow it to be the *Roman Intereſt* to exchange their Priſoners; for the *Carthaginians* were young men (he ſaid) and good Soldiers, but himſelf waſted with Old age. His Authority prevailing, the priſoners were deteined, and himſelf return'd to *Carthage*, without any regard to the Affection he had either for his Country, or for his Friends; He was not Ignorant neither, to how cruel an Enemy, and to what exquiſite Torments he expos'd himſelf, by his Return; only he was reſolved not to violate his Oath. When they had *Tortur'd*, and *Watch'd* him even to death; his Condition was yet more Honourable, then if he had ended his days in his Own houſe; a *decrepite Captive*, and a *Forſworn Senator*. But what a Fool was he, not only not to agree to the remitting of their Priſoners, but alſo to diſſwade it? But what? ſhall we call *That*, *Fooliſh*, that conduces to the *Good* of the *Commonwealth*? Or can any thing be *Profitable* to any *Member* of the *Publique*, that is not ſo to the *Whole*? It is a Subverſion of the *Fundamentals* of *Nature*, to divide *Profit* and *Honeſty*, for we do all of us deſire that which is *Profitable*: It is an Attractive that draws us to it, whether we will or no. Is there any man that avoids it; or rather that does not vigorouſly perſue it? Put ſince *Profit* is not any where to be found, but in that which is *Praiſeworthy*, *Honourable*, and *Honeſt*,

Honeſt, therefore do we account theſe Conſiderations as moſt Noble, and Excellent; intending under the name of *Profit*, what is rather neceſſary then Spſendid.

But what is there, you'll ſay, in an *Oath?* are we afraid that *Jupiter* ſhould take offence at us? Now This is a point common to all Philoſophers, that *God* is neither *Angry* with us, nor *Hurts* us: and not only to thoſe that take God himſelf to be *Idle*, and wholly careleſs of us, but to thoſe alſo that will have God to be always in *Action*, and doing of ſomething: But what greater harm could even an Angry *Jupiter* do to *Regulus*, then *Regulus* did to *Himſelf?* So that there was nothing of *Religion* in the perverting ſo great a *Profit*. Was it leaſt he ſhould do a *mean* thing? Firſt, of *Two evils* (we know) we are to chuſe the *Leaſt*. But was That Diſhonourable Propoſition then an evil Equal to the Torment? And *then*, That of *Accius*: *Haſt thou broken thy Faith? To any man that does not believe me, I neither Have given, nor Do give it.* Now tho' this was ſpoken by a Wicked King, it was yet well enough ſaid: And moreover; as we ſay that ſome things appear *Profitable*, which are *not* ſo; ſo do they ſay on the Other ſide, that ſome things *appear Honeſt* too, which are *not* ſo: As in this caſe of *Regulus*'s returning to the *Torment*, to ſave his *Oath*: For it is rendred *Diſhonourable*, becauſe it was done under a *Force*, and by an *Enemy*, and ſo ought not to be made good. And they go farther, that whatſoever is *very Profitable*, becomes *Honeſt* upon That Conſideration, tho' it was not ſo

The Sacredneſs of an Oath.

before. This is it which is commonly urg'd aginſt *Regulus*. But let us *examin what it amounts to*. *Jupiter* was not to be fear'd, leaſt he ſhould *hurt* us in his *Anger*; becauſe he does not uſe to be either *Angry* or *Miſchievous*. This Reaſon lies as ſtrong againſt all other Oaths, as againſt This of *Regulus*. But the queſtion is not in an *Oath*, the *fear* of being *puniſh'd* for *breaking it*, but the *Conſcience* and the *Obligation of* keeping it. Now an *Oath* is a *Religious Affirmation*, and whatſoever we promiſe p. fitively, as in the preſence of *God*, we muſt keep it: for This does not concern the Anger of the Gods, which is none at all; but it belongs to *Faith*, and *Juſtice*. *It is a glorious Exclamation of* Ennius.

O Holy Faith! the Tye o'th' Gods;
And fit to have thy Manſion in their Bleſt Abodes.

He therefore that violates his *Oath*, profanes the Divinity of *Faith* it ſelf, to which our Forefathers aſcribed *Divine Honours*; placing her in the *Capitol*, as (*Cato* tells us) next unto *Jupiter himſelf*. *But even an Angry* Jupiter (you ſay) *could not have hurt* Regulus *more then he did himſelf*. That were true, if there were no Evil but *Pein*: But we have the Authority of the greateſt Philoſophers for it, that Torment is ſo far from being the *Greateſt Evil*, that it is *None at all*. And let me recommend *Regulus* to you upon This point, as no Ordinary Teſtimony; Nay, perhaps none more Convincing. For what nobler Inſtance can be deſir'd, then to ſee ſo

Pein is no Evil.

Illuſtrious

Illustrious a *Roman* subject himself voluntarily to the *Torture*, rather then forego his *Duty*? For in saying the *Least* of *Evils*, it is meant by suffering rather *Dishonorably*, then *Miserably*. Is there any *Greater Evil* then a *Shameful Dishonesty*? How offensive is it to the *Eye*, any Deformity of the Body? But how much greater then should we account the *Pravity*, and *Corruption* of a *Polluted Mind*? Wherefore they that argue these things with the greatest Generosity and Vigour, as the *Stoiques*, pronounce *That* Only to be *Evil* which is *Shameful*: Nay the *Peripatetiques* themselves (who are not so Masculine as the other) make no difficulty of unanimously pronouncing it to be the *Greatest Evil*. As for That saying, *I have neither given, nor do I give, my Faith to a Faithless man*: It was well enough said of the Poet, in the Case of *Atreus*; but [illegible]se it was accommodate to the *Person*: But [illegible] they take up This once for Granted, that a man is not oblig'd to *keep Faith* with him that has *no Faith*: let them have a Care not to make use of that Shift as a Cover for Perjury.

As to the Rights and Customs of *War*, and keeping *Faith* with an *Enemy*, they are points we must be very *Tender of*: For whatsoever we swear, upon a full Perswasion in our Minds that it ought to be done, That must be observ'd: But Otherwise, a man may dispence with that Obligation without *Perjury*. As if a man that lies at the mercy of common *Thieves*, should promise them a certain Sum of Mony for the saving of his *Life*: 'Tis no deceipt, the receding from it, tho' I had given my Oath

A Pagan Dispensation.

for the performance: for we are not to look upon *Pyrates* as *Open* and *Lawful Enemies*; but as the Common *Adverſaries* of *Mankind*. For they are a ſort of men with whom we have neither *Truſt*, nor *Oath* in Common. For *Perjury* is not the *Swearing Falſe*, but the not *performing* of That which we ſwear, with an *Intention* to do it; as may be gather'd from the very form of our Oath. It was wittily ſaid of *Euripides*, *I ſwore with my Tongue, but not with my Heart.* But it was not for *Regulus*, however to embroyle the Conditions, and Rules of *War*, with *Perjury*; having to do with a *Juſt*, and a *Lawful Enemy*; in which Caſe, all the Rights and Laws of Arms were admitted betwixt them in Common. For if it were otherwiſe, the Senate would never have ſent and deliver'd up ſo many famous men in Chains to their Enemies. Which was the Caſe of *Titus Veturius*, and *Spurius Poſthumius*, in their *Second Conſulſhips*: Who when they were beaten at *Caudium*, an our Legions diſarm'd; for concluding a Peace with the *Samnites*, were deliver'd up to them as their Priſoners, becauſe they had done it without the the *Order*, and *Conſent* of the *People*, and *Senate*. And at the ſame time *T. Numitius*, and *Q. Melius*, who were then *Tribunes* of the *Common People*, were deliver'd up likewiſe, to Evacuate the Peace concluded, becauſe it was done by Their Authority; and *Poſthumius* himſelf, that was deliver'd up was the man that adviſed and propounded it. And the ſame thing was done many years after, by *C. Mancinus*, who having made a League with the

The Rigour of the *Roman* Diſcipline.

the *Carthaginians*, without the Authority of the *Senate*, perſwaded the repreſenting of it to the People, himſelf, that he might be deliver'd up to the Enemy; which propoſition, being ſo recommended, by *L. Furius*, and *Sextus Attilius*, was accepted and he accordingly deliver'd up. This was more Honourable yet, then that of *Q. Pompeius*, who, in the ſame caſe, upon his ſupplication that ſuch a *Decree* might not be paſt againſt him, prevail'd, *and was diſcharg'd*. Here, that which ſeem'd *Profitable*, was more Conſider'd then the *Honeſt*; but in the *Other Examples*; *the falſe Appearance* of *Profit*, was overcome by a Dignity of *Honor*, and *Virtue*. But in the Caſe of *Regulus*, the Promiſe was made under a Force, and he was not oblig'd to Perform it. As if any Force could work upon the Mind of a Valiant man: Why did he go to the Senate then, expreſly to move againſt himſelf, and diſſwade the Releaſe of the Priſoners? This is to reprehend the moſt Generous point in the whole Caſe, He would not reſt upon his own Opinion; but undertook the Cauſe, that the Senate might paſs judgment upon it; wherein if he had not interpoſed, the Priſoners had been certainly reſtor'd to the *Carthaginians* and then, *Regulus* might have continu'd ſafe in his Own Country. But as he did not account that courſe *Profitable* to his *Country*, ſo he took the *Honeſter* Part, in chuſing rather to ſuffer, and undergo what he did. Now as to their ſaying that when a thing is *very Profitable*, the advantage juſtifies it, tho' it were not *Honeſt* otherwiſe: Let me tell you, that it

it muſt *Be* ſo, and not be *Made* ſo: For there is nothing *Profitable*, which is not *Honeſt*, and it is not *Honeſt*, becauſe it is *Profitable*, but it is *Profitable*, becauſe it is *Honeſt*. So that out of many Wonderful Examples, a man ſhall hardly find a greater, or a more laudable Inſtance then This. For in the whole Character of *Regulus*, the moſt Worthy and Generous part of it was his Opinion for the detaining of the Priſoners. For as to his Return, tho' we wonder at it now adays, he could not yet at That time do otherwiſe: So that it was the Glory of the *Age*, rather then of the *Man*: For our Forefathers lookt upon the Tye of an Oath as the moſt Sacred Obligation in Nature. And this we find in the *Twelve Tables*; the Laws which we call *Sacratæ*, ſhew as much: And ſo do our *Leagues*, by which we are ty'd to keep Faith, even with an Enemy; and ſo do the *Orders*, and *Penalties* of our *Cenſors*; who were not ſo ſtrict in any thing, as in the bus'neſs of an *Oath*. *Lucius Manlius* (the Son of *Aulus*) in his *Dictatorſhip* was ſummon'd by *M. Pomponius*, the *Tribune* of the *Common people*, for Exerciſing the Power of a *Dictator*, ſome days beyond his time; And was further accus'd for Baniſhing his Son *Titus* (who was afterward called *Torquatus*) out of the Town, and Commanding him to live in the Country. The Young man, hearing that his Father was in trouble about it, is ſaid to have gone preſently to *Rome*; and the next morning by day-light, to *Pomponius*'s houſe. To whom it was ſuggeſted that *Torquatus* being very Ill us'd,

The Tye of an Oath.

us'd, had probably brought him ſome Complaint againſt his Father. *Pomponius* preſently left his Bed, turn'd all people out of the Room, and ſo order'd the young man to be brought unto him. He was no ſooner in the Chamber, but *Titus* drew his Sword, and ſwore that he would immediately kill him, if he did not preſently give him his *Oath*, that his Father ſhould be diſcharg'd: *Pomponius*, upon the apprehenſion of his preſent danger, paſt his *Oath*, and afterward reported the matter to the People; telling them he was forced to deſiſt, and the reaſon of it: Whereupon *Manlius* was let go. Such a Veneration had they in thoſe times for the Tye of an Oath! This *Titus Manlius* is the man, who having kill'd a *Frenchman* in a *Duel* upon a Challenge, at the River *Anien*, and taking from him a *Chain*, which the *Latins* call *Torquis*, took the *Sirname* of *Torquatus*. In his *Third Conſulſhip* the *Latins* were routed and diſperſed at *Veſeris*, near the Mountain *Veſuvius*. He was a man of the higheſt rank of Brave men, and not more eminently Indulgent to his Father, then he was afterward ſevere to his Son.

But as *Regulus* was to be commended for keeping of his Oath. So were thoſe *Ten men* after the Battle of *Cannæ* as much to be deſpiſed. *Hannibal* ſent them to the Senate, upon an *Oath* to render themſelves again in the Camp of the *Carthaginians*, if they could not obtain ſuch an exchange of Priſoners as was propounded. But this Story is variouſly reported: *Polybius* (an Author of ſingular Credit) ſays that *Nine* of the *Ten Noblemen* that were

The Severity of the *Romans* in caſe of Perfidy.

were ſent, delivered themſelves up, without prevailing for the *Exchanges*, but that *One* of the Ten never went back again; Having Returned to the Camp, ſo ſoon as he was out of it, upon pretence that he had left ſomething behind him; by which *Return*, he would underſtand himſelf to be diſcharg'd of his Oath: But without reaſon; For the *Fraud encreaſes* the *Iniquity*, without *diſſolving* the *Perjury*. Wherefore it was a fooliſh piece of Cunning, and a moſt perverſe Imitation of Prudence. Hereupon the Senate decreed that this ſhifting Jugler ſhould be ſent bound to *Hannibal*. But the moſt glorious thing of all was This, *Hannibal* had 8000 Priſoners; not taken in the Battle, or that had run any hazzard of their Lives, but they were only ſuch as were left in the Camp, by the *Two Conſuls Paulus* and *Varro*. They might have been redeem'd for a ſmall Sum of Money; but the Senate would not agree to't: for a Leſſon to the *Roman Soldiers* that they muſt either *Conquer*, or *Die*. This reſolution being made known to *Hannibal*, went more to the heart of him then any thing elſe (as the ſame Author has it) to ſee that the Senate and People of *Rome* in their greateſt Adverſity, ſhould ſtill uphold ſo generous a Reſolution. So that things *ſeemingly Profitable* are ſtill overcome by things that are *really honeſt*. Now *Acilius* that wrote the Story in *Greek*, reports it, that there were more of them went back to *Hannibal*'s *Camp*, under the ſame Colour, to deliver themſelves from their Oath; and that they were branded for it with all ſorts of Ignominy by the

the *Cenſors*. We ſhall now put an end to This matter; for it is clear, that whatſoever is done with a Timorous, Abject, Mean, and Broken Mind, cannot be Profitable, becauſe it is Flagitious, Diſhonorable, and Shameful: as this Action of *Regulus* would have been, if he had rather conſulted his *Own Intereſt*, then that of the *Publique*, in the buſineſs of the Priſoners; or rather choſen to have ſtaid at home.

Of Temperance.

The Fourth part yet remains, conſiſting in *Decency*, *Moderation*, *Modeſty*, *Continence*, and *Temperance*. Now can any thing be *Profitable*, in oppoſition to this Catalogue of ſuch Virtues? But *Ariſtippus's Cyrenaiques*, and the *Annicerian Philoſophers* place all *Good* in *Pleaſure*, and account *Virtue* to be therefore *Laudable*, for the *Pleaſure* it produces. As theſe grew out of date, *Epicurus* came on; the Supporter, Emprover, and in a manner, the Author of the ſame Opinion. With theſe we muſt contend (as they ſay) for Life; If we are reſolv'd to defend, and to maintein the Cauſe of Honeſty: For if not only *Utility*, but all *Happineſs of Life* reſts in a *Sound Conſtitution* of *Body*, or in the ſearch and hope of ſuch a Conſtitution (as *Metrodorus* will have it) This *Utility* certainly (and in the higheſt degree too (for ſo they underſtand it) will be found to claſh with *Honeſty*. For firſt, what Province ſhall we aſſign to *Prudence*? If the ſearch and enquiry after Delights; How wretched a *thing* is *Virtue*, when it comes to ſerve *Pleaſure*? But what is the *Office* of *Prudence*? To judge learnedly of *Pleaſure*? Sup-

Suppoſe that nothing could be more *Delightful* then That: There is nothing yet to be imagin'd, that is more *Diſhonorable.* Now for him that pronounces *Pein* to be the greateſt of *Evils*; what place is there in ſuch a Mind, for *Magnanimity*, that Exerciſes it ſelf in the Contempt of *Labours*, and *Peins?* For tho' *Epicurus*, in many places ſpeaks Generouſly enough (as he does in This) of *Pein and Affliction*; We are not yet ſo much to conſider what he ſays, as what may be Reaſonable for him to ſay, upon the Foundation of Terminating all *Good* and *Ill*, in *Pleaſure* and *Pein:* As to hear him now ſpeak of *Continence* and *Temperance*; he ſays many very good things in ſeveral places; but yet he's gravell'd; (as we ſay) for how can any man commend *Temperance*; and yet place our *Chiefeſt Good*, in *Pleaſure?* For *Temperance* is the *Enemy* of *Senſual Pleaſures*, and our *Appetites* are the *Servants*, and *Followers* of them. And yet in theſe Three kinds, they ſhuffle as well as they can, and their Evaſions are not without ſome Colour. They make *Prudence* to be the skill of ſupplying or procuring *Pleaſures*, and keeping away *Peins:* And then they make a ſhift too, to acquit themſelves in the point of *Fortitude:* which they ſay enables us to contemn *Death*, and to endure *Pein.* And in ſpeaking of *Temperance*; tho' they are not clear, yet they extricate themſelves after a faſhion; for they ſay that the *Greatneſs* of *Pleaſure* ariſes only from an *Abſence* or *Detraction* of *Pein.* And as for *Juſtice*, it is with Them, either *Tottering*, or rather *Groveling* upon the *Ground*; and ſo

Epicurus places Good and Ill in Pleaſure and Pein.

are

are all thoſe Virtues that are exercis'd in Common, and in the Society of Mankind. For there can neither be any Goodneſs, Liberality, or Gentleneſs (any more then Friendſhip) if theſe things be not deſirable for *Themſelves*; or elſe deſirable only in relation to *Pleaſure*, and *Profit*. But let us bring the matter into a Narrow Compaſs: For, as we have laid it down that nothing can be *Profitable*, in Oppoſition to *Honeſty*, ſo we do here affirm that all Pleaſure is directly Contrary to it. Concerning which point, I reckon *Calliphon*, and *Dinomachus* to be the more to blame, in thinking to put an end to this Controverſie, by coupling *Pleaſure*, with *Honeſty*, as if it were a *Man*, with a *Beaſt*. Whereas Virtue does not admit of That Coujunction, but deſpiſes and rejects it. And then for the end of *Good* and *Evil men*, which muſt be *Simple*; it cannot be *Temper'd*, and *Compounded* of *diſagreeing things*. But of This elſewhere more at large: And it is a weighty bus'neſs. But To my purpoſe now in hand. Concerning any matter to be determin'd in the Caſe of a *Concurrent Oppoſition* betwixt *Profit*, and *Honeſty*, we have ſaid enough already. But if *Pleaſure* ſhall be ſaid to carry ſome ſhew of *Profit* alſo, there can be no Conjunction of it with Honeſty. For allowing the moſt we can to *Pleaſure*, it does but ſerve us for *Sawce*, without any Profit in it at all.

IN This Book (my Son *Marcus*) your Father makes you a *Preſent*; in *My Opinion* a *Great* one; but it is to *You* according as you *Take* it. And yet however, you may allow Theſe

These Three Books of Mine, an Entertainment in your Study, among the Commentaries of *Cratippus.* If I my self had come to *Athens* (as I had done, if my Country had not Commanded me back, even when I was half way thorough) you should sometimes have been your Fathers Disciple too. So that I am now fain to speak to you in these Writings. Bestow as much of your time upon them as you can; and what you have a mind to do, you may do. When I shall understand that This Study pleases you, I hope it will not be long before I be with you my self. And however, at this distance, though in absence, I shall still be speaking to you. Wherefore My *Cicero* farewel: And assure your self that you are exceeding dear to me; And yet much dearer you will be, if I shall find that you take delight in these Memorials, and Precepts.

THE END.